Essays on Intellectual Property Protection and Product Standards in the Global Economy by Geng, Difei
ESSAYS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND PRODUCT 
STANDARDS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
 
By 
Difei Geng 
 
Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
Economics 
August, 2016 
Nashville, Tennessee 
 
 
 
Approved: 
Kamal Saggi, Ph.D. 
Eric W. Bond, Ph.D. 
Joel Rodrigue, Ph.D. 
Ping Lin, Ph.D. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my grandmother Keyun Sun  
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
I am profoundly indebted to my advisor Kamal Saggi who has provided enormous guidance 
and support for my research projects. What I learned from him about economic analysis is an 
invaluable asset to my career in the future. I am greatly thankful for members of my dissertation 
committee including Eric Bond, Joel Rodrigue and Ping Lin. Their comments and suggestions 
have substantially improved the quality of my dissertation research. 
I also benefited from discussions with Mario Crucini, Jennifer Reinganum, Andrew 
Daughety, Andrew Horowitz, Raja Kali, Devashish Mitra, Georg Schaur, Walter Park, Larry Qiu, 
Hongbin Cai, Kanda Naknoi and others too numerous to mention. Comments and feedbacks from 
participants in various seminar presentations are kindly acknowledged. 
Last but not least, my sincere gratitude goes to my family, especially my parents Sen Geng 
and Fugui Zhang, my parents-in-law Shaozhou Li and Yuzhen Cheng, and my wife Ziwei Li. Their 
complete understanding and unconditional support are indispensable to the accomplishment of this 
dissertation.  
 
  
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... vii 
Chapter 
I. Is There a Case for Non-discrimination in the International Protection of Intellectual 
Property?........................................................................................................................................... 1  
Introduction .................................................................................................................................1 
Baseline Model............................................................................................................................8 
Effects of NT in the Absence of Trade Frictions ......................................................................13 
      Discriminatory Patent Protection .........................................................................................13 
      Patent Protection Under NT .................................................................................................19 
NT in the Presence of Trade Frictions ......................................................................................22 
      Trade Frictions and Discrimination .....................................................................................22 
      Effective Patent Protection ..................................................................................................27 
      Social Welfare ......................................................................................................................28 
Further Analysis ........................................................................................................................33 
      NT in a North-South World .................................................................................................33 
      Trade Barriers and Patent Protection ...................................................................................41 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................44 
 
II. International Agreements on Product Standards Under Consumption Externalities: National 
Treatment Versus Mutual Recognition .....................................................................................47 
Introduction ...............................................................................................................................47 
Related Literature ......................................................................................................................54 
 v 
Model ........................................................................................................................................56 
Coordination over Product Standards .......................................................................................62 
      Optimal Product Standards .................................................................................................62 
      Welfare Analysis .................................................................................................................68 
      Global Externalities .............................................................................................................74 
Non-cooperative Product Standards ..........................................................................................76 
      Nash Equilibrium ................................................................................................................76 
      Welfare Analysis .................................................................................................................84 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................89 
 
III.The Nature of Innovative Activity and the Protection of Intellectual Property in Asia ...........91 
Introduction ...............................................................................................................................91 
The Protection of Intellectual Property in the Global Economy Post TRIPS ...........................93 
      Patent Applications and Grants ...........................................................................................94 
Patenting Activity Within BRICs..............................................................................................97 
      Outward Orientation of Patenting: A Measure of Quality ..................................................99 
Trends in Filings and Grants of Other Types of IPRs .............................................................101 
      Industrial Designs .............................................................................................................101 
      Utility Models ...................................................................................................................103 
      Trademarks ........................................................................................................................105 
Other Evidence on Innovation ................................................................................................107 
Evidence on the Economic Effects of TRIPS Mandated Reforms .........................................111 
Asian Emergence and the Current Policy Environment .........................................................115 
Concluding Remarks ...............................................................................................................118 
 
Appendix 
A.1 Proofs from Chapter 1 ..........................................................................................................120 
A.2 Proofs from Chapter 2 ..........................................................................................................123 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................128 
 vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table                                                                                                                                            Page 
I.1 Equilibrium Patent Protection and Welfare in a North-South World .......................................37 
 
III.1 Ginarte-Park Index, 1995-2010 .............................................................................................93 
III.2 Patent Applications Filed Abroad by Residents ..................................................................100 
III.3 National R&D Productivity and Efficiency .........................................................................108 
 
A.1 Expressions for the Thresholds of 𝜃 and 𝑠 ............................................................................123 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure                                                                                                                                          Page 
I.1 Discrimination Versus NT: How Trade Openness Matters ......................................................36 
I.2 Comparison When Market Size Differs Across Countries .......................................................39 
I.3 Welfare Difference with Asymmetric Human Capital Stocks .................................................40 
I.4 Welfare Difference with Asymmetric Market Sizes and Human Capital Stocks .....................41 
 
II.1 Optimal Product Standards and World Welfare Under Policy Coordination .........................67 
II.2 Effectiveness of NT Relative to MR Under Policy Coordination ...........................................71 
II.3 Effectiveness of NT Relative to MR Under Nash Equilibrium ..............................................87 
 
III.1 Resident Share of Patent Applications ...................................................................................97 
III.2 Patent Applications in BRICs ................................................................................................98 
III.3 Geographic Variation in Industrial Design Applications.....................................................102 
III.4 Geographic Variation in Trademark Applications ...............................................................106 
III.5 Intensity of R&D in Asian Countries...................................................................................107 
III.6 Nature of Innovation: Patents Relative to Utility Models ...................................................110 
III.7 Nature of Innovation: Patents Relative to Industrial Designs ..............................................111 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER I 
IS THERE A CASE FOR NON-DISCRIMINATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? 
Introduction 
The agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) was easily the 
most controversial outcome of the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations (1986-95). 
Due to this far-reaching agreement, all WTO members - regardless of their economic status and/or 
innovative capabilities - are obligated to adopt certain minimum standards of protection for all 
major types of intellectual property such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks.1 For example, 
TRIPS mandates that the duration of patent protection granted by WTO members must be at least 
20 years. In addition to such harmonization, an equally important aspect of TRIPS is that it requires 
intellectual property policies of WTO members to abide by certain fundamental principles, such 
as non-discrimination.2 The non-discrimination requirement in TRIPS manifests itself in two 
forms: the principle of national treatment (NT) that forbids discrimination between domestic and 
foreign firms/nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property and the most favored 
nation (MFN) clause that prohibits discrimination between foreign nationals originating from 
different countries.3 
                                                        
1 See Maskus (2000) for a comprehensive discussion of the economics of intellectual property rights 
protection in the global economy and the international externalities that a multilateral agreement such as 
TRIPS attempts to internalize. 
2 To be sure, the principle of non-discrimination predates TRIPS but historical international intellectual 
property treaties (such as the Paris and Berne conventions) were not backed by a powerful dispute 
settlement procedure like the one that is available to WTO members today. 
3 The NT requirement is specified in Article 3 of TRIPS which says that “each Member shall accord to the 
nationals of other Members treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard 
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Our primary objective in this chapter is to evaluate the case for NT in the protection of 
intellectual property. At first glance, the inclusion of NT in TRIPS seems hardly worthy of 
discussion; after all, NT is a central principle of all other multilateral agreements of the WTO. So 
why should TRIPS be any different? Nevertheless, we show in this work that the desirable 
properties of NT in the context of trade in goods and services do not automatically carry over to 
the domain of intellectual property. To investigate the economic effects of requiring countries to 
follow NT in the protection of intellectual property, we utilize an adapted version of the Grossman 
and Lai (2004) model of international patent protection and innovation.4 Our conceptual approach 
is straightforward and informative: we simply compare equilibrium outcomes and welfare in the 
absence of NT with those obtained in its presence. While our model focuses on patent policy, the 
insights it yields should also be relevant for other instruments of intellectual property protection 
such as copyrights and trademarks. 
In accordance with Article 3 of TRIPS, Grossman and Lai (2004) focus on non-discriminatory 
patent policies and show two major results. First, countries tend to offer too little patent protection 
in an open economy setting. Second, the harmonization of patent protection across countries is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving efficiency since it does not address the underlying 
problem of under-protection. In the present chapter, we build on their insights by examining the 
implications of the non-discrimination constraint on national patent policies imposed by NT 
thereby adding to our understanding of the economic consequences of TRIPS.5 
                                                        
to the protection of intellectual property.” MFN is contained in Article 4 which says that “any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.” These twin principles of non-
discrimination are found in some shape or form in every multilateral trade agreement of the WTO. 
4 Their work builds on Nordhaus (1969) who first addressed the question of optimal patent policy in a 
closed economy. 
5 In Grossman and Lai (2004) as well as in our model, all innovation is conducted by the private sector. See 
Scotchmer (2004) for an analysis of intellectual property treaties in a model where R&D is conducted by 
both the private and the public sector. 
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Issues surrounding the international protection of intellectual property have often been 
examined in the literature through the lens of North-South models of international trade and 
endogenous innovation. 6  While these models provide important insights, they do not derive 
optimal patent policies: instead they either consider the effects of marginal changes in an 
exogenously given rate of Southern imitation or examine policies that, on the margin, lower 
incentives for (endogenous) imitation. Thus, by design, they do not address the implications of 
core TRIPS principles such as NT for equilibrium patent policies and welfare. 
While little is known about how NT operates in the context of intellectual property, the effects 
of non-discrimination in the use of domestic tax instruments such as sales taxes are fairly well-
understood in the literature. Horn (2006) makes the important point that while NT with respect to 
internal taxes and other such domestic instruments can prevent countries from pursuing legitimate 
objectives, trade agreements that do not contain such a clause can be easily subverted by national 
governments who have an incentive to favor domestic firms over foreign ones. Thus, according to 
this view, NT serves as a line of defense against beggar-thy-neighbor tendencies of individual 
nations.7 
Horn’s (2006) basic query is no less relevant in the realm of intellectual property: when and 
why does it make sense to constrain national policies in the manner specified by NT? To be sure, 
incentives to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor policies are pervasive in the context of intellectual 
property.8 After all, a major reason the US and, to a lesser extent, the EU pushed hard for a 
                                                        
6 Much of this literature follows Grossman and Helpman (1991) who provide a comprehensive and unified 
treatment of the two leading approaches - i.e. the variety expansion model and the quality ladders model. 
Further building on this work, Helpman (1993) analyzes how a decline in Southern imitation affects global 
welfare both in the steady state and during the transition path. 
7 Saggi and Sara (2008) take Horn’s analysis further by studying the role of NT when countries are 
heterogeneous in market size and/or the quality of goods produced and the mutual agreement over NT is 
endogenously determined. Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010) examine the role of NT from the perspective 
of incomplete contracts. 
8 Lerner (2002) notes that prior to the emergence of major international agreements on intellectual property, 
discrimination against foreign patent applications was quite common during the mid-19th century across 
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multilateral agreement on intellectual property during the Uruguay round negotiations was that 
major developing economies such as Brazil, China, and India were offering little or no intellectual 
property protection to their firms, a policy environment that fostered widespread imitation and 
reverse-engineering of Western technologies by local firms in such countries. But does the 
presence of such beggar-thy-neighbor incentives necessarily generate a rationale for non-
discrimination in the protection of intellectual property? Our analysis below shows that it does not. 
Our baseline model considers a world of two countries and analyzes the effects of NT when 
trade between them is not subject to any frictions or barriers. Somewhat expectedly, we find that 
in the absence of a NT requirement, each country finds it optimal to grant weaker protection to 
foreign firms relative to domestic ones. This discrimination arises because governments do not 
care about the effects of their policies on the profits earned by foreign firms. However, we show 
that discrimination against foreign firms on the part of both countries does not have any welfare 
consequences. To understand the intuition for this surprising result, first note that a firm’s incentive 
for innovation depends upon the level of effective global protection available to it under alternative 
policy regimes, where the level of effective global protection is defined as a weighted sum of the 
patent protection granted by each country, with a country’s weight being equal to its market size. 
The reason NT fails to generate any welfare improvement under free trade in our model is that 
what each firm gains in terms of higher patent protection abroad if discrimination is replaced by 
NT is exactly offset by what it loses at home so that the effective global protection facing firms 
remains unchanged. 
In Section 4, we show that this invariance of innovation incentives and welfare to NT does 
not obtain in the presence of trade frictions. When international trade is subject to frictions - such 
                                                        
the world. Discriminatory measures used against foreigners included shorter duration of patents, higher 
fees, shorter extensions, and premature patent expirations. See also Goldstein (2001). 
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as transportation and/or communication costs - NT lowers innovation incentives by reducing the 
effective global protection enjoyed by firms. The intuition for this result is as follows. While trade 
frictions lower export profits and make foreign patent protection relatively less important for 
incentivizing innovation in each country, NT actually calls for each country to provide more of 
such protection rather than less. From the viewpoint of firms, in the presence of trade frictions 
favorable discrimination granted at home in the absence of NT more than offsets the negative 
incentive effects of unfavorable discrimination suffered abroad. Consumer welfare considerations 
reinforce the argument in favor of discrimination: due to trade frictions, the consumer surplus 
obtained by each country from foreign innovations is smaller than that obtained from domestic 
ones.9 Indeed, we show that for any positive level of trade frictions, it is actually jointly optimal to 
have each country offer a lower level of patent protection to foreign firms relative to domestic 
ones, a policy configuration precluded by NT. 
We also find that a reduction in trade frictions reduces each country’s incentive to 
discriminate against foreigners since domestic consumers derive greater benefits from foreign 
innovations when trade is freer. This result points to a potential synergy between the acceptance 
of international disciplines on intellectual property and the degree of trade liberalization in the 
global economy. It is worth noting here that TRIPS agreement followed almost five decades of 
multilateral trade liberalization achieved over eight separate rounds of trade negotiations 
conducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As is well 
known, pre-TRIPS rounds of GATT negotiations were successful in lowering the average global 
tariff on industrial goods from over 40% to under 4% (Bagwell and Staiger, 2002). Our analysis 
suggests that such multilateral trade liberalization during GATT years may have helped pave the 
                                                        
9  The empirical link between the protection of intellectual property and the volume and pattern of 
international trade was first established by Maskus and Penubarti (2001). See Maskus and Yang (2013) for 
a more recent investigation of related issues. 
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way for TRIPS by making international disciplines on intellectual property more palatable to 
countries. 
Our analysis also shows that differences in market size across countries affects incentives for 
discrimination in somewhat surprising ways. An important result in this regard is that if the market 
size of a country increases relative to the other, its incentive to discriminate against foreign firms 
declines while its level of patent protection increases. Intuitively, as a country’s market size 
increases, its weight in determining the level of effective global protection increases as does the 
benefit it enjoys from foreign innovations. Indeed, if one country becomes arbitrarily large relative 
to the other, its incentives for patent protection essentially converge to those of a closed economy 
since foreign consumers become a negligible part of the calculus determining optimal patent 
policies. 
Our result that a larger market has a weaker incentive to discriminate against foreign nationals 
seems to accord quite well with the fact that, during the Uruguay round, multilateral disciplines on 
intellectual property were pushed strongly by the two largest economies in the world (i.e. the US 
and the EU). From the perspective of these economies, TRIPS was primarily a means for getting 
developing countries to accept disciplines such as NT and MFN along with an increase in the 
degree of intellectual property protection that they had to extend to innovators. Furthermore, the 
model also clarifies that small developing countries not only have a weaker incentive to protect 
intellectual property because their own markets are too small to affect global innovation, they also 
lose more from having to follow the non-discrimination principle of NT. In this regard, it is 
noteworthy that in accordance with the general principle of special and differential treatment at 
the WTO, when TRIPS was ratified in 1995, developing countries were given an additional five 
years to achieve TRIPS compliance while the least-developed countries had until 2006 to do so, 
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which was then further extended to 2013 in general, and to 2016 for the enforcement of 
pharmaceutical patents and laws applying to trade secrets. 
Since an increase in market size asymmetry reduces the degree of discrimination in the larger 
market while it raises it in the smaller market, the average degree of discrimination declines in our 
model as markets become more unequal in size. For analogous reasons, the degree of effective 
global protection increases with market size asymmetry. Both of these factors imply that the global 
welfare loss generated by NT declines as markets become more asymmetric in size. This aspect of 
our model contrasts sharply with analyses of international trade agreements over conventional 
policy instruments such as tariffs and internal taxes since coordination over these traditional 
instruments as well as non-discrimination requirements with respect to their use generally become 
harder to implement as countries become less similar to each other - see, for example, Park (2000), 
Horn (2006), and Sara and Saggi (2008). In such models, as a country gets larger (i.e. has more 
market power) it tends to typically increase its tariff or tax but such a change immiserizes the other 
country. By contrast, in the present context, as the larger country increases its patent protection 
and lowers its discrimination against foreign firms, the smaller country’s welfare increases as does 
its ability to lower its own protection since innovation incentives of firms depend only on the 
effective global protection that they receive, and not on its composition across countries. Thus, the 
type of international spillovers that an international agreement over intellectual property helps 
internalize are fundamentally different in character from those internalized by trade agreements 
over tariffs and other trade policies.10 However, the different nature of spillovers in the context of 
patent protection is not the key driving force behind our surprising findings. Positive international 
spillovers created by patent protection only imply that there exists global under-protection of 
                                                        
10 Bagwell and Staiger (1999 and 2002) argue that the GATT/WTO principles of MFN and reciprocity help 
achieve efficiency when international trade agreements are motivated by the presence of terms of trade 
externalities between countries. 
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patents. The key reason discriminatory patent policies dominate NT in the presence of trade 
frictions is that such frictions make each country’s innovation relatively less responsive to foreign 
patent protection and by forcing each country to offer the same level of protection to domestic and 
foreign firms, NT reduces the overall effectiveness of patent protection as an instrument for 
encouraging innovation. 
Our work echoes an emerging empirical literature that examines how effectively countries 
practice non-discriminatory IPR policies during the post-TRIPS era. Rather surprisingly, existing 
evidence suggests that even WTO members tend to discriminate against foreign innovators in 
practice. For example, Webster et. al. (2014) find that, all else equal, both European and Japanese 
patent offices are more likely to grant patents to domestic applicants relative to foreign ones. In 
similar vein, using data for Canada, Mai and Stoyanov (2014) find that Canadian firms are 
substantially more likely to win court cases when the dispute involves foreign firms as opposed to 
other Canadian firms. Consistent with these empirical findings, our work shows that countries 
indeed have incentives to use discriminatory patent policies in the absence of NT. More 
importantly, our work establishes that the use of such discriminatory patent policies can be 
welfare-enhancing relative to NT when international trade is subject to frictions.11 
Baseline Model 
To study NT in the international protection of intellectual property, we utilize the two-sector 
model of ongoing innovation developed by Grossman and Lai (2004). Before describing policy 
choices, we summarize the underlying economic environment. The world consists of two 
                                                        
11 Lai (2007) also examines incentives for discriminatory patent policies in the absence of NT. However, 
he only considers a world of free trade and does not analyze how innovation and welfare differ across the 
two types of patent regimes (i.e. discrimination and NT). 
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countries: Home (𝐻)  and Foreign (𝐹) . In each country, a traditional sector produces a 
homogeneous good (which serves as the numeraire) while a modern sector produces a variety of 
differentiated goods. The representative consumer maximizes her lifetime utility 
 𝑈(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑧𝑢(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∞
𝑡
, (I.1) 
where 𝜌 is the subjective discount rate and 𝑢(·) is the instantaneous utility function given by 
 𝑢(𝑧) = 𝑦(𝑧) + ∫ ℎ(𝑥(𝑖, 𝑧))𝑑𝑖
𝑛(𝑧)
0
, (I.2) 
where 𝑦(𝑧) and 𝑥(𝑖, 𝑧) represent respectively the consumptions of the homogeneous good and the 
ith differentiated good at time 𝑧 and 𝑛(𝑧) denotes the measure of differentiated goods that are still 
alive at time 𝑧 . As in Grossman and Lai (2004), the function ℎ(∙) is assumed to satisfy the 
following regularity conditions (i) ℎ′ > 0 and ℎ′ < 0; (ii) every variety of differentiated goods is 
purchased in equilibrium (i.e. ℎ′(0) = ∞ ); and (iii) optimal monopoly price of a typical 
differentiated good is finite (i.e. −𝑥ℎ′′/ℎ′ < 1). 
Given the preferences in Eqs. (I.1) and (I.2), the representative consumer first chooses the 
consumption of differentiated goods and then purchases the homogeneous good with the remainder 
of her income (which is assumed to be positive). There are 𝑀𝑖  consumers in country 𝑖, where 𝑖 =
𝐻, 𝐹, so that 𝑀𝑖 measures country 𝑖’s market size for differentiated goods. 
There are two factors of production: capital (𝐾) and labor (𝐿). The amount of labor needed 
to produce one unit of the numeraire or that of a typical differentiated good in country 𝑖 equals 𝑎𝑖. 
The total labor resource in country 𝑖, 𝐿𝑖 , is assumed to be sufficiently large so that a positive 
amount of the numeraire good is produced in equilibrium in each country. Since the market for the 
numeraire good is assumed to be perfectly competitive, the wage rate in country 𝑖 simply equals 
the marginal product of labor in the traditional sector: i.e. 𝑤𝑖 = 1/𝑎𝑖. 
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Prior to being produced, a differentiated good must be first invented by R&D which requires 
a combination of labor (𝐿) and human capital (𝐾). For simplicity, the research technology in 
country 𝑖 is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form 
 𝜙𝑖(𝑧) = 𝐴[𝐿𝐼𝑖(𝑧)/𝑎𝑖]
𝛼(𝐾𝑖)
1−𝛼, (I.3) 
where 𝜙𝑖(𝑧) is the flow of innovations at time 𝑧, 𝐴 > 0 is a constant, 𝐿𝐼𝑖(𝑧) is the labor allocated 
to innovation, 𝑎𝑖  represents labor productivity, and 𝐾𝑖  represents the fixed stock of human 
capital.12 
A differentiated good has a finite life span (𝜏) during which it generates positive utility for 
consumers. At the end of its life span, a differentiated good produces zero utility for consumers 
and is therefore no longer produced. Given the technology specified for innovation in Eq. (I.3), 
during each time period 𝑧, 𝜙𝑖(𝑧) + 𝜙𝑗(𝑧) newly invented goods enter country 𝑖’s market while a 
measure of 𝜙𝑖(𝑧 − 𝜏̅) + 𝜙𝑗(𝑧 − 𝜏̅) existing goods die and exit the market. As a result, the growth 
in the measure of differentiated good at a given point in time is ?̇?𝑖 = 𝜙𝑖(𝑧) − 𝜙𝑖(𝑧 − 𝜏̅) + 𝜙𝑗(𝑧) −
𝜙𝑗(𝑧 − 𝜏̅). We focus on the steady state of the world economy where the measure of differentiated 
good in both markets remains constant over time, i.e. ?̇?𝑖 = 0. 
After it has been invented, a differentiated good can be targeted by imitators. To protect 
differentiated goods from imitation, the government in each country grants patent rights to 
inventing firms. While the patent is in effect, the patenting firm charges its optimal monopoly price. 
Let 𝜋 be the instantaneous per capita profit of a monopolist producing a patented differentiated 
                                                        
12 Our major results continue to hold when the production function for research has a CES form of the type 
𝜙𝑖(𝑧) = 𝐴{𝛼 [
𝐿𝐼𝑖(𝑧)
𝑎𝑖
]
𝛽
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝐾𝑖
𝛽}1/𝛽  with 𝛽 ≤ 0 . As is well-known, the Cobb-Douglas production 
function obtains when 𝛽 = 0. In the more general CES case, the assumption that𝛽 ≤ 0 has two implications. 
First, the responsiveness of innovation to patent protection decreases as the latter rises. Second, patent 
protection policies of different countries are strategic substitutes for one another. We consider both these 
features to be quite realistic. 
 11 
good so that 𝜋 = (𝑝𝑚 − 𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑖)𝑥𝑚 where 𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑖 = 1. Let the index of patent protection be defined 
as 
 𝛺 = (1 − 𝑒−𝜌𝜏)/𝜌 ,  (I.4) 
where ρ is the rate of time preference.13 By design, the present value of expected per capita profits 
from patenting a newly invented good equals 𝛺𝜋. After the expiration of its patent, a differentiated 
good can be imitated free of cost. Imitation drives the price of the good to its competitive level so 
that the post-imitation profits of an innovator equal zero. 
When analyzing optimal patent protection, Grossman and Lai (2004) focus on policies that 
abide by the non-discrimination principle of NT. As we noted earlier, Article 3 of TRIPS indeed 
requires countries to extend the same patent protection to all firms regardless of their national 
origin. One of our key objectives, however, is to examine the implications of the constraint that 
NT places on the patent policies of individual nations. To do so, we allow countries to discriminate 
between domestic and foreign firms by formulating and implementing patent protection policies 
that depend upon the national origin of firms. Accordingly, let country 𝑖 extend patent protection 
𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑅 to domestic firms and 𝛺𝑖𝑗
𝑅  to foreign ones under regime R, where 𝑅 = 𝐷 (discrimination) or 
𝑁𝑇 and 𝛺𝑖𝑖 = 𝛺𝑖𝑗 under 𝑁𝑇. 
Under regime 𝑅 , a firm from country 𝑖  that is successful in innovation earns total profit 
𝜋𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑅 in the home market and 𝜋𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
𝑅 overseas. The value of a typical innovating firm from 
country 𝑖 therefore equals 𝑣𝑖
𝑅 = (𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑅 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
𝑅)𝜋. Firms make decisions about their labor inputs 
                                                        
13 In Grossman and Lai (2004) a patent is assumed to have two dimensions: length 𝜏 and the degree of 
enforcement 𝜔 where 𝜔 ∈ [0,1]. But since 𝜔 plays no role in our analysis that is separate from patent 
length, we normalize 𝜔 to 1. 
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for R&D based on their expected total profits in the global market. The first-order condition 
determining demand for labor in country 𝑖 under regime 𝑅 where 𝑅 = 𝐷 or 𝑁𝑇 is 
 𝑣𝑖
𝑅 =
𝐹𝑖(𝐿𝐼𝑖, 𝐾𝑖)
𝐿𝐼𝑖
= 𝑤𝑖.  
Let 𝐶𝑚 and 𝐶𝑐 be the instantaneous (per capita) consumer surplus levels under monopoly and 
competition respectively, i.e. 𝐶𝑚 = ℎ(𝑥𝑚) − 𝑝𝑚𝑥𝑚  and 𝐶𝑐 = ℎ(𝑥𝑐) − 𝑝𝑐𝑥𝑐 . Let ?̅? = (1 −
𝑒−𝜌?̅?)/𝜌 be the present value of a 1 dollar flow over the entire useful life of a typical patented 
product. Then, the present value of surplus enjoyed by a typical consumer in country 𝑖 over the 
entire life of a domestic differentiated product can be written as 
 𝐶𝑚𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑅 + 𝐶𝑐(?̅? − 𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑅)  
and that derived from a foreign differentiated good as 
 𝐶𝑚𝛺𝑖𝑗
𝑅 + 𝐶𝑐(?̅? − 𝛺𝑖𝑗
𝑅 ).  
Let 𝛬₀ denote the welfare derived from goods invented prior to the implementation of the 
patent policy. We may then write country 𝑖’s national welfare under regime 𝑅 where 𝑅 = 𝐷 or 𝑁𝑇, 
as 
 
𝑊𝑖
𝑅 = 𝛬0 +
𝑤𝑖
𝜌
(𝐿𝑖 − 𝐿𝐼𝑖
𝑅 ) +
𝑀𝑖𝜙𝑖
𝑅
𝜌
[𝐶𝑚𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑅 + 𝐶𝑐(?̅? − 𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑅)] +
𝑀𝑖𝜙𝑗
𝑅
𝜌
[𝐶𝑚𝛺𝑖𝑗
𝑅 +
𝐶𝑐(?̅? − 𝛺𝑖𝑗
𝑅 )] +
𝜋𝜙𝑖
𝑅
𝜌
(𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑅 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
𝑅).  
(I.5) 
Similarly, let aggregate world welfare be defined simply as the sum of national welfare of each 
country 
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 𝑊𝑊
𝑅 = ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑅
𝑖
.       (I.6) 
We proceed by deriving equilibrium policies under discrimination and then impose the NT 
constraint on each country to see how it affects equilibrium policies and welfare. It is obvious that, 
in our model, the unilateral imposition of NT on a country can only make it worse off since even 
in the absence of NT it can always choose not to discriminate if it is welfare-maximizing to do so. 
But the more subtle issue, and the one that we address below, is how the simultaneous adoption of 
NT by both countries affects market outcomes and welfare. 
Effects of NT in the Absence of Trade Frictions 
We begin with the scenario where international trade is not subject to any frictions or barriers. 
An important implication of this assumption is that from a social welfare perspective, patent 
protection abroad is just as valuable to firms as patent protection in their domestic markets. In 
Section 4, we will show that the introduction of trade frictions breaks this equivalence which, in 
turn, has implications for equilibrium policies and welfare under the two types of patent regimes. 
Discriminatory Patent Protection 
In what follows, we derive the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium where each country 
simultaneously and independently determines its domestic and foreign patent protections, treating 
these protections in the other country as given. The objective of each government is to maximize 
national welfare. In particular, we assume interior solutions for both the NT and discrimination 
regimes, meaning that patent protections implemented by governments lie strictly between 0 and 
?̅?. 
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Let us first consider the case where countries are free to implement discriminatory patent 
policies. Following Grossman and Lai (2004), it turns out to be more intuitive to derive the best 
response curves of countries by equating each country’s marginal benefit of patent protection to 
the associated marginal cost, taking the policies of the other country as given. 
Consider the patent policies of country 𝑖. A marginal increase in its domestic protection 𝛺𝑖𝑖 
raises the value of all domestic innovators by extending their monopoly tenures. This leads to more 
R&D investment and a greater variety of differentiated goods invented by such firms. Each new 
differentiated good generates a discounted per-consumer surplus of  
1
𝜌
[𝐶𝑚𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑅 + 𝐶𝑐(?̅? − 𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑅)] over its lifetime. It follows that country 𝑖’s marginal benefit of domestic 
protection 𝛺𝑖𝑖 is  
 
𝑀𝑖
𝜌
𝜕𝜙𝑖
𝐷
𝜕𝛺𝑖𝑖
[𝐶𝑚𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝑐(?̅? − 𝛺𝑖𝑖)] (I.7) 
where 
𝜕𝜙𝑖
𝐷
𝜕𝛺𝑖𝑖
 represents the response of local innovation to a small change in domestic patent 
protection. 
In the Appendix, we show that 
 
𝜕𝜙𝑖
𝐷
𝜕𝛺𝑖𝑖
=
𝛾𝜙𝑖
𝐷𝑀𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
  
where 𝛾 =
𝛼
1−𝛼
 represents the responsiveness of innovation to the value of an innovation in 
elasticity form. Plugging this expression into Eq. (I.7), one obtains the following expression for 
country 𝑖’s marginal benefit of raising domestic protection 
 15 
 1
𝜌
𝛾𝜙𝑖
𝐷𝑀𝑖
2
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
[𝐶𝑚𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝑐(?̅? − 𝛺𝑖𝑖)]. (I.8) 
On the other hand, a marginal increase in domestic patent protection allows all existing 
innovators to charge monopoly prices for a longer time period. This causes a loss of consumer 
surplus, which is partially offset by the greater monopoly profits accruing to domestic innovators. 
Since 𝜙𝑖
𝐷  new goods are invented per unit of time, country 𝑖 ’s discounted marginal cost of 
domestic patent protection 𝛺𝑖𝑖 equals 
 
𝑀𝑖𝜙𝑖
𝐷(𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋)
𝜌
. (I.9) 
Equating the marginal benefit (I.8) of domestic patent protection 𝛺𝑖𝑖 to its marginal cost (I.9) 
and rearranging terms gives the first order condition determining 𝛺𝑖𝑖
14 
 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 =
𝛾𝑀𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝑐?̅?]. (I.10) 
Eq. (I.10) describes country 𝑖 ’s best response 𝛺𝑖𝑖  to the degree of patent protection that 
country 𝑗 extends to country 𝑖 (𝛺𝑗𝑖). It is easy to see from Eq. (I.10) that since 𝐶𝑚 < 𝐶𝑐, 𝛺𝑖𝑖 is a 
decreasing function of 𝛺𝑗𝑖: country 𝑖 finds it optimal to lower the patent protection that it grants to 
local innovating firms if they receive more protection from country 𝑗. The intuition behind this is 
straightforward. An increase in 𝛺𝑗𝑖 increases the value of innovation made by country 𝑖’s firms 
and thereby encourages them to invest more in R&D. However, due to diminishing returns in R&D, 
country 𝑖’s marginal benefit of extending patent protection to its own firms is lower when 𝛺𝑗𝑖 is 
                                                        
14 The second-order conditions can be shown to hold for both countries. 
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larger. As a result, 𝛺𝑖𝑖 has to fall in order to bring the marginal benefit back to the level of the 
marginal cost, namely, 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋. This implies that 𝛺𝑖𝑖 and 𝛺𝑗𝑖 are substitutable patent policies. 
Observe from (I.10) that in the absence of NT, changing country 𝑗’s domestic protection 
𝛺𝑗𝑗  has no direct effect on country 𝑖’s decision regarding its domestic protection 𝛺𝑖𝑖. This is not 
the case under NT, since a country cannot choose its domestic and foreign patent policies 
separately. 
Following the above logic, the best response curve for country 𝑖’s foreign protection, 𝛺𝑖𝑗, can 
be obtained as 
 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 =
𝛾𝑀𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑗 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑐?̅?]. (I.11) 
It is important to note from this first order condition that country 𝑖 ’s marginal cost of 
strengthening its foreign protection 𝛺𝑖𝑗  is not mitigated by 𝜋 , because the monopoly profits 
generated by extending such patent protection accrue to foreign firms. It follows that a country’s 
marginal cost of foreign patent protection is necessarily larger than that of domestic protection, 
which is the sole reason for why it has an incentive to implement discriminatory patent policies 
(as shown below). It is also clear from Eq. (I.11) that 𝛺𝑗𝑗  and 𝛺𝑖𝑗 are substitutes for each other: if 
country 𝑗 increases its domestic patent protection 𝛺𝑗𝑗  then country 𝑖 will find it optimal to lower 
its foreign protection 𝛺𝑖𝑗.  
We can show the following:15 
                                                        
15Proofs of all propositions that are not in the text are provided in the Appendix. 
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Proposition I.1. In the absence of NT, each country’s patent policy discriminates in favor of 
domestic firms: ∆Ω𝑖
∗ ≡ Ω𝑖𝑖
∗ − Ω𝑖𝑗
∗ > 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐹. 
Proposition I.1 is similar in spirit to the findings of Horn (2006) and Saggi and Sara (2008) 
who focus on NT in the context of tax policies. In particular, they show that if NT is not binding 
then each country will tax foreign firms more severely because their profits do not count as part of 
national welfare. The logic here is the same: discriminatory patent policies arise naturally from the 
fact that countries care about profits accruing to domestic firms but not foreign ones. The key 
question that follows is whether eliminating such discrimination via NT brings about efficiency 
gains, which will be addressed in the analysis below. 
Firms make R&D decisions based on the duration of patent protection in each country as well 
as its market size. The level of effective global protection received by firms from country 𝑖 under 
discriminatory patent policies equals 
 𝑃𝑖
∗ = 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
∗   
where 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐹. How does the level of effective global protection 𝑃𝑖
∗ vary with the national origin 
of firms? We can show the following: 
Lemma I.1. When countries implement discriminatory patent policies, the effective patent 
protection available to firms is equal across countries: 𝑃𝑖
∗ = 𝑃∗, 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐹. 
Lemma I.1 implies that the incentives for innovation are the same for firms in either country. 
Intuitively, when country 𝑖 protects its own firms more than country 𝑗 protects its own firms - as 
would be true if the market size of country 𝑖 is larger - then country 𝑖 also protects foreign firms 
more than country 𝑗. Indeed, if country 𝑖 is much larger than country 𝑗, it is possible for it to grant 
better protection to foreign firms than they receive from their own government even when country 
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𝑖 discriminates against foreign firms. Such international offsetting of patent protection equalizes 
incentives for innovation across countries. 
Since 
 𝑀𝑖Ω𝑖𝑖
∗ + 𝑀𝑗Ω𝑗𝑖
∗ =𝑀𝑗Ω𝑗𝑗
∗ + 𝑀𝑗Ω𝑖𝑗
∗ ,  
it follows that 
 𝑀𝑖∆Ω𝑖
∗ = 𝑀𝑗∆Ω𝑗
∗ ⇔ ∆Ω𝑖
∗/∆Ω𝑗
∗ = 𝑀𝑗/𝑀𝑖  
which we state as: 
Proposition I.2. The relative degree of discrimination (∆𝛺𝑖
∗/∆𝛺𝑗
∗) practiced by a country is 
inversely proportional to its relative market size (𝑀𝑖/𝑀𝑗), i=H, F. 
A country’s weight in determining the level of effective global protection facing innovators 
increases with its own market size, as does the benefit it enjoys from foreign innovations. 
Therefore, the country with the larger market has a weaker incentive to discriminate against foreign 
nationals. As we noted in Section 1, in typical models of international trade agreements, as a 
country gets larger (i.e. has more market power) it tends to typically increase discrimination 
against foreign sellers. By contrast, the opposite happens here: if one country gets larger, the other 
country benefits from a reduction in patent discrimination faced by its firms abroad as well as from 
an increase in the degree of global patent protection (which leads to more innovation). 
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Patent Protection Under NT 
Now suppose that each country must choose a non-discriminatory patent protection level that 
applies to all innovating firms, regardless of national origin. A detailed analysis of the NT regime 
is provided in Grossman and Lai (2004). Here, we focus on comparing outcomes under NT with 
those under discrimination. The best response curve for country 𝑖 under NT can be written as 
follows 
 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜇𝑖 =
𝛾𝑀𝑖
𝑃𝑖(𝛺𝑖, 𝛺𝑗)
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑖 + 𝐶𝑐?̅?] (I.12) 
where 𝑃𝑖(𝛺𝑖 , 𝛺𝑗) = 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗  and 𝜇𝑖 =
𝜙𝑖
𝑁𝑇
𝜙𝑖
𝑁𝑇+𝜙𝑗
𝑁𝑇 is the proportion of innovation that occurs in 
country 𝑖. Since the R&D production function is Cobb-Douglas in nature, it turns out that 
 
𝜇𝑖 =
𝐾𝑖
𝐾𝑖 + 𝐾𝑗
< 1, 
 
i.e., 𝜇𝑖 is determined solely by the relative human capital stocks of countries and is unaffected by 
their patent policies. 
Observe from Eqs. (I.10), (I.11), and (I.12) that country 𝑖’s marginal cost of patent protection 
under NT is strictly in between the marginal costs of granting patent protection to domestic firms 
and foreign firms under discrimination: 
 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 < 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜇𝑖𝜋 < 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚.  
This inequality follows from the fact that a country only cares about profits of local firms 
while NT forces it to treat all firms symmetrically. As a result, the profit of a typical innovating 
firm is discounted by 𝜇𝑖, where which increases in its home country’s human capital (𝐾𝑖). This 
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means that when a large share of the global innovation is carried out by local firms, the marginal 
cost of patent protection facing a country declines. In general, since NT forces countries into a 
scenario where the marginal cost of patent protection is a weighted average of the marginal costs 
associated with the discriminatory protection levels accorded to domestic and foreign firms, 
intuition suggests that NT might induce countries to select a level of protection that lies in the 
interval (𝛺𝑖𝑖, 𝛺𝑖𝑗) - a conjecture we formally confirm below: 
Proposition I.3. (𝑖) Under NT, each country selects a level of patent protection that exceeds the 
protection it grants to foreign firms under discrimination but falls short of that which it gives to 
its domestic firms: 𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ < 𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇 < 𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗  for i,j=H,F. If countries are symmetric then 2𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇=𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ +𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗  
for i,j=H,F. 
    (𝑖𝑖) The effective global protection available to firms as well as global welfare under NT 
is the same as that under discrimination: 𝑃𝑁𝑇 = 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗
𝑁𝑇 = 𝑃∗. 
To see more explicitly why welfare under NT is the same as that under discrimination, from 
Eq.       (I.6) we can rewrite world welfare under regime 𝑅 as 
 𝑊𝑊𝑅 = ∑ 𝛬𝑖0𝑖 +
1
𝜌
∑ 𝑤𝑖(𝐿𝑖 − 𝐿𝐼𝑖
𝑅 )𝑖 +
𝐶𝑐?̅?
𝜌
∑ 𝜙𝑖
𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝜙𝑖
𝑅𝑃𝑖
𝑅 [
𝐶𝑐−𝐶𝑚−𝜋
𝜌
]𝑖 .             
Observe from this that in the absence of NT, world welfare depends only upon the effective 
protection levels 𝑃𝑖
𝑅 = 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑅 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
𝑅  available to firms from both countries under regime 𝑅 
(where 𝑅 = 𝑁𝑇 or 𝐷) since 𝑃𝑖
𝑅 pins down all the other endogenous variables such as the allocation 
of resources to R&D (𝐿𝐼𝑖
𝑅 ) and the rates of innovation (𝜙𝑖
𝑅). But from Proposition I.3 we already 
know that 𝑃𝑖
∗ = 𝑃𝑁𝑇. As a result, world welfare is invariant to whether or not the underlying patent 
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regime abides by NT.16 Therefore, mandating NT is neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving 
efficiency provided international trade is not subject to any frictions. 
The welfare neutrality of NT in our model is a rather novel finding in the context of the 
literature on NT. As we noted earlier, models in which NT applies to taxation typically find results 
favorable to NT. Further, even in the context of patent protection, in a two period model Bond 
(2005) has shown that, holding constant the level of patent protection given to domestic firms, 
eliminating discrimination against foreign firms raises global welfare. The driving force behind 
this result is as follows: since each country offers less patent protection to foreign firms, the switch 
from discrimination to NT holding domestic protections constant increases overall patent 
protection thereby alleviating the inefficiency caused by the under-protection of patents in the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium. But our analysis shows that since it is optimal for both countries to 
lower their domestic patent protection when each of them increases its patent protection towards 
foreign firms, NT by itself does not raise welfare since it leaves the effective protection levels 
facing innovating firms unchanged. 
Grossman and Lai (2004) showed that the Nash equilibrium under NT gives rise to under-
protection of intellectual property due to the positive international externalities generated by 
national patent protection policies. From the above analysis, it is not hard to see that the free rider 
problem that plagues the Nash equilibrium under NT continues to exist even when countries 
institute discriminatory patent policies. While there is under-protection of patent protection in our 
model as well, our analysis highlights that a move towards increasing patent protection to 
                                                        
16 It is worth emphasizing that our model considers the simultaneous adoption of NT by both countries. One 
might also be interested in knowing the welfare consequences of a unilateral violation of NT by a single 
country, particularly since actual trade disputes among WTO members, particularly outside the realm of 
TRIPS, often involve a violation of the NT clause. We can show that given that country 𝑗 abides by NT, a 
unilateral violation of NT by country 𝑖 increases the effective global patent protection facing its firms while 
lowering that facing foreign firms, thereby increasing the rate of innovation in country 𝑖 while lower it in 
country 𝑗. 
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foreigners driven by NT does not occur in isolation since each country simultaneously lowers the 
protection it grants to domestic firms. In fact, changes in patent protection granted to domestic 
firms as a result of NT exactly offset the increased protection granted to foreign firms so that NT 
does not alter the effective global protection available to firms. In this way, our model is able to 
separate the impact of NT on welfare from the increase in overall patent protection that results if 
NT is interpreted as a policy that brings up the patent protection granted to foreign nationals 
holding constant the protection granted to domestic firms. 
NT in the Presence of Trade Frictions 
Since the welfare neutrality of NT in the benchmark model is driven by the complete 
offsetting of patent protection across countries when discriminatory policies are eliminated via NT, 
it is worth asking whether such international offsetting also obtains in the presence of trade barriers 
and/or frictions. We now address this issue and show that when trade frictions exist, NT induces 
incomplete offsetting of patent protection across countries and actually ends up lowering the 
effective level of global patent protection. 
Trade Frictions and Discrimination 
Before deriving the effect of trade frictions on the incentives for discrimination in patent 
protection, we make three simple observations. First, trade frictions reduce the surplus consumers 
derive from foreign goods. Second, by making it costlier for firms to export, trade frictions lower 
export profits of firms (while having no effect on their domestic profits).17 Third, trade frictions 
                                                        
17 Trade frictions do not affect domestic profits since each firm selling a patented product is a monopoly in 
its local market. 
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do not affect the surplus consumers derive from goods whose patents have expired, regardless of 
where they were invented, since imitated goods are produced locally in each market so that there 
is no trade in such goods. 
Denote the (inverse of) the degree of trade frictions between countries by 𝜃, where 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤
1 and 𝜃 = 1 represents free/costless trade while 𝜃 = 0  indicates the complete absence of trade. 
In the presence of trade frictions, denote the consumer surplus derived from a patented imported 
good by 𝜃𝐶𝑚 while the export profits earned by a firm by 𝜃𝜋. This parsimonious formulation of 
trade frictions (i.e. as being captured by a single parameter 𝜃) is adopted purely for expositional 
simplicity.18 Our results below hold as long as trade frictions lower the consumer surplus derived 
from foreign goods and the export profits of innovating firms, even if they do so in a non-linear 
fashion and/or at very different rates. All we require is that the due to the presence of trade frictions, 
the (per-capita) consumer surplus derived from imports be lower than that derived from locally 
produced goods and that the export profits (per-capita) of a firm be smaller than its domestic profits. 
It is worth noting that in the context of patent protection, a world with prohibitive trade 
frictions (𝜃 = 0) is not the same as one in which the two economies are fully autarkic in the sense 
of being completely shut off from each other. In particular, if technology transfer does not depend 
on trade (i.e. if ideas can flow across national borders without trade in goods - see Rivera-Batiz 
and Romer, 1991), then a country can imitate foreign goods even in the complete absence of 
international trade (i.e. 𝜃 = 0). As a result, one would expect a country to have less incentive to 
                                                        
18 If ℎ(𝑥) = Ϛ1/𝜀
𝜀
𝜀−1
𝑥
𝜀−1
𝜀  where 𝜀 > 1 and Ϛ > 0 and trade barriers are of the ice-berg type, then it is 
straightforward to show that consumer surplus from imports and overseas profits earned by firms equal 
𝜃𝐶𝑚 and 𝜃𝜋 respectively, where 𝜃 = (1 + 𝑡)
1−𝜀 is the inverse measure of trade frictions and 𝑡 > 0 is the 
ice-berg type trade cost. Lai and Yan (2013) embed this formulation of trade costs in a model of patent 
protection with firm heterogeneity and FDI and show that trade liberalization helps alleviate the problem 
of under-protection in Nash equilibrium. Even in their model, trade frictions lower overseas profits and 
consumer surplus derived from imported goods. Thus, allowing for firm heterogeneity and FDI does not 
affect the main channel that renders foreign patent protection less effective than domestic protection in our 
model. 
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protect intellectual property when 𝜃 = 0 relative to the autarky case. Indeed it is possible to show, 
for example, that patent protection under NT when 𝜃 = 0 is lower in both countries relative to the 
autarkic level. 
The key question we address below is: How do trade frictions affect incentives for 
discrimination? The overseas profit earned by a firm from country 𝑖 equals 𝜃𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑗𝑖𝜋 so that the 
corresponding firm value equals 
 𝑣𝑖
𝐷(𝜃) = (𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖)𝜋.   
As is clear from above, due to the presence of trade frictions (𝜃 < 1) patent protection in 
export markets (i.e. 𝛺𝑗𝑖 ) is relatively less valuable for firms than protection in their domestic 
markets (i.e. 𝛺𝑖𝑖). 
Now consider country 𝑖 ’s decision regarding patent protection. The marginal cost of 
extending domestic protection remains unchanged relative to free trade since trade frictions do not 
affect the consumption of domestic goods and the profit firms make in their domestic markets. A 
country’s marginal benefit of domestic protection, however, is different as trade frictions do affect 
the value of domestic firms by reducing their export profits and therefore the influence of foreign 
patent protection 𝛺𝑗𝑖 on their innovation incentives. 
The marginal benefit of extending domestic protection Ω𝑖𝑖 equals 
 1
𝜌
𝛾𝜙𝑖
𝐷𝑀𝑖
2
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
[(𝐶𝑚−𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝑐?̅?]. 
 
Note that holding constant 𝛺𝑗𝑖 (i.e. the protection domestic firms get abroad), the marginal benefit 
of increasing 𝛺𝑖𝑖 (i.e. the protection to domestic firms) decreases with 𝜃. All else equal, a reduction 
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in trade frictions makes 𝛺𝑗𝑖 a more effective substitute for 𝛺𝑖𝑖 due to increased export profits of 
firms. 
Country 𝑖’s best response curve for domestic protection 𝛺𝑖𝑖 can be written as 
 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 =
𝛾𝑀𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝑐?̅?]. (I.13) 
Regarding the protection extended to foreign firms, note that consumers in country 𝑖 only 
derive a surplus of 𝜃𝐶𝑚 units from buying a patented foreign good. Since consumers always buy 
the good from domestic imitators once the patent expires, the corresponding surplus post imitation 
equals 𝐶𝑐. Thus, the marginal cost of raising foreign protection equals 
 𝑀𝑖𝜙𝑗
𝐷(𝐶𝑐 − 𝜃𝐶𝑚)
𝜌
. 
 
As is clear, holding constant the rate of innovation, the marginal cost of protecting foreign 
firms increases with trade frictions. 
    Country 𝑖’s marginal benefit of protecting foreign firms can be written as 
 1
𝜌
𝛾𝜃𝜙𝑗
𝐷𝑀𝑖
2
𝜃𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑗 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗
[(𝜃𝐶𝑚−𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑐?̅?]. 
 
Note that holding constant 𝛺𝑗𝑗  (i.e. the protection foreign firms get from their own 
government), the marginal benefit of increasing 𝛺𝑖𝑗  (i.e. the protection given by country 𝑖  to 
foreign firms) increases as trade frictions fall. 
The best response curve for 𝛺𝑖𝑗 is given by 
 𝐶𝑐 − 𝜃𝐶𝑚 =
𝛾𝜃𝑀𝑖
𝜃𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑗 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗
[(𝜃𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑐?̅?]. (I.14) 
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Using the above best response curves, we can show the following: 
Proposition I.4. As trade frictions between countries fall (i.e. 𝜃 increases), each country increases 
the degree of patent protection granted to foreign firms 𝛺𝑖𝑗(𝜃) while decreasing that granted to 
domestic firms 𝛺𝑖𝑖(𝜃). Furthermore, a reduction in trade frictions increase the degree of effective 
global patent protection in both countries, i.e., 
𝜕𝑃𝑖
∗(𝜃)
𝜕𝜃
> 0 where 𝑃𝑖
∗(𝜃) = 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ (𝜃) + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
∗ (𝜃). 
We now compare NT and discrimination in the presence of trade frictions. As before, a typical 
firm’s value under the NT regime equals 
 𝑣𝑖
𝑁𝑇(θ) = (𝑀𝑖Ω𝑖 + θ𝑀𝑗Ω𝑗)𝜋.  
It is important to note that due to the existence of trade frictions, 𝑣𝑖 will in general be different 
from 𝑣𝑗  even under NT, which further implies that firms in different countries may face different 
levels of effective patent protection.19 
Under NT, the cost and benefit of a marginal change in patent protection depend upon the 
level of trade frictions. As the derivation is similar to before, we simply report country 𝑖’s best 
response curve for 𝛺𝑖 without presenting the relevant details: 
 
𝐶𝑐 − (𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝜇𝑗)𝐶𝑚 − 𝜇𝑗𝜋 =
𝛾𝑀𝑖𝜇𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖+𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑖 + 𝐶𝑐?̅?] +
𝛾𝜃𝑀𝑖𝜇𝑗
𝜃𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖+𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗
[(𝜃𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑖 + 𝐶𝑐?̅?].  
(I.15) 
We next investigate the efficiency impact of NT. To facilitate this analysis, we assume that 
countries are symmetric in all respects (𝑀𝑖 = 𝑀𝑗 = 𝑀, 𝐾𝑖 = 𝐾𝑗 = 𝐾 and 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑎). This is a 
                                                        
19 Recall that when trade is free, all firms receive the same effective level of global patent protection under 
NT. 
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useful simplification for three reasons. First, it helps isolate the effect of trade frictions on the 
international patent regimes. Second, the issue of non-discrimination is as relevant, if not more, in 
a North-North type setting of relatively similar countries as it is in a North-South setting where 
there are significant differences across countries with respect to market size and human capital. 
Third, although analytical solutions under NT are difficult to calculate when countries are 
asymmetric, we analyze the social planner’s problem and show that the key argument in favor of 
discrimination does not rest on the assumption of symmetry. Finally, in Section 5, we use 
numerical examples to study Nash equilibrium outcomes under asymmetry and show that our 
result that the equilibrium under discrimination is more desirable does not require symmetry. 
Effective Patent Protection 
Denote the symmetric Nash equilibrium level of patent protection under NT by 𝛺∗(𝜃). Under 
discrimination, let 𝛺𝑑
∗ (𝜃) be the patent protection granted by each country to domestic firms and 
𝛺𝑓
∗(𝜃) that given to foreign firms. We can then show the following: 
Proposition I.5. Suppose countries are symmetric and there exist trade frictions between them (i.e. 
0 ≤ 𝜃 < 1). Then the following hold: 
    (i) The degree of effective global protection received by firms under NT is lower than that 
under discrimination: 
 𝑃𝑁𝑇(𝜃) = 𝑀(1 + 𝜃)𝛺∗(𝜃) < 𝑃∗(𝜃) = 𝑀(𝛺𝑑
∗ (𝜃) + 𝜃𝛺𝑓
∗(𝜃)).  
(ii) The gap between the degree of effective patent protection under discrimination and NT 
decreases as trade frictions fall (i.e. 𝑃∗(𝜃) − 𝑃𝑁𝑇(𝜃) declines with 𝜃). 
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When trade frictions exist, from the viewpoint of firms, protection abroad matters less for 
profitability than protection at home. As a result, trade frictions make foreign protection relatively 
less effective in inducing innovation in each country. However, NT forces each country to treat 
firms the same even though their innovation incentives respond more to domestic protection. As a 
result, NT blunts the effectiveness of patent protection for incentivizing innovation so that, in 
equilibrium, the effective degree of protection chosen by countries under NT ends up being lower. 
This result is important because it shows that while there is under-protection of intellectual 
property under both NT and discrimination in our model, this problem is more severe under NT. 
Thus, somewhat paradoxically, in the presence of trade frictions allowing countries to discriminate 
against foreign nationals with respect to patent protection actually leads to stronger innovation 
incentives in the global economy. 
The intuition behind Proposition I.5 can also be understood by examining the marginal benefit 
and cost of strengthening patent protection. Suppose that 𝑃𝑁𝑇(𝜃) ≥ 𝑃∗(𝜃). Then we can show that 
the marginal benefit of patent protection is larger under discrimination for both countries. 
Moreover, it exceeds the marginal cost of patent protection so that each country would want to 
increase its total patent protection. This implies that 𝑃𝑁𝑇(𝜃) ≥ 𝑃∗(𝜃) cannot be sustained as a 
Nash equilibrium. As a result we must have 𝑃∗(𝜃) > 𝑃𝑁𝑇(𝜃). 
We now consider the problem of choosing jointly (or socially) optimal domestic and foreign 
patent protection for country 𝑖’s firms (i.e. 𝛺𝑖𝑖 and 𝛺𝑗𝑖). 
Social Welfare 
The jointly optimal policies solve 
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 𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝛺𝑖𝑖,𝛺𝑗𝑖
𝑊𝑊𝐷(𝜃)  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑊𝑊𝐷(𝜃) = ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝐷
𝑖
(𝜃). 
 
To derive the first order conditions for this problem, it is useful to separately consider the 
social marginal benefits and costs of patent protection in each country. Following our previous 
discussion, the social marginal cost of domestic patent protection in country 𝑖 (i.e. 𝛺𝑖𝑖) equals 
 
𝑀𝑖𝜙𝑖
𝐷
𝜌
(𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋) (I.16) 
while the social marginal benefit is 
 
𝛾
𝜌
𝑀𝑖𝜙𝑖
𝐷
𝑃𝑖
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)(𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖) + (𝑀𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗)𝐶𝑐?̅? − (1 − 𝜃)𝐶𝑚𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖] (I.17) 
where 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖. 
Analogously, we can write the social marginal cost and benefit of 𝛺𝑗𝑖 as 
 
𝑀𝑗𝜙𝑖
𝐷
𝜌
(𝐶𝑐 − 𝜃𝐶𝑚 − 𝜃𝜋) (I.18) 
and  
 
𝛾
𝜌
𝑀𝑗𝜙𝑖
𝐷𝜃
𝑃𝑖
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)(𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖) + (𝑀𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗)𝐶𝑐?̅? − (1 − 𝜃)𝐶𝑚𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖]. (I.19) 
respectively. Observe from Eq. (I.18) that when calculating the social cost of extending patent 
protection to foreign firms in country 𝑖, the social planner accounts for the export profits earned 
by these firms, which is why the term 𝜃𝜋 appears in Eq. (I.18) but not in Eq. (I.19). 
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We can write the first order conditions for 𝛺𝑖𝑖 and 𝛺𝑗𝑖 by equating the respective marginal 
cost of each type of protection to its marginal benefit. For 𝛺𝑖𝑖 we have 
 
𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 =
𝛾
𝑃𝑖
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)(𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖) + (𝑀𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗)𝐶𝑐?̅? − (1 −
𝜃)𝐶𝑚𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖]  
(I.20) 
while for 𝛺𝑗𝑖 it is 
 
𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 +
1−𝜃
𝜃
𝐶𝑐 =
𝛾
𝑃𝑖
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)(𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖) + (𝑀𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗)𝐶𝑐?̅? −
(1 − 𝜃)𝐶𝑚𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖].  
(I.21) 
Note that for all 𝜃 < 1 the right-hand sides of both FOCs are the same, but the left-hand side of 
Eq. (I.21) is larger. This implies that, except for the extreme case where each country is at a corner 
solution, both FOCs cannot hold simultaneously. In particular, if 𝛺𝑖𝑖 < ?̅? (i.e. Eq. (I.20) holds), 
then it must be that Eq. (I.21) does not hold so that 𝛺𝑗𝑖 = 0.
20 We can now state: 
Proposition I.6. In the presence of trade frictions (i.e. 𝜃 < 1), social optimality calls for each 
country to discriminate against foreign firms, i.e. 𝛺𝑖𝑗
𝑤 < 𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑤 for i,j=H,F.21 Furthermore, if it is 
optimal to offer firms less protection in their domestic markets than the useful lifetime of products 
                                                        
20 The case where 𝛺𝑖𝑖 = ?̅? is discussed in the Appendix. 
21 Since under this scheme of jointly optimal protection firms receive less protection abroad than they do at 
home, for any given innovation, foreign consumers begin to enjoy greater surplus (arising from local 
imitation) sooner than domestic ones. Indeed, if markets are unequal in size we can show that the degree of 
jointly optimal protection for firms in each country is increasing in the relative size of the other country’s 
market: 
𝜕𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑤
𝜕(𝑀𝑗/𝑀𝑖)
> 0. 
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(i.e. 𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑤 < ?̅?), then it is optimal to give them no patent protection in their export markets (i.e. 
𝛺𝑗𝑖
𝑤 = 0).22 
In fact, for the case where markets are symmetric (𝑀𝑖 = 𝑀𝑗 = 𝑀), we can use the first order 
condition in Eqs. (I.20) and (I.21) to write 
 
𝜕𝑊𝑊𝐷(𝜃)
𝜕𝛺𝑖𝑖
−
1
𝜃
𝜕𝑊𝑊𝐷(𝜃)
𝜕𝛺𝑗𝑖
=
𝜙𝑖
𝐷𝑀(1 − 𝜃)𝐶𝑐
𝜃
> 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 0 < 𝜃 < 1. (I.22) 
This equation explicitly shows that the net marginal social benefit of extending domestic patent 
protection to firms is strictly higher than the marginal benefit of foreign patent protection so long 
as their exist trade frictions between countries. Observe that this holds even when the human 
capital stocks of the two countries are unequal. 
The central point of Proposition I.6 is that trade frictions drive a wedge between the social 
value of domestic and foreign patent protections and social optimality calls for assigning a higher 
priority to domestic protection in each country. In other words, from the perspective of joint 
welfare, we care not only about the level of patent protection but also its composition across 
countries. In contrast, Grossman and Lai (2004) show that, under free trade, efficiency depends 
only on the level of total patent protection in the global economy and not on its composition across 
countries. In our model, this is easily verified by taking 𝜃 = 1 in Eq. (I.22), so that domestic and 
foreign protections have equal net benefit. Proposition I.6 shows that, in the realm of patent 
protection, the presence of trade costs makes it socially optimal to discriminate in favor of local 
innovators in each country. It is noteworthy that such discrimination is desirable even when 
                                                        
22 A corner solution for foreign protection might not arise if there exist enforcement costs that are increasing 
in the level of patent protection. Under such costly enforcement, foreign protection may be utilized even if 
domestic protection does not reach the boundary ?̅?. Even so, the rationale for discrimination would remain 
since such enforcement costs would presumably also apply to foreign protection, and might even be higher 
than those for domestic protection. 
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beggar-thy-neighbor incentives are completely missing (as they are when countries maximize joint 
welfare). 
    Bond (2005) has shown that it can be socially optimal to globally discriminate in favor of 
firms from one country provided the elasticity of innovation in that country with respect to patent 
protection is relatively higher. Note, however, that Bond’s analysis provides conditions under 
which it is socially optimal to provide favorable treatment to firms from one country in both 
countries whereas we consider whether it can ever be optimal to have firms from both countries 
enjoy favorable treatment in their respective domestic markets, an inquiry that is more in line with 
the actual spirit behind the national treatment clause. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the 
mere existence of trade barriers is sufficient to make such type of discrimination socially desirable; 
one does not need the elasticity of innovation with respect to patent protection to be unequal across 
countries, although that could be an additional contributing factor in our framework as well if our 
model were extended to incorporate it. 
    An interesting implication of the presence of trade frictions is that it socially desirable to 
discriminate more in favor of goods that are harder to trade. Specifically, in the extreme 
hypothetical case where all goods are non-tradable (i.e. 𝜃 = 1), there would be no reason to protect 
foreign firms at all since their innovation incentives would be unresponsive to patent protection 
granted by countries other than their own. Indeed, if 𝜃 = 0 protecting foreign innovations would 
only delay domestic consumption of newly invented foreign goods by the duration of the patent 
without affecting the foreign rate of innovation. 
Comparing the first-order conditions determining the Nash equilibrium with those under joint 
welfare maximization, it is easy to see that the marginal cost of patent protection under the Nash 
equilibrium (as perceived by each country) is no less than the true social cost while the marginal 
benefit of such protection is smaller if effective protection under the two scenarios is the same (i.e. 
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if 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑤 = 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
∗ ). Thus, in an interior solution we must have 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
∗ <
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
𝑤, i.e. there is under-protection in Nash equilibrium even in the presence of trade frictions, 
although the magnitude of the externality from foreign protection is reduced. Another interesting 
observation about discriminatory patent policies is that while coordination always leads to weaker 
foreign protection, in an asymmetric Nash equilibrium a country’s foreign protection can actually 
exceed the foreign country’s domestic protection. This is because the larger country tends to 
discriminate less while the smaller country tends to free ride more. Notably, even though the 
smaller country may be “sheltered” by the policies of the larger one, Proposition I.6 indicates that 
this is not justified from an efficiency point of view. 
Further Analysis 
In this section, we extend our model in two directions. First, we examine the effects of NT in 
a North-South setting where countries are asymmetric with respect to market size and/or their 
human capital stocks. Second, to capture the effects of trade policy variables, we consider a setting 
where the degree of trade openness facing firms depends upon their national origin - i.e. the access 
enjoyed by firms from country 𝑖 to country 𝑗’s market is not necessarily the same as that enjoyed 
by firms from country 𝑗 to country 𝑖’s market. The analysis of this scenario allows us to address 
how the incentives for discrimination vary with domestic and foreign trade policies. 
NT in a North-South Setting 
In this sub-section, we discuss how the relative performance of NT and discrimination 
depends upon the degree of asymmetry across countries. This issue is important because what 
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made TRIPS negotiations especially difficult was the clash between the views of developing and 
developed countries regarding the desirability of multilateral disciplines in the area of intellectual 
property. Furthermore, since WTO members differ markedly in terms of their economic 
capabilities and factor endowments, it is important to know how NT operates in such an 
environment. Section 4 showed that, in the presence of trade frictions, if patent policies are chosen 
to maximize joint welfare then NT is less efficient than discrimination, regardless of the degree of 
asymmetry across countries. What is interesting to know is whether this is also true in a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium when countries are asymmetric in terms of economic fundamentals 
and there is no policy coordination between them. 
In particular, it seems useful to consider a North-South scenario where the North’s market as 
well as the stock of its human capital is larger than that of the South: i.e. 𝑀𝑖 > 𝑀𝑗  and 𝐾𝑖 > 𝐾𝑖.
23 
The non-linearity of first order conditions (FOCs) under NT (see Eq. (I.15)) makes it difficult to 
obtain analytical solutions under asymmetry. Nevertheless, we show below that the key driving 
forces behind NT being efficiency-reducing relative to discrimination continue to operate in a 
North-South setting. To this end, adding up FOCs for both countries under NT yields 
 
2𝐶𝑐 − (1 + 𝜃)𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 = 𝛾{
𝜇𝑖
𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝑇(𝜃)
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝑇(𝜃) + (𝑀𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀𝑗)𝐶𝑐?̅? −
(1 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗(𝜃)] +
𝜇𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑁𝑇(𝜃)
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝑃𝑗
𝑁𝑇(𝜃) + (𝑀𝑗 + 𝜃𝑀𝑖)𝐶𝑐?̅? −
(1 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖(𝜃)]}.  
(I.23) 
Similarly, adding the two FOCs under discrimination yields 
                                                        
23 One may also assume that the North has higher labor productivity (i.e. 𝑎𝑖 < 𝑎𝑗), but this will not 
change our analysis in a substantive way. 
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2𝐶𝑐 − (1 + 𝜃)𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 = 𝛾{
1
2𝑃𝑖(𝜃)
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝑇(𝜃) + (𝑀𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀𝑗)𝐶𝑐?̅? −
(1 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗(𝜃)] +
𝜇𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑁𝑇(𝜃)
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝑃𝑗
𝑁𝑇(𝜃) + (𝑀𝑗 + 𝜃𝑀𝑖)𝐶𝑐?̅? −
(1 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖(𝜃)]}.  
(I.24) 
 
Note that the left hand-side of both FOCs can be interpreted as the global marginal cost of 
patent protection, as it is the sum of marginal costs of patent protection across countries. 
Analogously, the right hand-side of both FOCs represents the global marginal benefit of patent 
protection. Observe that while the global marginal cost of patent protection under the two regimes 
is the same (since the left-hand sides of the two FOCs are identical), the global marginal benefit is 
not. Indeed, the global marginal benefit of patent protection under NT is lower than that under 
discrimination. This is because NT forces countries to overuse foreign protection when trade is 
subject to frictions, which other things being equal, tends to reduce the global marginal benefit of 
patent protection. Recall that this overuse of foreign protection under NT was the key driving force 
behind our analysis of the symmetric case so it is not surprising that this mechanism continues to 
exist under asymmetry. Indeed, observe that the incentive-reducing effects of trade frictions under 
NT, captured by the terms (1 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖(𝜃) and (1 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗(𝜃) in Eq. (I.23), are larger than 
those under discrimination, captured by the terms (1 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑗(𝜃) and (1 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖(𝜃). This 
is because 𝛺𝑖(𝜃) > 𝛺𝑖𝑗(𝜃) (θ) and 𝛺𝑗(𝜃) > 𝛺𝑗𝑖(𝜃) in equilibrium.
24 Intuitively, when countries 
consider raising domestic patent protection under NT, they are more conscious of the negative 
                                                        
24 We have shown this is true under free trade, that is, 𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇(𝜃) > 𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝜃) and 𝛺𝑗
𝑁𝑇(𝜃) > 𝛺𝑗𝑖
∗ (𝜃) when 𝜃 =
1. As 𝜃 falls, both 𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝜃) and 𝛺𝑗𝑖
∗ (𝜃) decrease. Indeed, the marginal benefit of extending patent protection 
to foreigners becomes infinitesimally small as 𝜃 approaches zero (see the right hand-side of Eq. (I.14)). 
This is not true for 𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇(𝜃) and 𝛺𝑗
𝑁𝑇(𝜃)  since the marginal benefit of patent protection under NT has a 
positive lower bound due to the fact that such protection also extends to domestic firms and part of their 
innovation incentive stems from domestic profits that remain unaffected by trade barriers (see the right 
hand-side of Eq. (I.15)). Therefore, 𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇(𝜃) and 𝛺𝑗
𝑁𝑇(𝜃) cannot be lower than 𝛺𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑇(𝜃)and 𝛺𝑗𝑖
𝑁𝑇(𝜃). 
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incentive effects of trade frictions since the level of foreign protection has to raise by the same 
amount. 
It is also worth noting that, as shown before, the above distortion generated by NT readily 
disappears when trade fractions vanish. When 𝜃 = 1 domestic and foreign protections are equally 
effective so that the incentive-reducing terms in both Eqs. (I.23) and (I.24) drop out. 
We conducted numerical simulations to further study NT under asymmetry. We now briefly 
discuss the results of this analysis. For simplicity, we consider a constant elasticity demand 
function (𝑥 = 𝑝−𝜀 where 𝜀 = 1.5). With this specific demand function it can be shown that 𝐶𝑚 =
𝜋 ≈ 0.2𝐶𝑐. Also, we assigned the following values to the fundamental parameters of the model: 
𝛼 = 0.67, 𝛾 = 3, 𝐶𝑐 = 5  and ?̅? = 20 . Let 𝜌 ≈ 1  without loss of generality. These parameter 
values ensure interior solutions under discrimination and NT and our results are robust to 
variations in them. To normalize away any level effects, we fix the total world market size (𝑀𝑖 +
𝑀𝑗) and the stock of human capital (𝐾𝑖 + 𝐾𝑗). 
Figure I.1 Discrimination versus NT: how trade openness matters 
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Figure I.1 shows how the welfare difference between discrimination and NT, i.e. (𝑊𝑊𝐷 −
𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑇)/𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑇, varies with trade frictions 𝜃, given 𝑀𝑖 = 10, 𝑀𝑗 = 5, 𝐾𝑖 = 2 and 𝐾𝑖 = 1. First 
note that so long as trade frictions exist (𝜃 < 1), discrimination generates strictly higher welfare 
than NT regardless of the level of such frictions. This is consistent with our results regarding the 
negative effects of NT under the presence of trade frictions. Moreover, as trade frictions fall (i.e. 
𝜃 increases), the welfare differential between the two regimes converges to zero. 
Table I.1 compares the levels of total effective patent protection and national welfare across 
the two regimes for three different levels of trade frictions. First note that the level of patent 
protection under NT lies in between the two discriminatory protections regardless of the level of 
trade frictions (i.e. 𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇/𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ < 1 < 𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇/𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ ). This verifies the distortion that NT causes by the 
excessive use of foreign protection. Using the first four columns of Table I.1, it is easy to confirm 
that countries tend to discriminate less as trade frictions fall - i.e. 𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ /𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗  and 𝛺𝑗𝑗
∗ /𝛺𝑗𝑖
∗  both 
decrease with 𝜃 - which is consistent with Proposition I.4. Note also that the North (i.e. country 𝑖) 
is worse-off under NT even if it receives more total effective protection under NT relative to 
discrimination: i.e. 𝑊𝑖
𝑁𝑇/𝑊𝑖
𝐷 < 1 even though 𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝑇/𝑃𝑖
𝐷 < 1. The reason is that the South (i.e. 
country 𝑗) under-innovates due to it receiving lower effective protection under NT relative to 
discrimination, generating a large welfare loss for the North that ends up offsetting the benefit 
conferred by the higher degree of effective protection received by its firms under NT. Finally, the 
last two columns of Table I.1 show that the welfare loss imposed on each country by NT increases 
with the level of trade frictions. 
Table I.1 Equilibrium Patent Protection and Welfare in a North-South World 
θ 𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇/𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗  𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇/𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗  𝛺𝑗
𝑁𝑇/𝛺𝑗𝑗
∗  𝛺𝑗
𝑁𝑇/𝛺𝑗𝑖
∗  𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝑇/𝑃𝑖
𝐷 𝑃𝑗
𝑁𝑇/𝑃𝑗
𝐷 𝑊𝑖
𝑁𝑇/𝑊𝑖
𝐷 𝑊𝑗
𝑁𝑇/𝑊𝑗
𝐷 
0.8 0.948 1.186 0.593 1.544 1.011 0.964 0.980 0.959 
0.9 0.955 1.122 0.699 1.280 1.005 0.986 0.993 0.984 
1.0 0.967 1.073 0.807 1.135 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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To see how the welfare gap between NT and discrimination is affected by the degree of 
asymmetry between the two countries, we studied the effects of changes in their relative market 
size and human capital stocks. We first set 𝐾𝑖 = 𝐾𝑗 = 1 and 𝜃 = 0.75 and consider the effects of 
reducing the gap between 𝑀𝑖 and 𝑀𝑗 in the above experiment to 0, fixing their sum (at 20). Figure 
I.2 shows that the welfare loss from NT is smaller when countries are more asymmetric in terms 
of market size. To understand the intuition behind this result, recall from Proposition I.2 that a 
country’s incentive for discrimination is inversely related to its market size. Since an increase in 
market size asymmetry reduces discrimination in the larger market while it raises it in the smaller 
market, the average degree of discrimination declines in our model as markets become more 
unequal in size. For analogous reasons, the degree of effective global protection increases with 
market size asymmetry. Thus, the global welfare loss generated by NT declines as markets become 
more unequal in size. This finding suggests that the NT discipline may be a smaller concern in a 
North-South setting. 
Finally, we illustrate the effects of asymmetric human capital stocks. To this end, we equalize 
market size across countries by setting 𝑀𝑖 = 𝑀𝑗 = 7.5 and bring 𝐾𝑖 and 𝑀𝑗 closer to 1.5 from 2 
and 1 respectively. Again, we see in Figure I.3 that NT generates a smaller welfare loss when 
human capital stocks are less equal across countries. The intuition is different from that in the case 
of market asymmetry, however, as we have shown that relative capital stock does not affect a 
country’s tendency for discrimination. 
 
 
 39 
Figure I.2 Comparison When Market Size Differs Across Countries 
 
To see what drives our results, note that the North chooses stronger patent protection under 
NT as its human capital stock increases, since it is able to capture a larger share of global profits 
that result from innovation. In the meantime, Northern firms receive more total protection since 
the major component of their overall protection is Northern protection and the increase in such 
protection is not discounted by the level of trade frictions (𝜃). As a result, the North has a stronger 
incentive for innovation under NT, a pattern that promotes innovation and welfare. This helps 
explain why welfare under NT is higher when the distribution of human capital stock is more 
unequal across countries (although welfare under NT is still lower than that under discrimination). 
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Figure I.3 Welfare Difference with Asymmetric Human Capital Stocks 
 
To check the robustness of our findings, we also conducted further numerical analysis by 
varying relative market size and human capital stock simultaneously. Figure I.4 plots the relative 
welfare difference between discrimination and NT for one such simulation. We utilize the same 
parameter values as Figure I.1 and set 𝜃 = 0.75. In the figure, the horizontal axes represent the 
two country characteristics of interest, each varying from 0.5 (very asymmetric) to 1 (symmetric). 
The first observation is that discrimination yields higher world welfare regardless of the degree of 
asymmetry, as illustrated by the welfare difference plane which lies above zero everywhere. 
Moreover, as can be seen from Figure I.4, the welfare difference between NT and discrimination 
becomes larger as countries become more alike in either characteristic (i.e. market size or human 
capital). In particular, the plane peaks at the upper-right hand corner where both market size and 
human capital stock are equal across countries. 
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Figure I.4 Welfare Difference with Asymmetric Market Sizes and Human Capital Stocks 
 
Trade Barriers and Patent Protection 
Our analysis thus far assumes symmetric trade barriers in both directions since a single 
parameter 𝜃 captures the degree of trade openness of both countries. This approach is reasonable 
when trade frictions reflect underlying structural parameters such as transportation costs but is on 
weaker grounds if such frictions arise from tariffs and other trade policy barriers which can, and 
do, differ across countries. To understand how changes in national trade policies affect incentives 
for patent protection, we now extend our model to allow for the presence of asymmetric trade 
barriers. Let 𝜃𝑖 be the trade barriers facing imports flowing into country 𝑖, where an increase in 𝜃𝑖 
implies unilateral trade liberalization on the part of country 𝑖 . As before, such liberalization 
increases the export profits of country 𝑖’s firms as well as the surplus consumers in country 𝑖 
derived from imported goods. 
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In the absence of NT, country 𝑖’s FOCs for patent protection under asymmetric trade barriers 
can be written as 
 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 =
𝛾𝑀𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝑐?̅?] (I.25) 
and 
 𝐶𝑐 − 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑚 =
𝛾𝑀𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝑐?̅?]. (I.26) 
Country 𝑗’s FOCs can be obtained by simply switching 𝑖 and 𝑗. 
To isolate the role of national trade barriers, we assume countries are symmetric in terms of 
market size and human capital. Given this, it can then be shown that country 𝑖’s equilibrium levels 
of patent protections under discrimination are 
 𝛺𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗) =
𝐶𝑐?̅?[(1 + 𝛾 − 𝜃𝑗)𝐶𝑐 − 𝛾𝜃𝑗𝐶𝑚 + 𝜃𝑗𝜋]
(𝐶𝑐 − 𝜃𝑗𝐶𝑚)[(2 + 𝛾)(𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚) − 𝜋]
 (I.27) 
and 
 𝛺𝑖𝑗(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗) =
𝐶𝑐?̅?[(𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝜃𝑖 − 1)𝐶𝑐 − 𝛾𝜃𝑗𝐶𝑚 + 𝜃𝑗𝜋]
𝜃𝑖(𝐶𝑐 − 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑚)[(2 + 𝛾)(𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚) − 𝜋]
. (I.28) 
Consider now the effects of unilateral trade liberalization by country 𝑖 on its own patent 
policies when it is free to implement discriminatory patent policies. Using Eq. (I.27) we have 
 
𝜕𝛺𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗)
𝜕𝜃𝑖
= 0 (I.29) 
and 
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𝜕𝛺𝑖𝑗(𝜃𝑖, 𝜃𝑗)
𝜕𝜃𝑖
=
𝐶𝑐?̅?[𝜃𝑖
2𝐶𝑐𝐶𝑚 + 𝛾𝜃𝑖
2𝐶𝑐𝐶𝑚 − 2𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑐𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋𝜃𝑖
2𝐶𝑚 − 𝛾𝜃𝑖
2𝐶𝑚 + 𝐶𝑐
2]
𝜃𝑖
2(𝐶𝑐 − 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑚)2[(2 + 𝛾)(𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚) − 𝜋]
> 0, (I.30) 
i.e., a reduction in own trade barriers does not affect country 𝑖’s domestic protection but it increases 
the patent protection it grants to foreign innovators. Thus, own trade liberalization makes a country 
less willing to discriminate against foreign innovators with respect to its patent policies. The 
intuition is straightforward: since neither the profits of domestic innovators nor the surplus 
consumers enjoy from local goods depends upon local trade barriers, the value of patent protection 
granted to local firms is independent of local trade barriers.25 On the other hand, the reduction of 
trade barriers by country 𝑖 increases the profits foreign innovators derive from its market while 
also increasing the surplus consumers derive from foreign innovations. Both these factors increase 
the value of foreign innovations to country 𝑖, making it optimal to offer stronger patent protection 
to foreign innovators. 
Note further that country 𝑖’s domestic protection falls with foreign trade liberalization 
 
𝜕𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ (𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗)
𝜕𝜃𝑗
= −
𝐶𝑐
2?̅?(𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋)
(𝐶𝑐 − 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑚)2[(2 + 𝛾)(𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚) − 𝜋]
< 0. (I.31) 
The intuition for this is that since 
𝜕𝛺𝑗𝑖(𝜃𝑖,𝜃𝑗)
𝜕𝜃𝑗
> 0 (i.e. country 𝑗’s foreign protection increases with 
its trade liberalization) and patent protection policies are strategic substitutes across countries, it is 
optimal for country 𝑖 to lower the protection it extends to domestic firms when they start receiving 
more protection abroad. Finally, since country 𝑗’s trade barriers affect neither consumer surplus in 
country 𝑖 nor the profits of firms from country 𝑗 in country 𝑖, we have: 
                                                        
25 This result is driven by the fact that there is no product market competition in our model since 
each new differentiated good is unrelated to existing goods (i.e. is produced by a true monopolist). 
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∂Ωij(θ𝑖, θ𝑗)
∂θ𝑗
= 0. (I.32) 
Let ∆𝛺𝑖(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗) = 𝛺𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗) − 𝛺𝑖𝑗(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗) measure the degree of patent discrimination practiced 
by country 𝑖. It follows immediately from our results above that trade liberalization by either 
country reduces the degree of discrimination practiced by both countries, i.e. 
 
𝜕∆𝛺𝑖(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗)
𝜕𝜃𝑖
< 0 (I.33) 
and 
 
𝜕∆𝛺𝑖(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗)
𝜕𝜃𝑗
< 0. (I.34) 
An important implication of Eqs. (I.33) and (I.34) is that global trade liberalization makes countries 
less resistant to accepting NT with respect to their patent policies. 
Conclusion 
The TRIPS agreement was controversial from the start. Developing countries fought hard 
against the inclusion of any multilateral agreement on intellectual property in the WTO, just as 
major developed countries put their considerable weight behind it. In addition to increasing the 
level of intellectual property protection in developing countries, TRIPS made it illegal for WTO 
members to discriminate against foreign nationals via the NT principle. 
At first glance, the inclusion of a non-discrimination principle in TRIPS hardly seems worthy 
of comment. After all, the idea of non-discrimination is the very foundation of the multilateral 
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trading system. Yet, our analysis has shown that the desirable properties of NT in the context of 
trade in goods do not extend automatically to the domain of intellectual property. 
The key driving force behind our results is that incentives for innovation depend upon the 
overall patent protection firms receive in the global economy and the composition of such 
protection matters only when international market access is hampered by trade frictions. Absent 
such frictions, NT is inconsequential since what firms lose abroad is offset by what they gain at 
home. While we focus mostly on a two-country setting, we show that the key driving force behind 
our analysis carry over to a multi-country scenario. 
When access to foreign markets is hampered by trade frictions (i.e. transportation costs and/or 
trade policy barriers), the case for non-discrimination in patent protection is even weaker. The 
intuition here is simple as it is undeniable: in the presence of trade frictions, substituting domestic 
patent protection for foreign protection affords innovating firms a higher level of effective patent 
protection because, all else equal, exports are less profitable than domestic sales. Furthermore, 
consumer welfare considerations reinforce this argument: trade frictions make foreign innovation 
relatively less valuable to domestic consumers in each country by making foreign goods costlier 
(or by reducing the volume of trade). As a result, in our model, imposing a NT constraint on 
national governments actually reduces global innovation and welfare in the presence of trade 
frictions. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that our findings do not necessarily imply that NT should 
not have been included as a fundamental principle in TRIPS. Rather, we see our findings as 
highlighting one potential efficiency cost of NT that arises from the wedge that trade frictions 
create between the incentive effects of domestic and foreign patent protection. NT may yield other 
benefits that are not captured by our model, such as lower enforcement and implementation costs, 
greater consistency across international trade agreements, and potentially lower costs of 
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international coordination across countries. Inclusion of these potential benefits of NT can make 
it more desirable than discrimination. 
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CHAPTER II 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PRODUCT STANDARDS UNDER 
CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES: NATIONAL TREATMENT VERSUS 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
Introduction 
Over the last six decades or so, significant tariff reductions worldwide have brought 
increased attention to various types of non-tariff barriers to international trade.1 A leading 
example of such types of trade barriers is technical barriers to trade (TBT) that arise from 
products having to meet specific standards in order to be authorized for sale in a given 
country. TBT are controversial because they can serve legitimate as well as protectionist 
purposes, with the line between the two often being obscure. In order to curb the 
protectionist use of TBT, member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have 
entered into the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade - a multilateral agreement whose 
objective is to ensure that regulations, standards, testing and certification procedures do 
not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. The European Union (EU), in the 
hope of paving the way for its common market, has adopted its own distinct approach to 
the regulation of TBT.2 
                                                     
1 As Baldwin (1970) vividly notes: “The lowering of tariffs has, in effect, been like draining a 
swamp. The lower water level has revealed all the snags and stumps of nontariff barriers that still 
have to be cleared away.” 
2 See the Council Resolution 85/C 136/01 by the EU on a new approach to technical harmonization 
and standardization. The document is available online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:31985Y0604(01). 
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A key difference between these two institutional arrangements is that while the 
WTO’s agreement on TBT is based on the principle of national treatment (NT), the 
approach adopted by the EU rests on the rule of mutual recognition (MR). In a nutshell, 
NT mandates that product standards imposed on foreign firms should be no stricter than 
those on domestic firms - i.e. NT is essentially a non-discrimination requirement. By 
contrast, MR requires that a country’s standards on foreign firms be the same as what those 
firms have to comply with in their home countries. Thus, under MR a good that is lawfully 
sold in one country can be sold in the other.  
By design NT and MR are not compatible with each other: a country under NT has 
full control over the standards applied in its domestic market, while under MR standards 
on foreign firms are determined by their own countries. This salient distinction naturally 
sparks several important questions: Why have the WTO and the EU made different choices 
regarding NT and MR? Are these choices well-founded from a welfare perspective? In a 
broader sense, what are the determinants of the relative efficacy of these alternative types 
of agreements on product standards? This work argues that taking account of country 
heterogeneity in consumer preferences can shed useful light on these questions. 
The work is built on two key ideas. First, consumers in different countries are likely 
to have different valuations regarding product quality. For example, consumers in countries 
with high GDP per-capita may put a higher premium on quality, a pattern that has received 
substantial empirical support from recent trade literature.3 The second key idea underlying 
the analysis is that consumer preferences across WTO members are likely to be 
                                                     
3  See, for example, Hallak (2006), Feenstra and Romalis (2014) and Caron et al. (2015). 
Specifically, these and other recent empirical studies have identified per-capita income as an 
important factor explaining the patterns of import and export quality across countries. 
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substantially more heterogeneous than those within the EU, because income dispersion 
amongst WTO members is substantially larger than that amongst EU members. For 
instance, while both organizations involve rich countries like Luxembourg, the EU’s 
poorest country Bulgaria has a GDP per-capita that is thirty times higher than that of 
Malawi which is the poorest country in the WTO.4 Building upon these two premises, our 
work offers new insights about the preferences of the WTO and the EU over different 
product standards agreements, by showing that an agreement based on NT is more 
palatable to countries with a higher degree of taste heterogeneity such as WTO members 
than one based on MR. 
Our model is based on Costinot (2008) and Brander and Krugman (1983). We 
consider a world of two countries, each having a firm that sells in both markets. We analyze 
the case of quality standards. Specifically, consumption of the good produced by the two 
firms is associated with a negative externality, the degree of which determines the quality 
(or version) of the good. A key assumption of the model is that consumers of one country 
care relatively less about quality in the sense that they incur a smaller welfare loss from 
any given level of the negative consumption externality. As discussed above, such 
asymmetric preferences can arise due to differences in per-capita income across countries. 
The timing of decision making in the model is as follows. First, countries enter into a 
product standards agreement (based on either NT or MR). Second, given the constraint 
imposed by the relevant underlying principle (i.e. NT or MR), countries set product 
standards that mandate the quality of the good produced by .rms. Third, consumption and 
trade take place. 
                                                     
4 Data on GDP per-capita come from the World Bank and are chosen for the year of 2013. 
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The model highlights two factors that can contribute to the performance of an 
international standards agreement: the nature of the institutional constraint imposed by the 
agreement and that of the strategic policy interaction induced by the constraint. The first 
factor affects the “second-best” outcome that can be possibly attained when an agreement 
is binding. In particular, an agreement that imposes a more stringent constraint undermines 
the second-best outcome by lowering the level of the highest possible social welfare. The 
constraint associated with an agreement can also affect the way in which countries 
strategically choose their national policies, which will in turn have substantive welfare 
implications. To isolate their respective effects, we consider two scenarios while assuming 
NT or MR is always binding. In the first scenario, countries coordinate their product 
standards to maximize joint welfare, while in the second they act non-cooperatively and 
each country chooses its standards to maximize its national welfare. The former scenario 
is important as it allows us to identify the welfare cost of the constraint related to each type 
of agreement by eliminating the confounding effects of strategic policy interaction. Once 
this objective is achieved, we allow countries to strategically choose their standards and 
examine how this new channel may alter the relative performance of NT and MR. 
Furthermore, to fully characterize the welfare effects of the constraints imposed by the two 
types of agreements, we also compare the constrained optimal policies in the first scenario 
with the first-best outcome obtained under no institutional constraints. 
Our analysis starts with the characterization of the coordinated product standards 
subject to the constraint of NT or MR. As might be expected, for very high (low) levels of 
the externality, it is optimal for both countries to implement a strict (lenient) standard under 
either NT or MR. When the externality is moderate, optimal policies under NT are 
 51 
 
differential: a lenient standard is adopted by the country that is less averse to the externality 
while a strict standard is enforced by the other. A somewhat surprising result is that 
differential policies are never optimal under MR. This occurs because such policies give 
rise to a mismatch of standards under MR: although countries may have fairly divergent 
preferences over the consumption externality, they have to recognize each other’s 
standards under MR even though they are fairly incompatible with domestic needs. 
Differential policies respecting MR hence represent an inefficient assignment of product 
standards. As a result, coordination under MR always leads both countries to choose 
identical standards regardless of the externality and the preference heterogeneity. 
We next show that this feature plays an important role in determining the welfare 
consequences of the institutional constraints imposed by NT and MR. We find that NT 
yields weakly higher world welfare than MR for all levels of the externality and strictly 
dominates it when the externality is moderate. The reason is that the mismatch of standards 
restricts countries to use symmetric standards under MR, while such patterns of standards 
are dominated by the differential policies under NT for intermediate levels of the 
externality. An important implication is that the constraint imposed by MR is weakly 
costlier than that of NT from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, we show that as 
preference asymmetry increases between countries, NT outperforms MR over a larger 
range of the externality so the mismatch of standards induced by MR tends to appear more 
restrictive. This implies that the MR constraint becomes more stringent as compared to that 
of NT when countries possess more heterogeneous preferences. 
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To facilitate our comparative analysis, we further define the effectiveness of NT 
relative to MR as the ratio between the ranges of the externality in which NT and MR 
respectively yield higher world welfare. It follows that under coordination, NT tends to be 
more effective than MR between countries with a higher degree of preference 
heterogeneity. Provided policy coordination is possible, this finding indicates that from a 
welfare point of view, the WTO is more likely to favor NT compared to the EU as its 
member countries possess more dissimilar preferences. Thus our analysis provides a new 
insight that helps rationalize the observed choices by the two organizations regarding 
alternative standards agreements based on NT and MR.5 
Notably, we also find that socially optimal product standards obtained free from 
institutional constraints are non-discriminatory, which indicates that coordination under 
NT in fact leads to the first-best outcome. An important implication of this observation is 
that imposing NT on product standards does not cause any welfare cost, while the 
constraint of MR gives rise to a welfare loss when the externality is moderate. Moreover, 
we show that country heterogeneity plays a vital role in driving a wedge in the welfare 
effects between NT and MR. Indeed, when countries are identical, both types of 
agreements induce the same (first-best) outcome so that even the MR constraint creates no 
welfare cost. This is because the mismatch of standards under MR vanishes when countries 
share the same preference. 
                                                     
5 Notably, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that was just reached in October 2015 also lays 
down specific rules about the regulation of TBT. Indeed, these rules are based on NT rather than 
MR, an outcome consistent with our insight given the considerable heterogeneity among TPP 
members. 
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When countries set their standards non-cooperatively, NT can be dominated by MR 
for certain levels of the externality. This is because countries under NT tend to overuse the 
strict standard: as NT requires lowering the standards on both firms, choosing the lenient 
standard generates a positive profit externality on the foreign firm. On the other hand, 
countries use too much of the lenient standard under MR since doing so confers a negative 
profit externality on the foreign firm. As found in Costinot (2008) under symmetric 
countries, this leads NT and MR to be favorable for relatively large and small levels of the 
externality. Interestingly, we show that this finding depends importantly on the assumption 
of symmetry. In particular, with heterogeneous country preferences, such a pattern could 
exist over multiple ranges of the externality, so that NT dominates MR for higher levels of 
the externality only in an “average” sense. An important policy implication is that, applying 
NT (MR) to goods with large (small) externalities is optimal between similar countries but 
can be inefficient when there exists a certain degree of heterogeneity in country preferences. 
    Our final task is to investigate the effect of country heterogeneity on the 
performance of NT and MR in the presence of strategic interaction. We find that the 
effectiveness of NT relative to MR first decreases and then increases in the degree of 
preference asymmetry across countries. Despite this non-monotonic relationship, as the 
decreasing trend only occurs for a reasonably small range of asymmetry, we argue that our 
results remain consistent with the observed institutional arrangements of product standards 
initiated by the WTO and the EU. In particular, we show that as long as preference 
heterogeneity within the WTO is larger than some mild threshold, the relative effectiveness 
of NT will be greater for the WTO so that it would view NT as more appealing than MR 
when compared to the EU. 
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    The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related economic 
literature. Section 3 describes the model of quality standards. In Section 4 we compare NT 
and MR assuming countries can coordinate policies on product standards, while in Section 
5 we investigate how the comparative assessment may be altered when countries 
strategically choose their standards. Section 6 concludes. We collect all the proofs in the 
Appendix. 
Related Literature 
To our best knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes product standards 
agreements while incorporating country heterogeneity. The paper that is most related to 
ours is Costinot (2008) albeit there are two important differences. First and foremost, the 
model in Costinot (2008) assumes identical countries so it cannot be used to examine the 
role of country heterogeneity. Second, we differentiate between contributions to the 
performance of a standards agreement from its institutional constraint and strategic 
interaction induced by the constraint. By contrast, Costinot (2008) focuses on non-
cooperative settings of product standards so the comparison between NT and MR captures 
a mixed effect of the two forces.6 Another closely relevant study is Markusen (2013) who 
also takes the perspective of asymmetric country preferences to examine government’s 
incentives for setting environmental standards. Similar to our study, the paper analyzes 
both coordinated and Nash equilibrium policies, although the focus is not on the 
institutional arrangements such as NT and MR. 
                                                     
6 To be sure, Costinot (2008) establishes the first-best outcome by examining coordination under 
no institutional constraints. We examine this scenario as well as coordination under NT or MR. 
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This work also relates to several theoretical studies that examine the welfare 
implications of a particular type of product standards agreement. Battigalli and Maggi 
(2003) provide an incomplete contract explanation about why NT has been taken as a rigid 
rule in the WTO. More recently, Staiger and Sykes (2011) apply the terms-of-trade 
framework to analyze the effect of NT on the regulation of product standards. The paper 
shows that the terms-of-trade effect gives rise to incentives for large countries to impose 
discriminatory standards that are overly stringent on foreign firms. Moreover, prohibiting 
such discrimination through NT may still lead to inefficiently stringent standards under 
certain circumstances. Toulemonde (2013) provides a welfare analysis of MR under 
differential learning ability of consumers about foreign norms. The paper identifies the 
winners and the losers (i.e. firms versus consumers) due to the adoption of an MR 
agreement. While these studies provide important insights, they focus only on a single type 
of standards agreement and ignore country heterogeneity.7 
There also exists an established literature that examines the strategic incentives for 
countries to choose product standards. Inspired by Brander and Spencer (1985), Barrett 
(1994) analyzes and emphasizes the strategic use of environmental standards between 
countries whose firms compete on the world market. Boom (1995) examines the effect of 
asymmetric standards on market outcomes in a vertical differentiation model. Fischer and 
Serra (2000) study the incentives for a country to impose minimum standards when its own 
firm faces foreign competition in the home market. Gandal and Shy (2001) examine a 
country’s decision to recognize foreign standards and characterize conditions under which 
countries are willing to form a standards union. Furthermore, Klimenko (2009) models 
                                                     
7 Other related studies include Bagwell and Staiger (2001) and Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier 
(2002). For a comprehensive treatment of the effect of TBT liberalization, see Baldwin (2000). 
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strategic interaction of national product standards in the context of technical compatibility. 
While our work also captures such strategic incentives, it differs from the above studies by 
placing a clear focus on the institutional aspect of product standards. 
Finally, our analysis relates to several recent studies that examine the principle of NT 
in contexts other than product standards. As a seminal paper, Horn (2006) studies the 
welfare implications of the NT clause in the GATT for tariff and tax policies. Sara and 
Saggi (2008) extend Horn’s work by introducing product and country heterogeneity. Most 
recently, Geng and Saggi (2015) evaluate the case for implementing NT in the international 
protection of intellectual property. An important lesson from this literature is that the 
performance of NT is likely to depend on the nature of the policy instrument. In particular, 
while NT helps induce more efficient tax policies, it tends to work against efficiency when 
applied to intellectual property protection. While these studies compare cases with and 
without NT, our work compares NT with MR as these are two observed regulatory 
frameworks for product standards. Our study contributes to this literature by showing that 
in the context of product standards, NT appears more desirable than MR from an overall 
perspective and this edge is enhanced in a world of more heterogeneous countries. 
 
Model 
Consider a world comprised of two countries: 𝐴 and 𝐵. Each country has one firm 
that sells a homogeneous good with two versions: H and L. Consumption of version L 
generates a negative per-unit externality 𝜃 > 0 and such externality is zero for version H. 
Version H on the other hand is more expensive to produce. We denote the unit costs of 
producing H and L with 𝑐 > 0 and zero respectively. As an example, one may think of 𝜃 
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as the degree of pollution generated by cars, with 𝐻 and 𝐿 being the “hybrid” and the 
“regular” models of a car. Following Costinot (2008) we assume the regularity condition 
that 𝑐 < 1/4 . Firms share identical technologies and compete à la Cournot in both 
countries.8 
A representative consumer in either country buys at most one unit of the good. 
Consumer’s utility in country 𝑖 is given as 
 
𝑈𝑖 = {
𝑢 − 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖𝜑𝑖             𝑖𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑠 𝑒𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
−𝑠𝑖𝜑𝑖                                        𝑖𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔
           𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵 
 
(II.1) 
where 𝑢 represents consumer’s willingness to pay for the good, 𝑝𝑖  is the market price, 𝜑𝑖  
denotes the magnitude of consumption externality, 𝑠𝑖 ∈ [0,1] is a parameter capturing how 
much consumers are affected by the externality. In particular, 𝜑𝑖  is defined as 
 𝜑𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗𝑞𝑗𝑖         𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵 (II.2) 
where 𝑞𝑖𝑖  and 𝑞𝑗𝑖  represent quantities sold by the domestic and the foreign firm 
respectively, 𝜃𝑖 and 𝜃𝑗  can be 𝜃 or zero depending on the version being sold. Thus, how 
much consumption externality a country incurs depends on both the quantity and the 
version of the good being consumed in its market.9 
                                                     
8 Following previous studies we implicitly assume that markets are segmented, so that firms can 
charge prices independently across countries. This is helpful to isolating the effect of country 
heterogeneity by controlling for the potential impact of market structure. A notable observation is 
that the EU actually involves a more integrated market than the WTO. Exploring how difference 
in market structure may affect the performance of product standards agreements is an important 
topic for future research. 
9 The formulation of 𝜑 implies that the consumption externality is local in the sense that it occurs 
within national boundaries. Local consumption externalities are not uncommon; examples include 
safety standards on cars, pesticide use in agricultural products, environmental standards on product 
packages, etc. We discuss the case of global externalities in Section 4. 
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To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that 𝑢 is uniformly distributed over [0,1]. The 
market price can then be written as 
 𝑝𝑖 = 1 − (𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗𝑖). (II.3) 
A novel feature of our model is that consumers in the two countries may have 
heterogeneous preferences over product quality which is reflected by the extent of the 
consumption externality. Without loss of generality we assume that 𝑠𝐴 < 𝑠𝐵 = 1  and 
denote 𝑠𝐴  with 𝑠. Therefore consumers in country 𝐴 are relatively less affected by the 
negative consumption externality, implying that they value quality to a less extent. This 
could be due to the dispersion of per-capita income that leads to differential marginal utility 
of income across countries. In particular, our model can be interpreted as a North-South 
one with country 𝐴  (𝐵) belonging to the South (North). As we shall see, this simple 
structure of heterogeneous preferences retains tractability while generating rich strategic 
interactions between countries of national product standards. 
Countries set product standards as a means for regulating the market. Let σ denote a 
generic standard that stipulates the version of the good that is legal to be sold. In particular 
σ can be either 𝐻 (high or strict standard) or 𝐿 (low or lenient standard). Standards are firm 
specific: let σ𝑖𝑗 be country 𝑖’s standard for firm 𝑗, where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐴, 𝐵.
10 Under NT, countries 
have to treat foreign firms no worse than domestic ones, which implies 𝜎𝑖𝑖 ≼ 𝜎𝑖𝑗 with “≼” 
meaning “being no stricter than”. Since in our context countries do not have incentives to 
offer better deals to the foreigners, we simply assume equal treatment under NT, i.e. 𝜎𝑖𝑖 =
                                                     
10 In principle countries may allow firms to produce more than one versions, but in that case firms 
would simply produce version L as the cost is lower. Therefore, without loss of generality we 
simply assume the choice of standard to be a singleton. 
 59 
 
𝜎𝑖𝑗.
11 Under MR, on the other hand, a country’s standard on foreign firms is identical to 
what these firms follow in their home country, and this implies 𝜎𝑖𝑗 = 𝜎𝑗𝑗. Alternatively 
speaking, a standard applies to all firms in a given market under NT while to a given firm 
in all markets under MR. It is important to note that under either type of agreement each 
country only needs to determine the standard for domestic firms (𝜎𝑖𝑖 ): under NT this 
standard will automatically apply to foreign firms selling in domestic market, while under 
MR the standard on foreign firms is determined by their home countries. To economize 
notation, we will simply denote country 𝑖’s standard as 𝜎𝑖, with the understanding that 𝜎𝑖 
applies to country 𝑖’s market under NT but to country 𝑖’s firm under MR. We use (𝜎𝑖, 𝜎𝑗) 
to represent a generic policy combination for the two countries. 
As an illustration, let ({𝜎𝑖𝑖, 𝜎𝑖𝑗},{𝜎𝑗𝑗 , 𝜎𝑗𝑖}) be a full-fledged policy combination with 
{𝜎𝑖𝑖, 𝜎𝑖𝑗} and {𝜎𝑗𝑗 , 𝜎𝑗𝑖} denoting country 𝑖 and 𝑗’s standards respectively. Then we have the 
following correspondences: 
(i) (𝐻, 𝐻) = ({𝐻, 𝐻}, {𝐻, 𝐻}) under both NT and MR, 
(ii) (𝐿, 𝐿) = ({𝐿, 𝐿}, {𝐿, 𝐿}) under both NT and MR, 
(iii) (𝐻, 𝐿) = ({𝐻, 𝐻}, {𝐿, 𝐿}) under NT and ({𝐻, 𝐿}, {𝐿, 𝐻}) under MR, 
(iv) (𝐿, 𝐻) = ({𝐿, 𝐿}, {𝐻, 𝐻}) under NT and ({𝐿, 𝐻}, {𝐻, 𝐿}) under MR. 
We define country 𝑖’s welfare under agreement 𝑟 as 
 𝑤𝑖
𝑟(𝜎𝑖, 𝜎𝑗, 𝜃) = 𝑐𝑠𝑖
𝑟(𝜎𝑖, 𝜎𝑗 , 𝜃) + 𝜋𝑖
𝑟(𝜎𝑖, 𝜎𝑗 , 𝜃) + 𝜋𝑗
𝑟(𝜎𝑖, 𝜎𝑗 , 𝜃), (II.4) 
                                                     
11 Treating foreign firms better is not optimal because firms across countries are identical, thus 
doing so only lowers domestic firm’s profit without yielding extra gains. 
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where 𝑟 = 𝑁 (𝑁𝑇)  or 𝑀 (𝑀𝑅) , 𝑐𝑠𝑖(∙)  is consumer surplus, 𝜋𝑖(∙)  and 𝜋𝑗(∙)  represent 
firm’s domestic and foreign profits. World welfare is defined simply as the sum of each 
country’s welfare: 
 𝑤𝑤𝑟(𝜎𝑖, 𝜎𝑗 , 𝜃) = 𝑤𝑖
𝑟(𝜎𝑖, 𝜎𝑗 , 𝜃) + 𝑤𝑗
𝑟(𝜎𝑖, 𝜎𝑗, 𝜃). (II.5) 
Importantly, difference in the performance of NT and MR hinges on two factors: the 
nature of the constraint related to the agreement and that of the strategic policy interaction 
induced by the constraint. To identify their respective effects, we assume NT or MR is 
always binding and consider two scenarios of policy determination. In the first scenario 
countries coordinate their product standards to maximize joint welfare, while in the second 
they non-cooperatively choose standards to maximize each’s national welfare. In particular, 
as the effect of strategic interaction is shut down in the first scenario, any difference in the 
welfare effects must arise from different stringency of the constraints imposed by NT and 
MR. 
In either scenario the interaction between countries and firms proceeds as follows: 
Stage 1: countries simultaneously choose product standards, either cooperatively or 
non-cooperatively, subject to the NT or the MR constraint. 
Stage 2: firms compete à la Cournot in both countries while following the standards 
chosen in the first stage. 
We use backward induction to solve this game. Before studying the open economy 
with two countries, it would be helpful as a benchmark to examine firm behavior and 
optimal standards under autarky. To this end, note that in a closed economy domestic firm 
maximizes profit as 
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 max
𝑞
𝑝𝑞 − 𝐼(𝜎 = 𝐻)𝑐𝑞, (II.6) 
where  𝑝 = 1 − 𝑞  given that 𝑢  is uniformly distributed over [0,1], 𝐼(⋅) is an indicator 
function equal to one if the standard is strict (i.e. 𝜎 = 𝐻) and zero otherwise. Solving the 
problem in Eq. (II.6) yields optimal outputs as 𝑞(𝜎 = 𝐻) = (1 − 𝑐)/2 and 𝑞(𝜎 = 𝐿) =
1/2. The firm’s profit is calculated as 𝜋(𝜎 = 𝑘) = 𝑝(𝜎 = 𝑘)𝑞(𝜎 = 𝑘) where 𝑘 = 𝐻, 𝐿. 
Given the equilibrium market price, it is easy to see that only consumers with 𝑢 > ?̂?(𝜎 =
𝑘) would buy the product. It follows that consumer surplus and national welfare can be 
calculated as 
 
𝑐𝑠(𝜎 = 𝑘) = ∫ (𝑢 − 𝑝(𝜎 = 𝑘)
1
𝑢(𝜎=𝑘)
𝑑𝑢 − 𝑠𝜃(𝜎 = 𝑘)𝑞(𝜎 = 𝑘), 
𝑤(𝜎 = 𝑘) =  𝑐𝑠(𝜎 = 𝑘) + 𝜋(𝜎 = 𝑘). 
 
 
(II.7) 
To maximize national welfare the government simply compares 𝑤(𝜎 = 𝐻) with 𝑤(𝜎 =
𝐿) . It follows that optimal product standards would depend on the magnitude of the 
externality 𝜃. In particular, we have 
 𝑤(𝜎 = 𝐻) > 𝑤(𝜎 = 𝐿) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 > 𝜃𝐴𝑈, (II.8) 
where 𝜃𝐴𝑈 is a threshold level of the consumption externality.12 Condition (II.8) indicates 
that the strict standard is preferred if the externality is so large that it exceeds 𝜃𝐴𝑈 , 
otherwise the lenient standard is welfare maximizing. Intuitively, the government faces a 
fundamental trade-off between lowering the production cost and curbing the negative 
externality. When 𝜃 is large the latter consideration is dominant, so implementing the strict 
                                                     
12 To preserve space, we collect expressions of all the thresholds in the Appendix. 
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standard is desirable; otherwise the lenient standard is chosen to exploit cheaper production 
technology. 
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that 
 𝜕𝜃𝐴𝑈
𝜕𝑠
< 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜕𝜃𝐴𝑈
𝜕𝑐
> 0. 
 
(II.9) 
The first inequality in Eq. (II.9) says that a country would be more likely to impose 
the lenient standard as it becomes more tolerant of the negative consumption externality. 
The second inequality indicates that as it is costlier to produce under the strict standard, 
the lenient standard becomes more appealing and will be chosen at a higher level of the 
externality. As we shall see, these mechanisms play a fundamental role as countries 
determine product standards in an open economy setting. 
Coordination over Product Standards 
Optimal Product Standards 
We start by analyzing coordination over product standards subject to the constraint of 
NT or MR. Assume first that both countries sign an agreement based on NT that mandates 
equal treatment of firms. Countries then maximize world welfare as 
 max
𝜎𝑖,𝜎𝑗∈{𝐻,𝐿)
𝑤𝑤𝑁(𝜎𝑖, 𝜎𝑗, 𝜃)  𝑠. 𝑡. 𝜎𝑖 = 𝜎𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝑖𝑗 . (II.10) 
As each country can choose either 𝐻 or 𝐿, there are four possible policy combinations 
under NT: (𝐻, 𝐻), (𝐿, 𝐿), (𝐻, 𝐿) and (𝐿, 𝐻). As a useful result, it can be shown that 
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 𝑤𝑤𝑁(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) > 𝑤𝑤𝑁(𝐻, 𝐿, 𝜃) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝜃, (II.11) 
that is, (𝐻, 𝐿) is never an optimal policy profile from the social point of view. The intuition 
is clear: given country 𝐴 cares less about externalities, it is not efficient for it to implement 
a stricter standard than country 𝐵.13 Furthermore, as with the case of autarky, optimal 
standards in the open economy depend on the magnitude of the externality 𝜃. To see this, 
first note that for sufficiently large 𝜃, it is optimal to impose the strict standard in both 
countries. As 𝜃  declines it becomes desirable to have countries switch to the lenient 
standard. In particular, it is jointly optimal to have country 𝐴 loosen its standard first 
because its consumers suffer less from the negative externality. It can then be shown that 
there exists a unique threshold 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁  such that 
 𝑤𝑤𝑁(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) > 𝑤𝑤𝑁(𝐻, 𝐻, 𝜃) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁 . (II.12) 
That is, for 𝜃  below 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁  country 𝐴 should switch to the low standard while country 𝐵 
should maintain the high standard. As 𝜃 further decreases to a sufficiently low level, it 
becomes optimal to also have country 𝐵 lower its standard. One can similarly show that 
there exists 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 such that this is the case given 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁: 
 𝑤𝑤𝑁(𝐿, 𝐿, 𝜃) > 𝑤𝑤𝑁(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 . (II.13) 
Moreover, it can be verified that 
 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁  𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 < 1, (II.14) 
                                                     
13 While we have suppressed the details, in our model raising the standard in either country reduces 
trade flows and raises local prices, which is consistent with recent empirical findings in Fontagné 
et al (2015). 
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which implies that for 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁  differential standards (𝐿, 𝐻)  must be the unique 
optimal policy combination. To verify this is indeed the case, simply note that for 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 <
𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁  Eqs. (II.12) and (II.13) together imply that world welfare is maximized at (𝐿, 𝐻). 
Moreover, to see how preference heterogeneity affects jointly optimal standards, we 
may readily derive the following: 
 𝜕(𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁 − 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁)
𝜕𝑠
< 0. 
As expected, when preference asymmetry increases (i.e. 𝑠  falls), differential standards 
(𝐿, 𝐻) become more desirable as they will be optimal over a larger range of the externality. 
We summarize the main results so far in the following proposition: 
Proposition II.1. Suppose countries coordinate their product standards. Jointly optimal 
policies under NT are as follows: 
(i) When the externality is large, i.e., 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁  both countries choose the strict 
standard (𝐻, 𝐻); 
(ii) When the externality is moderate, i.e. 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁 , country 𝐴  chooses the 
lenient standard and country 𝐵 enforces the strict standard: (𝐿, 𝐻). 
(iii) When the externality is small, i.e. 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 , both countries choose the lenient 
standard: (𝐿, 𝐿). 
(iv) As preference heterogeneity increases, i.e. 𝑠 falls, the range of the externality 
[𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 , 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁 ] in which differential policies (𝐿, 𝐻) are optimal expands. 
Proposition II.1 emphasizes that differential product standards (𝐿, 𝐻) are necessarily 
optimal when countries have heterogeneous preferences and the externality is moderate. 
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The reason is that such a policy profile allows country 𝐴 to take advantage of the lower 
production cost of version 𝐿, and the gain of doing so would dominate the mild rise in the 
impact of the negative consumption externality. Moreover, as country 𝐴 becomes less 
affected by consumption externalities, it should implement 𝐿 for even higher levels of the 
externality, which leads the parameter range in which (𝐿, 𝐻) prevails to increase. 
Now let us establish jointly optimal standards under MR. In particular, countries now 
maximize world welfare as follows: 
 max
𝜎𝑖,𝜎𝑗∈{𝐻,𝐿)
𝑤𝑤𝑀(𝜎𝑖, 𝜎𝑗 , 𝜃)  𝑠. 𝑡. 𝜎𝑖 = 𝜎𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝑗𝑖 . (II.15) 
Hence the MR constraint essentially demands that each firm follows a same standard across 
countries. There are also four policy combinations consistent with MR: (𝐻, 𝐻), (𝐿, 𝐿), 
(𝐻, 𝐿) and (𝐿, 𝐻). Note that the latter two profiles are different from those under NT that 
are represented by the same notations. 
To begin with, it is easy to check that 
 𝑤𝑤𝑀(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) = 𝑤𝑤𝑀(𝐻, 𝐿, 𝜃) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝜃, (II.16) 
that is, when policies are differential between countries, world welfare is not affected by 
which country implements the low standard. This is because both versions are produced in 
each country whether (𝐿, 𝐻) or (𝐻, 𝐿) is implemented. Moreover, as firms have identical 
cost functions it does not matter which firm produces version 𝐻  (or 𝐿). In either case 
market prices and outputs are exactly the same across countries, and so is consumer 
surplus. It follows that total profit, i.e. the sum of each firm’s global profit, also remains 
unaltered. However, note that the distribution of profit may vary between firms: the firm 
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whose home country imposes a lenient standard will enjoy a cost advantage in both markets 
and hence make a larger share of the total profit. Without loss of generality, we will assume 
(𝐿, 𝐻) as the policy profile that is actually chosen by both countries. 
Under MR it is jointly optimal for both countries to impose the strict standard if the 
externality is high. Moreover, it can be shown that there exists a threshold 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀  such that 
 𝑤𝑤𝑀(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) > 𝑤𝑤𝑀(𝐻, 𝐻, 𝜃) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀 , (II.17) 
that is, imposing the low standard by country 𝐴 is preferred if the externality falls below 
the threshold 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀 . Similarly, we can find 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀  such that 
 𝑤𝑤𝑀(𝐿, 𝐿, 𝜃) > 𝑤𝑤𝑀(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑀, (II.18) 
i.e. it is optimal for both countries to set the low standard when the externality is small. 
Importantly, it can be shown that 
 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑀. (II.19) 
What Eq. (II.19) says is that for 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑀, (𝐿, 𝐻) must be dominated by either (𝐻, 𝐻) 
or (𝐿, 𝐿) and thus will not be welfare maximizing. This leaves (𝐻, 𝐻) and (𝐿, 𝐿) as the 
only candidate policy options. Comparing these two policy profiles, we find 𝜃𝑐𝑚 such that 
 𝑤𝑤𝑀(𝐻, 𝐻, 𝜃) > 𝑤𝑤𝑀(𝐿, 𝐿, 𝜃) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑐𝑚. (II.20) 
Moreover, it can be readily checked that 
 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑐𝑚 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑀. (II.21) 
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Eqs. (II.20) and (II.21) together imply that both countries should choose either the strict or 
the lenient standard under MR, with 𝜃𝑐𝑚  being the threshold of the externality that 
determines the switch between the two policy combinations. Note that this observation 
holds for all 𝑠 ≤ 1 and so does not depend on the existence of preference asymmetry. 
The following proposition summarizes the above major findings: 
 Proposition II.2. Under MR, jointly optimal standards are symmetric regardless of the 
degree of preference heterogeneity. Specifically, 
(i) When the externality is large, i.e. 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑐𝑚 , both countries choose the strict 
standard (𝐻, 𝐻). 
(ii) When the externality is small, i.e. 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑚 , both countries choose the lenient 
standard (𝐿, 𝐿). 
Figure II.1 depicts the optimal standards under NT and MR. 
Figure II.1: Optimal Product Standards and World Welfare Under Policy Coordination 
 
Why are differential policies such as (𝐿, 𝐻) never be optimal under MR? The reason 
hinges on the fact that when it is optimal to impose a low standard exclusively in country 
𝐴, MR mandates the standard to mechanically apply in country 𝐵. This renders the cost of 
imposing the low standard unnecessarily borne by country 𝐵  whose consumers value 
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quality to a greater extent. Therefore, the pattern of differential policies under MR is 
inefficient from the social point of view. 
Finally, it is important to note that preference heterogeneity plays a key role in driving 
the distinct patterns of optimal policies between NT and MR. In fact, under symmetry (i.e. 
𝑠 = 1) it is straightforward to show that 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀 = 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑀 = 𝜃𝑐𝑚, that is, coordinated standards 
under NT become symmetric regardless of the externality. Hence optimal policies under 
the two types of agreements coincide: 
Corollary II.1. Suppose countries are symmetric, i.e. 𝑠 = 1. Then coordination under NT 
or MR yields the same optimal product standards. 
Welfare Analysis 
We now investigate the welfare implications of the constraints imposed by NT and 
MR. We first propose a simple measure for the effectiveness of NT relative to MR, which 
will be useful to characterizing the effect of preference heterogeneity on the relative 
performance of the two types of agreements. 
Definition II.1. Let the effectiveness of NT relative to MR be measured as 
 𝑟 =
𝑚(𝐷)
𝑚(𝐸)
, (II.22) 
where 𝐷 = {𝜃|𝜃 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑁𝑇 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒} , 𝐸 =
{𝜃|𝜃 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑀𝑅 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒}  and 𝑚(⋅)  denotes the 
Lebesgue measure on 𝑅. 
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Moreover, if the denominator of 𝑟 is zero, i.e. MR never dominates NT, then we define 
𝑟 = 𝑚(𝐷).  
If the numerator of 𝑟 is zero, i.e. NT never dominates MR, then define 𝑟 =
1
𝑚(𝐸)
. 
Thus, in a rough sense 𝑟  simply reflects the relative range of 𝜃  for which NT is 
preferred to MR in terms of world welfare. A larger 𝑟 indicates that NT yields higher world 
welfare over a greater portion of 𝜃 and will become more effective relative to MR. By 
definition we may consider 𝑟 as a relatively “conservative” measure as compared to one 
based on the absolute changes in the range of 𝜃 such as 𝑚(𝐷) − 𝑚(𝐸). This is because 
when 𝑟 rises 𝑚(𝐷) − 𝑚(𝐸) must also increase, but the converse may not be true. In the 
following analysis we will use r as the index for the evaluation of the efficacy of NT and 
MR. 
It is also worth noting that a presupposition underlying the definition of the index r is 
that different levels of the externality contribute equally to calculating the relative 
effectiveness of alternative standards agreements. It can be expected that higher levels of 
externality may carry more weight as they could have larger impacts on social welfare. For 
tractability we have abstracted from this consideration. Nevertheless, as will be seen, NT 
tends to dominate MR for large values of the externality, and such dominance is amplified 
as preference asymmetry increases between countries. Thus, if NT performs relatively 
better between more asymmetric countries, a result that we will establish, then our findings 
would in fact be strengthened if also accounting for the gravity of externalities. 
Now let us compare the welfare implications of NT and MR. An important 
observation is that NT yields weakly higher world welfare than MR for all 𝜃, because 
optimal policies under MR are restricted to symmetric standards, while those under NT 
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involve both symmetric and differential ones. In particular, it is easy to see that for 𝜃 ≥
𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁  and 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁, the two agreements are equally efficient by inducing the same optimal 
policies. For 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁 , however, NT would dominate MR as symmetric standards are 
available under NT but are not chosen (see Figure II.1). By Definition 1, the effectiveness 
of NT relative to MR can then be written as 
 𝑟1 = 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁 − 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 . (II.23) 
Moreover, it is easy to check that 
 𝜕𝑟1
𝜕𝑠
< 0. 
 
Hence 𝑟1  increases as 𝑠  falls, implying that NT is relatively more effective between 
countries with a higher degree of heterogeneous preferences over the externality. These 
findings are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition II.3. Suppose countries coordinate their standards to maximize joint welfare. 
(i) NT yields weakly higher world welfare than MR for all levels of the externality. In 
particular, world welfare is strictly higher under NT for intermediate levels of the 
externality: 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁 . 
(ii) NT becomes relatively more effective than MR as countries possess more 
heterogeneous preferences over the externality.14 
                                                     
14 Note that the reasoning is robust to how preference asymmetry is generated. Suppose instead 
𝑠𝐴 = 1 and 𝑠𝐵  rises above 1, i.e. country 𝐵  now cares more about negative externalities in an 
absolute sense. Then it is straightforward to check that NT will dominate MR over some new range 
[?̃?𝑙
𝑁, ?̃?𝑢
𝑁], and as 𝑠𝐵 increases it can be shown that ?̃?𝑙
𝑁 falls while ?̃?𝑢
𝑁 remains unchanged. As a 
result ?̃?𝑢
𝑁 − ?̃?𝑙
𝑁 continues to expand so that NT would still dominate MR for a larger range of the 
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Figure II.1 shows the weak dominance of NT while Figure II.2 depicts how the 
effectiveness of NT relative to MR varies with preference heterogeneity. 
Figure II.2: Effectiveness of NT Relative to MR Under Policy Coordination 
 
Proposition II.3 is important in two aspects. First, it characterizes the welfare cost or 
the stringency related to the constraints imposed by NT and MR. Part (i) of the proposition 
indicates that when country preferences are heterogeneous, the MR constraint tends to 
generate a weakly larger welfare cost than that of NT, thus being more stringent from a 
social point of view. Moreover, part (ii) says that the welfare cost of MR relative to NT 
tends to increase as the degree of preference asymmetry rises. The intuition for these results 
is clear. Under MR countries have to recognize foreign standards which may be rather 
different from domestic norms if preferences are fairly different across countries. This 
generates a negative international spillover represented by a mismatch of product standards 
                                                     
externality. This further implies that our results would remain valid if both 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵 vary and 
diverge from each other. The intuition is that the relative performance of NT to MR depends on the 
degree of asymmetry in country preference rather than its magnitude. 
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that would affect both countries. In contrast, countries under NT have full control over the 
standards to be implemented in their domestic markets and therefore do not suffer from 
this mismatch problem. When countries coordinate their policies, they take this into 
account by foregoing differential policies under MR to avoid the mismatch problem. 
However, this reduces the available choice set by leaving them with symmetric policy 
profiles alone, which are less efficient than the differential ones under NT given the 
externality is moderate. As country heterogeneity increases, the constraint of MR appears 
relatively more stringent than that of NT because the differential policies under NT are 
optimal under a larger set of circumstances. 
Second, part (ii) of the proposition indicates that although NT always weakly 
dominates MR, countries with more heterogeneous preferences would see NT as preferable 
to MR to a greater extent. This property could shed light on the observed choices by the 
WTO and the EU regarding their respective agreements on product standards. Specifically, 
let 𝑠𝑊𝑇𝑂  and 𝑠𝐸𝑈  be the degrees of preference asymmetry for the WTO and the EU 
respectively and simply assume 𝑠𝑊𝑇𝑂 > 𝑠𝐸𝑈, that is, the WTO involves member countries 
with more heterogeneous preferences. Proposition II.3 then implies that our index 𝑟 will 
take a greater value for the WTO than for the EU, that is, NT should appear more appealing 
to the WTO as the welfare improvement it induces over MR is larger for WTO members. 
On the other hand, the EU’s preference for MR might seem puzzling at first sight since 
MR never dominates NT for all levels of the externality. However, it turns out that MR 
may involve other benefits which we do not explicitly model here, such as the avoidance 
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of conversion cost for the exporting firms.15 These extra gains could make MR favored by 
the EU but not the WTO, as the latter would benefit from NT more. 
Interestingly, Proposition II.1 to II.3 together may also speak to the harmonization of 
product standards across countries, a principle that has been implemented to some extent 
in the EU.16 Our analysis implies that the need for harmonization may depend on the nature 
of the standards agreement. In particular, an agreement based on MR would guarantee 
harmonization provided countries can coordinate their standards. In the meantime, our 
results also indicate that harmonization without qualifications (i.e. for all 𝜃) is necessarily 
suboptimal between heterogeneous countries. In particular, while applying harmonized 
standards is desirable for very high or low levels of the externality, it is not so when the 
externality is moderate. As a specific example, consider the externality as pollution. Then 
Proposition II.3 implies that harmonization over 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁  would lead to either “race 
to the bottom” (i.e. uniform low standards (𝐿, 𝐿)) or “green protection” (i.e. uniform high 
standards (𝐻, 𝐻)) as compared to the optimal outcome under NT (i.e. (𝐿, 𝐻)). 
It is also useful to examine the first-best policies that are obtained under no 
institutional constraints. Similar reasoning as above indicates that, starting with uniform 
strict standards when the externality is very large, it is socially optimal to switch to the 
lenient standard first in country 𝐴 and then in country 𝐵 as the externality continues to 
decline. Moreover, we show in the Appendix that it is always optimal for either country to 
                                                     
15  A conversion cost is the expenditure that occurs when firms switch between two different 
versions of a product. By definition 𝑐 in our model, i.e. the production cost for the 𝐻 version, 
should not be considered as a conversion cost because it does not arise when firms switch from 𝐻 
to 𝐿. 
16 In particular, the European Commission requires that a harmonized standard should be developed 
by recognized European Standards Organizations: CEN, CENELEC, or ETSI. There have been 
harmonized standards formulated for various industries such as chemicals, construction healthcare 
engineering, etc. Whether to adopt harmonized standards remains voluntary. 
 74 
 
apply the lenient standard on both firms. In other words, discriminatory policies 
characterized by imposing the low standard on just one firm in either market are never 
efficient. Importantly, this implies that the optimal policies under NT are in fact consistent 
with the first-best outcome. Thus, we know that while there can be an efficiency cost to 
imposing the MR constraint, such a cost is zero for NT. We state this result in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition II.4. Coordination under NT leads to the first-best outcome. Therefore, 
optimal world welfare is not affected by the institutional constraint of NT, but it is reduced 
by the constraint of MR when the externality is moderate. 
Note that heterogeneity in country preferences plays a key role in driving a wedge in 
the welfare implications between the two types of agreements. In fact, by Corollary II.1 we 
immediately know that when countries are identical, world welfare is identical under both 
agreements for all levels of the externality: 
Corollary II.2. Under symmetric countries, NT and MR are equally effective, i.e. they yield 
the same world welfare for all levels of the externality. 
Global Externalities 
In the real world some externalities can move across national borders and so are global 
in nature. In this section we investigate how global externalities may affect the relative 
performance of NT and MR. As the key driving force that gives NT an edge when 
externalities are local is the mismatch of standards induced by MR, we examine whether 
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this mechanism would be altered in the presence of global externalities. To this end, we 
assume that the externality is caused by both domestic and foreign consumptions of the 
good: 
 𝑈𝑖 = {
𝑢 − 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖(𝜑𝑖 + 𝛿𝜑𝑗)      𝑖𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑠 𝑒𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
−𝑠𝑖(𝜑𝑖 + 𝛿𝜑𝑗)                                 𝑖𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔
           𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵 (II.24) 
 
 
where 𝛿  measures the impact of the externality arising from foreign consumption. We 
further assume that 𝛿 < 1, i.e. the foreign externality causes a smaller damage on consumer 
utility than the domestic one. With the specification as in Eq. (II.24), we can use similar 
reasoning as above to find thresholds of 𝜃 that characterize the optimal standards under the 
two types of agreements. In particular, starting with uniform strict standards, we can find 
𝜃𝑢
𝑁′  under NT such that country 𝐴  switches to the lenient standard, and 𝜃𝑙
𝑁′  such that 
country 𝐵 also does so. Moreover, it can be shown that 
 𝜃𝑢
𝑁′ > 𝜃𝑙
𝑁′ 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝛿 < 1. (II.25) 
Therefore, for 𝜃𝑙
𝑁′ < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁′ differential policies (𝐿, 𝐻) remain optimal under NT. Along 
similar lines, we can find 𝜃𝑢
𝑀′and 𝜃𝑙
𝑀′ under MR which correspond to 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 and 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 under 
local externalities. Importantly, we can show that 
 𝜃𝑢
𝑀′ > 𝜃𝑙
𝑀′. (II.26) 
As with the case of local externalities, condition (II.26) says that differential policies (𝐿, 𝐻) 
are never optimal under MR. This leaves (𝐻, 𝐻) and (𝐿, 𝐿) as the only candidate policy 
combinations. It follows that there exists 𝜃𝑐𝑚
′  such that (𝐻, 𝐻) is chosen for 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑐𝑚
′  and 
(𝐿, 𝐿) is preferred otherwise. As the pattern of optimal standards remains unchanged under 
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global externalities, we know NT continues to weakly dominate MR and yields strictly 
higher world welfare for 𝜃𝑙
𝑁′ < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁′. The reason is similar as before: over this range 
of 𝜃 symmetric standards are chosen under MR but they are inferior to the differential 
standards (𝐿, 𝐻) under NT. Moreover, it is easy to check that fixing any 𝛿, the range of 𝜃 
in which NT strictly dominates MR (i.e. (𝜃𝑢
𝑁′ − 𝜃𝑙
𝑁′) ) expands, indicating that the 
effectiveness of NT relative to MR enhances between countries with more heterogeneous 
preferences. Therefore, under global externalities the mismatch of standards associated 
with MR remains, and our findings continue to hold. 
Non-cooperative Product Standards 
Nash Equilibrium 
In this section we assume countries non-cooperatively set their product standards to 
maximize each’s national welfare. This allows us to examine how the effectiveness of NT 
and MR may depend upon the strategic interaction of national product standards. Let us 
begin by characterizing the equilibrium outcome in the presence of NT. First, it is important 
to note that policy decisions under NT are independent across countries, i.e. the best 
response function for one country does not depend on the policy choice of the other.17 The 
reason is that the non-discrimination constraint imposed by NT automatically eliminates 
the profit-shifting incentives as in Brander and Spencer (1985): in our context countries are 
                                                     
17 An implication is that maximizing national welfare is equivalent to maximizing the sum of 
consumer surplus and firm’s domestic profit, while the foreign profit will be determined by the 
other country’s standard policies. 
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not able to shift profits to domestic firms via setting a higher standard exclusively on 
foreign competitors because doing so will violate NT. 
Having that said, note that Nash equilibrium outcome depends critically on the 
magnitude of the externality. For sufficiently large 𝜃, uniform strict standards must be the 
unique Nash equilibrium. To see why, note that due to preference asymmetry it is country 
𝐴 that always has a stronger incentive to loosen the standard as the externality becomes 
smaller. Hence we can identify 𝜃𝑢
𝑁  below which country 𝐴  would prefer the lenient 
standard such as 
 𝑤𝐴
𝑁(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) > 𝑤𝐴
𝑁(𝐻, 𝐻, 𝜃) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 . (II.27) 
Conversely, country 𝐴  would stick with the strict standard when 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 . Moreover, 
country 𝐵 would maintain the strict standard whenever country 𝐴 does so because it views 
the negative externality as costlier. Therefore no country has an incentive to deviate to the 
lenient standard when 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑁, which verifies that (𝐻, 𝐻) is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
Next we show that if the externality is sufficiently low, then (𝐿, 𝐿), i.e. uniform lenient 
standards is the unique equilibrium. Note that starting from this outcome it is country 𝐵 
that is more willing to raise the standard as 𝜃 rises. This allows us to find 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 which makes 
the following hold: 
 𝑤𝐵
𝑁(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) > 𝑤𝐵
𝑁(𝐿, 𝐿, 𝜃) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 . (II.28) 
Conversely, country 𝐵 chooses the lenient standard as long as 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑁. But whenever 
this is the case country 𝐴 would also implement the lenient standard. Thus (𝐿, 𝐿) is the 
unique Nash equilibrium for 𝜃 that falls below 𝜃𝑙
𝑁. 
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Moreover, as it can be shown that 
 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 < 1, (II.29) 
we also need to solve for the equilibrium for 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 . Note that over this range 
neither (𝐻, 𝐻) nor (𝐿, 𝐿) can be an equilibrium outcome, because conditions (II.27) and 
(II.28) indicate that either country would have an incentive to deviate. Also note that given 
country 𝐴 being less averse to the externality, it would never impose a lower standard 
relative to country 𝐵. This rules out (𝐻, 𝐿) as an equilibrium for all 𝜃. It follows that (𝐿, 𝐻) 
must be the only possible equilibrium outcome. To see this is indeed the case, note that 
condition (II.27) indicates that country 𝐴 would not have incentives to switch to the strict 
standard. Similarly, condition (II.28) tells us that country 𝐵  also has no incentives to 
deviate to the lenient standard. Therefore, (𝐿, 𝐻) is the unique Nash equilibrium over 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 <
𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁. 
It is also straightforward to examine the effect of preference asymmetry on the 
equilibrium outcome: 
 𝜕(𝜃𝑢
𝑁 − 𝜃𝑙
𝑁)
𝜕𝑠
< 0. 
  
Hence as preference asymmetry increases (𝐿, 𝐻) arises as an equilibrium outcome for more 
levels of the externality. We can summarize the above results as: 
Proposition II.5. Nash equilibrium standards under NT are as follows: 
(i) When the externality is large, i.e. 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 , both countries choose the strict 
standard: (𝐻, 𝐻). 
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(ii) When the externality is moderate, i.e. 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 , country 𝐴  chooses the 
lenient standard while country 𝐵 imposes the strict standard: (𝐿, 𝐻). 
(iii) When the externality is small, i.e. 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 , both countries choose the lenient 
standard: (𝐿, 𝐿). 
(iv) As preference heterogeneity increases, i.e. s falls, the range of the externality 𝜃 
in which asymmetric equilibrium (𝐿, 𝐻) arises expands. 
We may compare the policy outcomes with and without coordination to examine the 
effect of strategic incentives on the choice of standards. In particular, it is straightforward 
to derive that: 
 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁 . (II.30) 
What Eq. (II.30) says is that countries are less willing to impose the low standard under 
NT when strategic incentives are present. The reason is that doing so under NT generates 
a positive externality for foreign countries: a lower standard has to apply to both firms and 
this raises foreign firm’s profit by reducing its production cost. For instance, country 𝐵’s 
firm makes a profit of (1 − c)2/9 in country 𝐴 under the high standard, while its profit 
rises to 1/9 when country 𝐴 switches to the low standard. The same holds for the profit of 
country 𝐴’s firm earned in country 𝐵. This positive profit externality explains why NT 
leads to an overuse of the high standard as shown in Costinot (2008) between identical 
countries. As might be expected, Eq. (II.30) implies that this tendency continues to exist 
when countries have heterogeneous preferences over the externality. 
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Now consider Nash equilibrium under MR. By examining country 𝐴’s incentives we 
can pin down the unique threshold 𝜃𝑢
𝑀  above which both countries choose the strict 
standard. Specifically 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 must satisfy 
 𝑤𝐴
𝑀(𝐻, 𝐻, 𝜃) > 𝑤𝐴
𝑀(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 . (II.31) 
Along similar lines, one can show that there exists a threshold 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 below which country 𝐵 
would turn to the lenient standard: 
 𝑤𝐵
𝑀(𝐿, 𝐿, 𝜃) > 𝑤𝐵
𝑀(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀. (II.32) 
Thus both countries prefer the lenient standard as 𝜃 falls below 𝜃𝑙
𝑀. Furthermore, we make 
the following useful observation: 
 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 < 𝑠𝑎
𝑀, (II.33) 
where 𝑠𝑎
𝑀 ∈ (0,1) is a threshold for 𝑠. Eq. (II.33) indicates that 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 can be larger or smaller 
than 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 depending on the degree of preference asymmetry 𝑠. When preferences are similar 
across countries such that 𝑠𝑎
𝑀 < 𝑠 ≤ 1, we have 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 which implies that both (𝐻, 𝐻) 
and (𝐿, 𝐿) could arise as equilibrium over 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀. In this case, we follow Costinot 
(2008) by focusing on the “most cooperative” outcome that would yield higher world 
welfare. To this end, recall that 𝑤𝑤𝑀(𝐻, 𝐻, 𝜃) > 𝑤𝑤𝑀(𝐿, 𝐿, 𝜃) if and only if 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑐𝑚 . 
Moreover, it is easy to check that 𝜃𝑐𝑚 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀. Hence (𝐻, 𝐻) yields higher world welfare for 
all 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 and will be the most cooperative outcome for later analysis. 
Multiple equilibria arise under MR because of strategic dependence in the national 
product standards. In particular, it can be shown that standards between countries are 
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strategic complements regardless of preference heterogeneity: a country is more likely to 
choose the standard that is enforced by its trading partner. Strategic complementarity 
occurs under MR due to the existence of profit-shifting incentives: as each country sets 
standards in both countries for its own firm, it is possible to adjust the standard so as to 
shift profits from foreign to domestic firm. This leads to a negative profit externality of 
lowering product standards under MR: when country 𝐴 switches to the lenient standard, its 
firm would enjoy a reduced production cost and make more profit in both markets at the 
cost of country 𝐵’s firm. This would make country 𝐵 more willing to lower its standard as 
well to offset the negative shock to its firm. Particularly, the following can be shown to 
hold: 
 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑀 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 , (II.34) 
Eq. (II.34) indicates that the negative profit externality due to profit-shifting 
incentives make both countries tend to overuse the lenient standard under MR. Recall this 
is opposite to the pattern under NT in which countries are inclined to overuse the strict 
standard. Such a contrast arises exactly from the different nature of the profit externalities. 
Interestingly, our analysis implies that multiple equilibria under MR would vanish if 
𝑠 < 𝑠𝑎
𝑀, that is, when countries have sufficiently asymmetric preferences. In fact for 𝑠 <
𝑠𝑎
𝑀 we must have 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀, and over  𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 both (𝐻, 𝐻) and (𝐿, 𝐿) can no longer 
sustain as equilibrium because either country would have an incentive to switch the 
standard. Moreover, one can also rule out (𝐻, 𝐿) as a viable equilibrium for all 𝜃 as given 
country 𝐴 caring less about externality, it has no incentives to impose a higher standard 
 82 
 
than country 𝐵. Hence (𝐿, 𝐻) is the unique equilibrium over 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀, as Eqs. (II.31) 
and (II.32) together imply that no incentives exist for either country to deviate. 
Finally, given 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 we can show that 
 𝜕(𝜃𝑢
𝑀 − 𝜃𝑙
𝑀)
𝜕𝑠
< 0. 
  
Hence (𝐿, 𝐻) would arise as a more prevalent equilibrium between countries with a higher 
degree of preference heterogeneity. We can state the following proposition: 
Proposition II.6. Nash equilibrium standards under MR depend on the degree of 
preference heterogeneity: 
a. When countries have preferences that are relatively alike, i.e. 𝑠 > 𝑠𝑎
𝑀: 
(i) If the externality is large, i.e. 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑀, both countries choose the strict standard: 
(𝐻, 𝐻). 
(ii) If the externality is small, i.e. 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀, both countries choose the lenient standard: 
(𝐿, 𝐿). 
b. When countries have sufficiently different preferences, i.e. 𝑠 > 𝑠𝑎
𝑀: 
(i) If the externality is large, i.e. 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑀, both countries choose the strict standard: 
(𝐻, 𝐻). 
(ii) If the externality is moderate, i.e. 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀, country 𝐴 chooses the lenient 
standard while country 𝐵 imposes the strict standard: (𝐿, 𝐻). 
(iii) If the externality is small, i.e. 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀, both countries choose the lenient standard: 
(𝐿, 𝐿). 
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(iv) As preference heterogeneity increases between countries, asymmetric equilibrium 
(𝐿, 𝐻) arises for a larger range of the externality. 
Proposition II.6 generalizes the finding in Costinot (2008) which demonstrates that 
MR induces multiple equilibria under perfect symmetry. In particular, part (a) shows that 
multiple equilibria would occur as long as preferences are sufficiently similar between 
countries. Nevertheless, part (b) implies that multiple equilibria would disappear if 
consumer tastes become rather different between countries. The key reason is that greater 
preference asymmetry reduces the complementarity of national policies on product 
standards. To see this, note that as country 𝐴 cares less about the externality, it tends to 
choose the lenient standard when the externality remains relatively high. This makes 
country 𝐵 less likely to respond by lowering its standard because the welfare loss from 
incurring the externality is large. As a consequence, when strategic complementarity is 
sufficiently small, asymmetric standards (𝐿, 𝐻)  would arise as the unique Nash 
equilibrium. 
We may also note a useful property of the threshold preference asymmetry 𝑠𝑎
𝑀. The 
result would be useful to proving Proposition II.7 below. 
Lemma II.1. The threshold 𝑠𝑎
𝑀 is decreasing in 𝑐. In particular, 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 0) = 1. 
Lemma II.1 says that the profit-shifting incentives under MR, and hence the likelihood 
of multiple equilibria, depend on the cost differential between the two versions of the good. 
A lower 𝑐  represents a smaller cost differential, which weakens the profit-shifting 
incentives since the gains from loosening the standard decline. This reduces the degree of 
strategic complementarity and makes multiple equilibria less likely to occur. In particular, 
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as 𝑐 = 0  the two versions of the good become indistinguishable so that strategic 
complementarity simply vanishes. This can be seen by noting that both 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 and 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 would 
collapse to 𝜃𝑐𝑚 at 𝑐 = 0, implying that unique equilibrium is guaranteed for all 𝑠 ≤ 1. 
Finally, we make an observation regarding the Nash equilibrium under symmetric 
countries. As shown in Costinot (2008), both countries choose the lenient standard under 
NT at a lower level of externality than under MR, and neither agreement induces socially 
optimal outcome due to the existence of profit externalities. Thus unlike the case of 
coordination analyzed above, NT and MR no longer induce the same policy outcome in 
the presence of strategic incentives. Since Costinot (2008) examines Nash game, the 
difference in the equilibrium outcome between the two types of agreements reflects a 
compound effect from the two factors highlighted by our analysis: institutional constraint 
related to the agreement and strategic policy interaction. By Corollary II.1 we readily know 
that such a difference arises exclusively from strategic interaction as both agreements 
impose the same institutional constraint when countries are identical. 
Welfare Analysis 
We now examine the effectiveness of NT relative to MR under non-cooperative 
product standards. We first state the main results that summarize the comparison of the 
welfare effects for NT and MR and then discuss their implications: 
Proposition II.7. When countries set product standards non-cooperatively, the following 
hold: 
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    (i) NT and MR are equally effective for very large and small values of the 
externality, i.e. 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 and 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑁. 
    (ii) For intermediate levels of the externality 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀, the performance of NT 
and MR depends on the preference heterogeneity 𝑠. 
    (ii-a) For relatively large and small 𝑠  (i.e. 𝑠 >
3
4
 and 𝑠 <
3
5
), NT yields higher 
world welfare for relatively high levels of the externality, while MR dominates for relatively 
low levels of the externality. 
    (ii-b) For intermediate levels of s (i.e. 
3
5
< 𝑠 <  
3
4
), the pattern in (ii-a) holds for two 
separate but consecutive intervals of 𝜃. 
    (iii) The effectiveness of NT relative to MR first decreases and then increases as 
preference heterogeneity rises. 
The proof is relegated to the Appendix. 
Part (i) of the proposition holds because for very large and small values of the 
externality both NT and MR induce the symmetric equilibrium outcome (i.e. (𝐻, 𝐻) or 
(𝐿, 𝐿)). In particular, we have 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 as countries are more likely to switch to the low 
standard under MR. Thus (𝐻, 𝐻) will be the equilibrium under both types of agreements 
as long as 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑀. Similarly, for the lower end of 𝜃 we have 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 so uniform low 
standards (𝐿, 𝐿) attain for both agreements when 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑁. It follows that world welfare is 
the same under NT and MR given 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 and 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑁. 
Part (ii) of the proposition contains two notable messages. First, while NT always 
weakly dominates MR under coordination, with strategic policy interaction NT may yield 
lower welfare than MR over certain ranges of the externality. As discussed, this is because 
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strategic incentives create a source of efficiency loss under NT by making countries tend 
to overuse the strict standard. Meantime, countries are also tempted to overuse the lenient 
standard under MR due to the strategic complementarity of national policies on product 
standards. These two forces together explain why NT on average dominates MR for large 
values of the externality but is less efficient when the externality is small. While this is the 
central finding in Costinot (2008), part (ii-a) of Proposition II.7 extends the result by 
showing that the pattern continues to hold when preference asymmetry is either large or 
small. 
Second and perhaps more importantly, part (ii-b) of the proposition indicates that the 
pattern would exist for multiple ranges of 𝜃 when preference heterogeneity is moderate. 
The reason is subtle but hinges on emergence of asymmetric policies under NT. This can 
be illustrated for example from Figure II.6. In particular, the range 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 is exactly 
the case examined in Costinot (2008) where equilibrium policies are symmetric under both 
agreements and NT (MR) dominates over larger (small) values within this range. However, 
the asymmetric equilibrium under NT now creates a new range 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 where NT is 
likely to dominate MR, but due to strategic incentives NT outperforms MR only over the 
upper section 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁. Therefore, the pattern in Costinot (2008) can be a local rather 
than a global feature given heterogeneous country preferences. This has important policy 
implications. In particular, Costinot proposes that for symmetric countries NT and MR 
should be enforced for relatively high and low levels of the externality. By contrast, our 
analysis shows that such a policy arrangement is optimal between similar countries but 
may be inefficient when there exists an intermediate level of country heterogeneity. 
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Moreover, recall that under coordination the effectiveness of NT relative to MR is 
monotonically increasing in the degree of preference asymmetry, whereas from part (iii) 
we know this relationship takes on a U-shape curve when strategic interaction is present. 
The intuition for this result is the following. For 𝑠 close to one, the problem of standards 
mismatch is minimized under MR because symmetric policies such as (𝐻, 𝐻) prevail. On 
the other hand, under NT the welfare cost arising from strategic incentives increases as 
preference asymmetry increases. This leads NT to become less effective as compared to 
MR when 𝑠  falls while being close to one. As 𝑠  continues to decrease, however, 
asymmetric equilibrium occurs under MR so the mismatch of standards starts to play out. 
This leads NT to be more desirable than MR as taste asymmetry further rises. Figure II.3 
depicts how preference heterogeneity may affect the effectiveness of NT relative to MR in 
the presence of strategic interaction. 
Figure II.3: Effectiveness of NT Relative to MR Under Nash Equilibrium 
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Finally, we argue that from the welfare perspective, NT would be considered as more 
appealing to the WTO than to the EU given the non-monotonic relationship between 𝑠 and 
𝑟. Indeed, our argument would hold as long as 𝑠𝑊𝑇𝑂 <
3
5
, which is a mild condition given 
the existence of considerable heterogeneity among WTO members. To see why this 
condition suffices, note if 𝑠𝐸𝑈 < ?̂?(𝑐) where ?̂?(𝑐)  is the turning point of the U-shaped 
curve in Figure II.3, then both 𝑠𝑊𝑇𝑂 and 𝑠𝐸𝑈 are on the left part of the curve. This implies 
that 𝑟 is always higher for the WTO than for the EU, which is the desirable result. If 𝑠𝐸𝑈 >
?̂?(𝑐), i.e. 𝑠𝐸𝑈 being on the right part of the curve, then the largest possible 𝑟 for the EU is 
𝑟5(𝑠 = 1) where 𝑟5 is defined by (A.22) in the Appendix. But it can be shown that 
 𝑟3(𝑠) > 𝑟5(𝑠 = 1) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 ≤
3
5
, (II.35) 
 
where 𝑟3 is defined by (A.19) in the Appendix. As a result, 𝑟 must take a larger value for 
the WTO than for the EU as long as 𝑠𝑊𝑇𝑂. Moreover, it is expected that some heterogeneity 
also exists within the EU so that we actually have 𝑠𝐸𝑈 < 1. In this case our argument would 
be strengthened as the value of 𝑟  for the EU now becomes lower, indicating that the 
threshold for 𝑠𝑊𝑇𝑂 will be even higher. Therefore, regardless of policy coordination, the 
WTO should be more likely to favor NT over MR when compared to the EU. Our analysis 
thus provides an insight that is consistent with the choices of the WTO and the EU between 
NT and MR as two main types of product standards agreements.18 
                                                     
18 It is worth noting that our comparison is based on the assumption that the WTO and the EU have 
the same number of countries. Given that the WTO involves more countries, it should be subject 
to a larger effect of strategic interaction. But such effects will apply to both NT and MR and will 
work to cancel out one another when we calculate r for the WTO. Also note that this is not a concern 
under coordination because strategic interaction is completely ruled out. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter argues that country heterogeneity has important implications for the 
relative effectiveness of alternative international agreements on product standards. To this 
end, we examine existing standards agreements based on two distinct principles: National 
Treatment and Mutual Recognition. We focus on a highly empirically relevant dimension 
of country heterogeneity which concerns consumer preferences for product quality. 
Employing a simple model of quality standards, we show that NT is more effective than 
MR between countries that exhibit more diverging preferences. Importantly, the key 
mechanism that makes MR relatively less desirable is the mismatch of standards induced 
between countries, a problem that does not arise under NT. Our findings therefore provide 
justifications for the observed choices of standards agreements by the WTO and the EU. 
We also find that when countries have heterogeneous preferences, the pattern in which NT 
and MR dominate respectively can be different from those between identical countries. In 
particular, with preference asymmetry NT may not always be preferred to MR for goods 
associated with high levels of externalities. 
While our analysis provides some new insights, we have abstracted from several 
important considerations. For example, we ignore political incentives that can affect the 
adoption of certain trade agreements, while such incentives are widely applicable in the 
real world. Also, we have focused exclusively on product standards. Taking account of 
other policy instruments such as tariff and intellectual property protection could yield 
useful insights. Finally, while our study emphasizes the demand-side heterogeneity, 
countries can be different along multiple dimensions. For example, technology asymmetry 
across countries is also a prevalent phenomenon. Analyzing product standards agreements 
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under alternative types of heterogeneity constitutes an interesting avenue for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NATURE OF INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY AND THE PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA 
Introduction 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was 
perhaps the most important and controversial outcome of the Uruguay Round (1986-95) and 
multilateral negotiations that led to its birth were rather contentious, with developing and 
developed countries expressing very different opinions about the need for a multilateral agreement 
on intellectual property rights (IPRs).1 
TRIPS negotiations were driven by a deep-rooted sense of dissatisfaction in the United States 
with the state of IPR protection in the global economy, especially with the widespread imitation 
and piracy occurring in major developing countries (many of them Asian). Several major policy 
reports issued by leading governmental organizations in the United States (US) had raised concerns 
about the substantial losses being incurred by key US industries due to the lack of adequate IPR 
protection in foreign countries.2 
Supported by the European Union and Japan, the US was successful in introducing IPRs into 
the multilateral negotiating agenda of the Uruguay Round that began in 1986 and culminated in 
1995. Major developing countries such as Brazil, India, and China were not the only ones opposed 
                                                     
1 See Maskus (2000) and Maskus (2012) for comprehensive overviews of the economics of IPRs in a global 
setting and extensive analysis of the various facets of TRIPS. 
2  See, for example, United States International Trade Commission (USITC) (1988), US-Chamber of 
Commerce (1987), and the annual reports issued by the office of the United States Trade Representative. 
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to the inclusion of any rules pertaining to IPRs into the multilateral trading system. There was 
widespread skepticism among academicians and other neutral observers regarding the merits of 
and the need for TRIPS. Indeed, it is fair to say that a shadow of skepticism hangs over TRIPS 
even today. 
In a nutshell, TRIPS called for all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to adopt 
certain minimum standards with respect to the protection of IPRs and its main practical effect was 
to force developing countries to alter their IPR policies to bring them closer to those of rich 
countries, such as the USA. However, this adjustment was not expected to occur immediately. 
When TRIPS took effect on 1 January 1995, while developed countries were given only 1 year to 
ensure that their laws and practices were TRIPS - compliant, developing countries were given 5 
years (until 2000). Least-developed countries had 11 years to achieve TRIPS compliance, until 
2006 - which was then extended to 2013, in general, and to 2016 for pharmaceutical patents and 
trade secrets. 
In this chapter, we critically examine recent changes in the volume and the nature of 
innovative activity in major Asian economies during the post TRIPS era. At the outset, we note 
that our analysis is descriptive in nature, and we do not mean to suggest that these changes in 
innovative activity were caused primarily by TRIPS, although it is difficult to believe that they 
were totally unrelated to TRIPS either. To limit the scope of the work, we focus on countries that 
have been major contributors to innovative activity within Asia since the ratification of TRIPS: 
Japan, China, India, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia. Among these, we pay special attention 
to China and India since the policy environment of these two large countries was significantly 
altered by TRIPS. 
Wherever relevant, we provide a comparison of innovative activity in the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China) countries. We also briefly discuss the observed variation in the nature of 
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innovative activity within Asia as well as BRICs during the post-TRIPS era. To this end, we 
examine not only the variation in the fields of technologies of patent applications across countries, 
but also in the ratio of the number of patent applications to utility models (as well as industrial 
designs). It is worth noting at the outset that since our analysis abstracts from institutional factors, 
it cannot shed light on the role that differences in national innovation systems play in determining 
the level and nature of innovative activity in different countries. In other words, our primary focus 
is on describing the variation in such activity across our chosen set of countries during the post-
TRIPS era. Perhaps future research can explore factors that help explain this observed variation. 
The Protection of Intellectual Property in the Global Economy Post TRIPS 
A commonly used index for measuring the degree of patent protection available in a country 
is the Ginarte-Park (GP) index. This index is the sum of scores earned by a country in five separate 
categories pertaining to patent protection: coverage, membership in international treaties such as 
TRIPS, the duration of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and restrictions (such as compulsory 
licensing) that limit a patent-holder’s control over its invention. The scores range from 0 to 5.  
Table III.1: Ginarte-Park index, 1995-2010 
Country 1995 2000 2005 2010 
China 2.12 3.09 4.08 4.21 
India 1.23 2.27 3.76 3.76 
Japan 4.42 4.67 4.67 4.67 
Malaysia 2.70 3.03 3.48 3.68 
Singapore 3.88 4.01 4.21 4.21 
South Korea 3.89 4.13 4.33 4.33 
USA 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 
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Table III.1 reports the GP index for selected Asian countries and the USA during the post-
TRIPS era. As one might expect, the degree of patent protection in the USA remains essentially 
flat at 4.88 (quite near the maximum possible value of 5.0) for the entire time period. Similarly, 
TRIPS had little effect on the degree of patent protection available in Japan, Korea, and Singapore.  
As per Table III.1, the sharpest changes in patent protection occurred in China and India: the 
value of the index for India increased sharply from 1.03 to almost 3.76 while that for China, it 
doubled from 2.12 to 4.21. These are large changes with important economic implications not just 
for India and China but also for the rest of the world.  
Patent Applications and Grants 
Global patent applications have grown rapidly during the post TRIPS era. Indeed, global 
patent applications in 2011 were roughly twice that in 1997.3 Asia has been the single biggest 
driver of global patent applications during the post-TRIPS era: its share of global patent 
applications has hovered around 50% during the 1997-2011 period. Over the same time period, 
North America’s share increased slightly from roughly 20% to 25% whereas that of Europe fell 
from 20% to 15%.  
Within Asia, the changes appear to have been rather dramatic.4 The big story, of course, has 
been the emergence of China. In 1997, Japan dwarfed the other Asian countries in terms of patent 
applications and grants but it was overtaken by China in 2010. Indeed, so sharp and salient has 
been China’s rise that patent filings in China during 2011 not only exceeded those in Japan but 
                                                     
3 Unless otherwise noted, the data for the various figures and tables contained in this work have been taken 
from the World Intellectual Property Organization:  http://ipstatsdb.wipo.org/ipstatv2/ipstats/patentsSearch. 
4  We limit our discussion to China, India, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Singapore since these 
countries account for over 90% of the patent applications and grants in a typical year. 
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also the US, making China the country with the largest number of patents filed (and granted) in 
2011. Roughly 25% of all patent applications filed in the world during 2011 were filed in China. 
The corresponding shares for the US and Japan were 24% and 16% respectively.  
While these statistics pertaining to China’s emergence are undoubtedly impressive, it is 
important to interpret them carefully. Count data on patent applications (and grants) tell us virtually 
nothing about the economic values or the qualities of the underlying technologies. Indeed there is 
widespread recognition in the Chinese leadership that while the number of patent applications in 
China has increased sharply along with investment in research and development (R&D), the 
quality of local patent applications remains relatively low. The first objective stated in the Chinese 
Promotion Plan for the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy is to 
“improve IP appraisal and assessment system… and to shift the focus on IP quantity to IP quality, 
and boost IP value.”5  Of course, the concern with patent quality is hardly unique to China: 
examples abound of trivial inventions that have been granted patents even in the USA.6  Yet, using 
some additional data, we will argue below that this concern is especially acute for China. 
Consider now the data on patents granted within Asia and the rest of the world. During 2011, 
nearly 1 million patents were granted world-wide, with roughly 40% of them accruing to non-
residents, a clear reflection of the globalization of contemporary innovation.  Roughly 7.88 million 
patents were in force globally during 2011, over 25% of these being in the USA.  
From 1997 to 2011, the number of patents granted in Asia more than doubled. While more 
patents were granted in 2011 in all Asian countries, the sharpest increase was witnessed in China, 
where the number in 2011 was almost 50 times that in 1997. This massive increase in the number 
                                                     
5 This report is available at http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/developing/201204/t20120410_667158.html. 
6  See Maskus (2012) for some examples of patents granted by the United States that have attracted 
widespread criticism and helped fuel the concern that patent protection in the US has gone overboard. 
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of patents granted in China is even more impressive considering the fact that China’s grant rate 
over this time period (of around 40%) was quite comparable to that of the Japan and USA.7  
Patent applications in Asian countries vary substantially at the industry level. For example, 
from 1998-2012, while digital communications was the most important industry in China 
(accounting for 9% of all patent applications), the chemical and pharmaceutical industries 
dominated in India, accounting for 22% and 24% of applications, respectively. Indeed, India is 
unique among Asian countries, and perhaps in the world, in exhibiting such a heavy reliance on a 
few industries as engines of innovation. There is substantial overlap between Japan and Korea in 
terms of the key industries that drive innovation in these economies. Indeed, in both countries, the 
key industries driving innovation are electrical machinery, audiovisual technology, computer 
technology, semiconductors, and optics.  
Since TRIPS has increased patenting incentives of both residents and non-residents, we next 
examine variation within Asia with regard to the role played by residents of each country in driving 
patenting activity in order to roughly gauge the share of innovation that is indigenously generated.  
Figure III.1 shows the residents’ share of patent applications in Asian countries. From 1997 
to 2011, the share of local residents in total patent applications filed in China surged from around 
50% to roughly 80%, while the increase in Malaysia was of an even higher order of magnitude. 
By contrast, in Japan, the share of local residents declined slightly, as it did in Asia overall.  One 
could perhaps reasonably interpret the increase in the share of patents filed by residents in China 
as an indication of its enhanced ability to innovate. 
 
                                                     
7 We calculated ratios of patent grants to patent applications (lagged by 1 as well as 2 years). The estimated 
grant rate was then calculated by averaging these two ratios. 
 97 
 
Figure III.1: Resident Share of Patent Applications 
 
Patenting Activity Within BRICs 
Much attention has been paid to the rise of BRICs during the last few decades and their 
economic performance relative to each other. It is interesting to compare BRICs from the 
viewpoint of innovative activity. Figure III.2 presents the raw data on patent applications in BRICs. 
This figure hardly needs explanation: China simply dwarfs the other BRICs countries in terms of 
patent applications filed during 1997-2011. 
The two BRICS countries other than China and India exhibit a fairly different pattern of 
innovation than leading Asian countries such as Korea and Japan. For example, the major sources 
of innovation in Brazil are medical technology, civil engineering, furniture, and other special 
machines, with each of the industries accounting for roughly 6% of patent applications. For Russia, 
the important innovative industries are pharmaceuticals, medical technology, civil engineering, 
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and food chemistry. The composition of industrial innovation in Russia is more like that of India 
as opposed to South Korea. 
Figure III.2: Patent Applications in BRICs 
 
Focusing only on patent filings and grants in individual during the post TRIPS era only gives 
us an incomplete picture of the innovative capacity of a country since these measures do not tell 
us much about the stock of intellectual property available to a country. For example, while 
patenting activity in China has increased rapidly during the post TRIPS era, in 2012 Japan had 
roughly twice the number of patents in force than China. However, relative to BRICs countries, 
the Chinese stock of patents in 2012 was rather large: China had roughly twice the number of 
patents in force relative to Brazil, more than four times that of Russia, and more than twenty times 
that of India. Since the variation in quality of patents across BRICs countries is likely to be a 
secondary concern, there is little doubt that, at least among the lower and middle countries, China 
has truly emerged as a major player in the field of innovation. 
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Outward Orientation of Patenting: A Measure of Quality 
It stands to reason that firms have strong incentives to protect their most important inventions 
in foreign markets. As a result, we can obtain a rough gauge of the quality of a country’s patent 
portfolio by examining the share of total patent applications that are filed abroad by its residents. 
If the residents of a country tend to file a small percentage of its patent applications abroad, it 
implies that a majority of domestic patent-holders do not find it worthwhile to seek protection in 
foreign markets, a position they are unlikely to take if their inventions are valuable and high 
quality.  
As a benchmark, consider the behavior of US residents - widely perceived to be the most 
innovative country in the world. In 2000, 41% of all patent applications filed by the US residents 
worldwide were in foreign markets; in 2010 the analogous number was 44%. Table III.2 presents 
patent applications filed abroad by residents of Asian and BRICs countries as a share of their total 
applications. 
Over the relevant time period, Japanese residents started to file an increasing share of its 
patents abroad; the same is true of Korea, although to a lesser extent. Not only is the ratio of foreign 
to domestic patenting quite small for China, it has not changed much during the post TRIPS era. 
By contrast, India exhibits a stronger tendency to file patent applications in foreign markets. The 
share of foreign patent applications as a share of total resident applications by Chinese residents is 
also quite small relative to the other BRICs countries. While hardly conclusive, this evidence 
supports the view that the quality of most patent applications in China may not yet be high enough 
to merit protection in global markets.  
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Table III.2: Patent Applications Filed Abroad by Residents 
Country 2000 (%) 2005 (%) 2010 (%) 
Brazil 15.9% 17.6% 26.3% 
China 4.3% 4.6% 5.0% 
India 23.6% 41.2% 40.5% 
Japan 21.8% 30.6% 38.1% 
Malaysia 8.9% 43.3% 36.5% 
Russia 3.0% 8.3% 11.7% 
Singapore 26.8% 70.0% 78.8% 
South Korea 15.1% 24.9% 26.2% 
USA 41.3% 45.8% 44.1% 
Consider now the evidence from patents granted in foreign markets. In the year 2010, patents 
granted to US residents in foreign markets accounted for roughly 44% of their total number of 
patents. The corresponding percentages for Japan and Korea were 35% and 32% respectively. By 
contrast, only 6% of the patents granted to Chinese residents worldwide during 2010 were granted 
by other countries. Thus, an overwhelming percentage of patents granted to Chinese citizens in 
2010 were granted domestically. It is worth pointing out that even residents of Brazil and India 
had a much higher rate of foreign patenting: in 2010, foreign patents accounted for approximately 
61% of the total patents granted to residents of each country.  
It stands to reason that the tendency to patent abroad is likely to be stronger for inventors 
residing in smaller countries. For example, 80% of the total patents granted to Singapore residents 
were from abroad. It is possible that the large size of the Chinese market reduces the incentives of 
Chinese residents to seek patents in other countries. But this cannot be an important part of the 
story for several reasons. First, the Chinese economy is highly export oriented and its firms have 
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come to capture a large share of the global market in many industries. Why then would they not 
do the same in the context of innovation if it were possible for them to do so? Second, and perhaps 
more fundamentally, the decision to file for a patent application in another country depends upon 
a comparison of the marginal benefit of doing so relative to its marginal cost. If an innovation is 
of high quality, it ought to be valued world-wide. It is conceivable that a large domestic market 
creates incentives for investing in innovations that are only valuable locally, perhaps due to 
idiosyncratic differences in consumer tastes across countries. If so, residents of large countries 
could show a domestic bias in terms of innovation and patenting. However, this argument in no 
way changes the marginal calculus determining patent application behavior in foreign markets. 
Furthermore, as Table III.2 notes, residents of the largest market in the world, i.e. the United States, 
have a rate of foreign patenting that is roughly ten times that of Chinese residents.  
Trends in Filings and Grants of Other Types of IPRs 
 We next consider trends in filings and grants of industrial designs, utility models, and 
trademarks during the post TRIPS era. 
Industrial Designs 
An industrial design is an innovation pertaining to the functional, ornamental or aesthetic 
aspect of a good. Industrial designs differ from patents in several fundamental ways. First, while 
patented inventions are primarily technology-based, industrial designs generally have low 
technology content and can even be purely artistic innovations. Second, industrial designs tend to 
be much more market-oriented in the sense that industrial designers are generally motivated by 
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consumer preferences when developing new designs. As a result, industrial designs are brought to 
market relatively more quickly and there tend to be fewer “junk” industrial designs. Under TRIPS, 
the minimum protection granted to industrial designs is 10 years (relative to 20 years for patents).     
 Global industrial design applications worldwide grew substantially over the time period 
1997-2011. Notably, the average growth rate over this time period was 9.3%, the highest of all the 
forms of IPRs investigated in this chapter. Examination of regional data reveals that Asia has 
played a dominant role in driving world industrial design applications: Asia’s share of global 
industrial design applications rose from roughly 50% in 2000 to 84% by 2011. North America 
accounts for a very small share of global industrial design applications (only around 4.6% in 2011). 
Similarly, Europe’s share dropped rather sharply from around 31% in 2000 to 8% in 2011. Figure 
III.3 summarizes these observations. 
Figure III.3: Geographic Variation in Industrial Design Applications 
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Consider now the variation within Asia. The foremost observation is that during 2011, China 
accounted for over 80% of all industrial design applications in Asia, sharp increase from its share 
of 38%. In 2011, China’s share was about 20 and 10 times that of Japan and Korea respectively. 
Notably, as in the case of patents and trademarks, Japan’s share of industrial applications has 
shrunk over time.  
China’s growth in industrial design applications is also striking within the context of BRICs. 
In 2001, the size of China’s industrial design applications was about 16, 18 and 24 times larger 
than Brazil, India and Russia respectively. These remarkable ratios increased further to astounding 
levels of 76, 63 and 124 in 2011. Thus, the scale of innovative activity in China is getting 
progressively larger relative to other BRICs, a development that is surely going to have 
implications for the relative long run per capita incomes of these countries. 
Utility Models 
A utility model is an intellectual property right similar to a patent but it is granted for smaller 
inventions.8 Although a utility model is granted only if an invention is novel, it does not necessitate 
a sufficiently large inventive step as compared to a patent. Indeed, utility models are sometimes 
called “petty patents”. The approval process of utility model is often simpler and shorter, as patent 
offices in most countries do not review applications regarding their substance prior to registration. 
Moreover, the term of utility model is typically shorter, mainly ranging from 7 to 10 years with 
preclusion of extension or renewal. 
                                                     
8 Not all countries grant utility models. For example, the US does not. Among Asian countries that we focus 
on, utility models are granted by all except India and Singapore. 
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The number of global applications for utility models more than quadrupled over 1997-2011 
from one hundred and fifty thousand to more than six hundred and seventy thousand. This 
translates into an average growth rate of 11.2% per year. Notably, the growth of utility model 
applications has been even more striking in recent years. While the average growth rate over 1997-
2008 was 6.8%, that over 2008-2011 was a remarkable 28.8%.  
The dramatic growth of global applications for utility models was driven predominantly, once 
again, by China. While China accounted for about 33% of global utility model applications in 
1993, its share had risen to 87.3% in 2011. This reflects an average growth rate of utility model 
applications of 19.2% in China over 1997-2011, and an even more remarkable growth rate of 
37.4% over 2008-2011. Within Asia, today China is undoubtedly the dominant receiver of utility 
model applications: it accounted for 91.3% of these applications in 2011. Within BRICs, Russia 
follows China with the second largest number of applications. Notably, Russia and Republic of 
Korea are also the third and fourth largest offices for utility model applications.  
Compared to patents, utility model applications tend to be more locally concentrated: 
residents enjoy a dominant share of these applications across countries. For example, China’s 
resident share of utility model applications during 2011 was 99.3% while for patent applications 
the corresponding share was only 79%. Also, in 2011 China Hong Kong featured a low share of 
resident patent applications of about 1.3% whereas the share of resident utility model applications 
was 63.2%. This pattern is prevalent worldwide and reflects the fact that innovations seeking utility 
models are less likely to be world-class and hence not profitable enough to justify seeking 
protection overseas.   
Our discussion above indicates that one might expect utility model applications to have higher 
a grant rate than patent applications. This hypothesis is strongly supported by data. For example, 
the estimated grant rate worldwide for utility models was 76.8% over 1997-2011 whereas that for 
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patents was 44.3%.9 Asian countries or BRICs for whom data are available all exhibit grant rates 
for utility model applications that exceed 70%, while the grant rates for patent applications are 
generally below 50%.   
Trademarks 
A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol, and/or design used to distinguish a good or service of 
one firm from those of other firms. Once a firm is able to establish a reputation for a high quality 
product, its trademark allows the firm to benefit from repeat purchases and word-of-mouth 
references as well as other forms of promotional activities. Unlike a patent, a trademark does not 
have any time limits: once established, a trademark can exist indefinitely.  
The number of global applications for trademarks more than doubled during 1997-2011 from 
about two million to over four million. Like patents, the sharpest increase was observed in Asia 
where the number increased from about half a million to over two million. By contrast, the increase 
in North America was relatively modest. While evaluating these numbers, it is worth bearing in 
mind that some of the best known trademarks of the world – such as those of Coca Cola, 
Macdonald’s, and Levis – have existed for a long time and fewer new applications may be filed in 
countries (such as the United States) that already have a large stock of well-known trademarks. 
Figure III.4 shows the global variation in trademark applications during 1997-2011.  
Perhaps the most noticeable aspect of this figure is the sharp increase in Asia’s share of global 
trademark applications and the noticeable decline in Europe’s share. Around 1997, both 
continents’ share of global trademark applications was roughly 1/3rd but in 2011, Asia’s share 
                                                     
9 Since utility model applications are approved or rejected within a few months, we estimated the grant rate 
without lagging applications relative to grants. 
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exceeded 50% while that of Europe was below 20%. Over the same time period, North America’s 
share declined from roughly 15% to under 10%. 
Within Asia, China was once again the stand-out performer. When compared with BRICs 
countries, the increase in trademark applications in China is even more remarkable. While the 
number of trademark applications filed in all BRICs countries during 1997 was relatively similar 
(with most of them having fewer than 100,000 filings and China being below 200,000), such is no 
longer the case: in 2011, trademark applications in China were more than seven times that in India, 
the BRIC country with second largest number of trademark applications in 2011. 
Figure III.4: Geographic Variation in Trademark Applications 
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Other Evidence on Innovation 
In this section, we examine how the efficiency of R&D as well as the nature of innovative 
activity has evolved in Asia during the post TRIPS era.  
While patents and trademarks granted measure the output side of the R&D process, it is also 
useful to examine the input side. Figure III.5 presents data on R&D intensities (measured as R&D 
expenditures divided by GDP) during 1998-2006.  
Figure III.5: Intensity of R&D in Asian Countries 
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doubled during this time period. Third, and perhaps most noteworthy, Japan’s R&D intensity in 
2006 exceeded not only the other Asia countries but also that of the United States.10  
It is also instructive to consider the variation across countries in terms of the productivity of 
R&D. We constructed a rough measure of R&D productivity by dividing the average patent 
granted to residents of each country during (2005-2010) by its lagged average R&D expenditure 
(during 2003-2005). This data is presented in Table III.3. 
Table III.3: National R&D Productivity and Efficiency 
Country R&D productivity R&D efficiency 
China 1.86 0.02 
India 0.36 0.03 
Japan 1.02 0.16 
Malaysia 0.26 0.14 
Singapore 0.20 0.31 
South Korea 3.29 0.12 
USA 0.26 0.30 
Table III.3 shows that R&D productivity in South Korea is much higher than that in other 
Asian countries. Surprisingly, South Korean productivity surpasses even that of US and Japan. It 
is important to interpret our metric of R&D productivity carefully since it totally disregards the 
quality of patents.  
An alternative, and in some ways a preferable, measure of the efficiency of a country’s R&D 
investment is the value of royalties payments received by it on world markets divided by its R&D 
                                                     
10 However, given the size of the US economy, the absolute level of R&D expenditures in Japan during 
2006 were less than half that of the US. 
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expenditure. Since current royalty income results from past R&D and because data on royalty 
payments for countries of interest is available only since 2000, we constructed a measure of R&D 
efficiency by dividing the average royalty payments received by each country during (2005-2010) 
by its lagged average R&D expenditure (during 2003-2005). Table III.3 reports this measure of 
R&D efficiency for the six Asian countries as well as the USA.  
It can be seen that Singapore and USA have the highest levels of R&D efficiency, which is 
perhaps not unexpected given their superior environment for R&D activities. Japan and South 
Korea also feature moderately high levels of efficiency, although Japan’s R&D performance seems 
lower than one might expect. The most striking observation, however, is that China actually 
represents the lowest R&D efficiency level. Once again, this is in sharp contrast to the recent surge 
of patent applications in China, suggesting that many of these innovations might be of low quality.  
We should note here that royalty payments are only one channel via which innovators profit 
from their intellectual property. For example, instead of licensing its technology internationally, a 
firm may decide to produce a newly created product itself and export it to world markets. In such 
a situation, the return on its investment in innovation would show up as export revenues as opposed 
to royalties and licensing fees.  
Since patents are granted for substantial innovations while industrial designs, and certainly 
utility models for relatively minor ones, further insight into the nature of innovative activity in 
Asia can be gained by considering how the ratio of patents to industrial designs as well as that to 
utility models have evolved during the period of our investigation. 
Figure III.6 shows the ratio of patent to utility model applications from residents for countries 
that grant utility models.  
Perhaps the most striking observation is that the ratio of patent to utility model applications 
is the lowest in China and has only marginally increased over time. This suggests that the Chinese 
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pattern of innovation is skewed in favor of minor innovations relative to major ones. Moreover, 
even Brazil and Russia have slightly higher ratios than China although Russia’s ratio has been 
declining. Korea shows an upward trend in this ratio since 2006, an indication that it is likely 
shifting away from minor innovations to major ones. Finally, perhaps not to anyone’s surprise, 
Japan has a ratio of patent to utility model applications that is significantly higher than all other 
Asia countries; indeed its ratio in 2011 was more than sixty times that of China’s. While 
differences in the ratio of patents to industrial designs between China and countries like Brazil and 
Russia are not significant, the gap between China and Japan is substantial and informative. It seems 
patently clear that China has some distance to go before it transforms into a major generator of 
world-class innovations. 
Figure III.6: Nature of Innovation: Patents Relative to Utility Models 
 
One may also look at the ratio of patent to industrial design applications of residents as an 
alternative way of capturing the nature of innovation. The calculated ratios are depicted in Figure 
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III.7. Once again, we see some similar patterns. For example, China again features the lowest ratio 
of all countries and the gap between it and Japan is huge. 
Although the count data on filings and grants of various forms of IPRs is fairly informative 
in many respects, it does not tell us much about the effects of TRIPS in the market place. We now 
discuss the recent literature that addresses this. 
Figure III.7: Nature of Innovation: Patents Relative to Industrial Designs 
 
Evidence on the Economic Effects of TRIPS Mandated Reforms 
As we discussed earlier, both China and India were largely opposed to TRIPS. The logic for 
their position was two-fold. One, strengthening IPRs would strengthen market power of rights 
holders and therefore raise local prices. Second, there was concern that strengthening IPR 
protection would hamper their ability to absorb foreign technologies thereby slowing down their 
technological progress and economic growth. 
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As Branstetter and Saggi (2011) note, TRIPS proponents countered that foreign firms are 
more likely to transfer technologies to markets where IPRs are better protected. Similarly, 
multinational firms might favor locations that offered stronger IPR protection, especially when 
locating subsidiaries handling recent technologies or conducting R&D. 
Available empirical evidence supports the argument that TRIPS enforcement would be 
detrimental to consumer welfare (in the short run). For example, Chaudhuri et. al. (2006) 
conducted a counterfactual analysis based on a structural model of the antibiotic sub-segment of 
the pharmaceutical market in India and found that the elimination of local brands in the year 2000 
would have resulted in significant welfare losses for Indian consumers. An interesting result of 
their empirical analysis was that local consumers in India showed a preference for local brands 
over foreign ones, perhaps due to the better developed distribution networks of local firms. While 
their analysis was confined to the Indian market, their findings with respect to the effects of TRIPS 
enforcement on prices would apply to developing countries at large since many of them import 
pharmaceuticals from India. 
Since most developing countries are net buyers of patented goods, one would expect TRIPS 
to be regressive in the sense that it would cause income to be transferred from developing to 
developed countries. How large might such transfers be? McCalman (2001) estimates what the net 
present value of patents held by developed countries would have been in 1988 had the developing 
countries in his sample complied with TRIPS. His results indicate that these transfers ran into 
billions of dollars with the US benefitting more than other developed countries, a finding that fits 
well with the prominent role played by the US during TRIPS negotiations. On the other side of the 
equation, he finds that large developing countries such as Brazil and India stood to lose the most, 
a finding that is once again consistent with the vociferous opposition to TRIPS shown by these 
countries during Uruguay Round negotiations. 
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During the post-TRIPS era, net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have increased to 
all major Asian countries under study except Japan. The rate of increase, however, varies across 
countries. Over 1997-2011, India experienced the highest average growth rate of net FDI inflows 
(of 17.9%). This was almost twice as high as that of Korea, which ranked second with a growth 
rate of FDI of 9.6%. However, despite its slower growth rate of 7.5%, China remains the country 
that receives the largest amount of FDI inflows in Asia. China also tops Asian countries under 
study in terms of the magnitude of FDI stock (7.1 trillion in 2011), with Singapore following 
closely behind (6.3 trillion in 2011). Nevertheless, the ratio of FDI to GDP for China is only of 
intermediate level, ranking below Singapore, Malaysia and India in 2011. Moreover, this ratio has 
been constantly declining for China while it has been increasing in India.  
The global stock of FDI has also grown dramatically during the last decade or so: it increased 
from roughly $2 trillion in 1990 to over $22 trillion in 2012 (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), 2013). While most FDI flows still occur primarily between 
industrial countries, from 1990-2012, the share of global stock of FDI residing in developing 
countries increased from 25% to just over 33% (Maskus and Saggi, 2013).  
Policy-makers and analysts value FDI not only because it can supplement domestic 
investment but also because FDI is a major channel of international technology transfer (Maskus, 
2012). When measured by the receipts and payments of royalties and licensing fees, much of the 
global activity in technology transfer is within developed countries and occurs within the 
boundaries of multinational firms: in a typical year over 80 percent of global royalty payments for 
international transfers of technology are made from subsidiaries to their parent firms.11   
                                                     
11 From 1990-2012, the royalties and licensing fee receipts of multinational firms increased from $27 billion 
to $235 billion (UNCTAD, 2013). 
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So dominant are multinational firms in the field of innovation that the R&D spending of some 
of the largest multinational firms exceeds that of many developing countries, even large ones.  For 
example, in 2009 Toyota Motor Corporation invested more in R&D expenditures than India, a 
country of roughly 1.2 billion people (UNCTAD, 2010).   
The relationship between FDI and IPR protection has received significant empirical scrutiny 
in the literature.12 As the survey by Park (2008) notes, as far as US data is concerned, there appears 
to be a clear positive relationship between the degree of IPR enforcement in developing countries 
and investment by US firms, results derived from non-US data portray a more mixed picture.  
Branstetter, Fisman, Foley, and Saggi (2011) study the impact of IPR reform on multinational 
production by focusing on the responses of U.S. multinationals to IPR reforms by sixteen countries 
in the 1980s and 1990s.13 Their most important finding is that U.S.-based multinationals expanded 
the scale of their activities in reforming countries after they undertook IPR reforms. They also 
analyzed U.N. industry-level data and showed that industry-level value added increase after 
reforms, particularly in technology-intensive industries.  
While much of the focus in the empirical literature has been on how stronger IPR enforcement 
can help attract FDI, less attention has been paid to how increased FDI might contribute to local 
innovation. In a recent paper, Branstetter et al. (2013) examine data on patents issued by the US 
to foreign residents and find that a majority of patents in China (as well as India) have been granted 
to researchers working for subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs). They argue that this 
development and the general rise of international co-invention reflects an expanded international 
                                                     
12 For a nuanced and detailed discussion of this literature, see Maskus (2000) and Maskus (2012). 
13 The Asian countries included in their sample were: China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. 
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division of labor within global R&D networks, much like the slicing of the global production chain 
across the world.  
They also compare the quality of granted patents (as measured by citations) to Chinese or 
Indian indigenous inventions with those from (a) co-inventions with inputs from advanced 
economies and (b) co-inventions with inputs from advanced economies under the sponsorship of 
multinational firms. They find that co-invented patents tend to be of higher quality, as do the 
patents under the sponsorship of MNCs. Furthermore, they note that patents of purely indigenous 
firms in China and India tend to be of relatively lower quality, a finding that suggests that spillovers 
from MNCs to local companies in these countries have not yet materialized. 
In a recent paper Hu and Jefferson (2009) investigate the factors that help explain the surge 
in Chinese patenting observed during the post-TRIPS era. They find that the intensification of 
R&D in China explains only a small percentage of the increase in patenting. Their analysis points 
to increased FDI as a significant explanatory factor behind increased Chinese patenting, along with 
the changes in Chinese patent law that took place in 2000 and China’s accession to the WTO in 
2001. Since the latter two factors were captured by year dummies (for 2000 and 2001) in their 
analysis, it is hard to be fully certain that the underlying factors were indeed patent reforms and 
China’s WTO accession but it is difficult to imagine other more important and relevant policy 
changes in China during those two years.  
Asian Emergence and the Current Policy Environment 
The empirical evidence discussed in this chapter indicates that the scale of innovative activity 
in China has increased dramatically during the post TRIPS era. India too has experienced an 
increase in such activity, although to a much smaller extent. These facts are noteworthy because 
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prior to the ratification of TRIPS, frictions between the US and China and US and India over 
violations of IPRs were fairly common. For example, both countries have been frequently listed 
under the Super 301 annual list of trading partners that have been deemed to be engaged in unfair 
trading practices by the US government. Does the changing global landscape of innovation imply 
that international frictions over the enforcement of IPRs are a thing of the past? This is almost 
surely not the case although the nature of underlying problems seems to have evolved.  
Through-out the 1980s and early 1990s, US-China frictions over IPRs had to do with the 
widespread imitation of US products and technologies by Chinese firms as well as the infringement 
of copyrights. While these issues have not entirely gone away, several new ones have emerged in 
recent years. One of the major complaints that the US government has expressed about the current 
policy environment in China has to do with its policy of forcing foreign firms to share their 
technologies as a precondition for access to the local market. Starting in 1994, China started to 
impose specific technology transfer requirements on foreign firms wishing to enter its local 
market.  This quid pro quo policy of exchanging market access for technology is best understood 
in the context of China’s “indigenous innovation policy”. This policy was first promulgated in 
2009 by the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) when it provided conditions 
that would determine whether or not new products in six major industries could be viewed as 
having been the result of indigenous innovation. Only products that were deemed to be indigenous 
would be included in the catalog of approved government procurement lists, thereby setting up 
conditions for potential preferential treatment of indigenous innovation.  
As Maskus (2012) explains, this focus on indigenous innovation can easily run afoul of the 
national treatment obligation of TRIPS and raised substantial concern among foreign enterprises 
owning IPRs. In response to these concerns and other external pressures, MOST circulated a 
revised and weaker draft of the indigenous innovation policy in 2010. At this time, there is 
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considerable uncertainty regarding the true nature and actual implementation of this policy. Rest 
assured, if discrimination against foreign innovators becomes widespread or systemic, one would 
expect the dispute settlement process of the WTO to play an active role in refereeing and clarifying 
this Chinese policy.  
During the Uruguay Round negotiations (when China was not a member of GATT), India 
was a leading opponent of strengthening IPR protection in developing countries. But TRIPS came 
to pass and India had to significantly alter its patent regime in order to comply with TRIPS. Since 
developing countries had been given up to 10 years to make their IPR regimes TRIPS compliant, 
India’s introduced significant patent reforms in 2005. Prior to these policy changes, India did not 
recognize product patents for pharmaceuticals. As a result, prior to the 2005 patent reforms, reverse 
engineering and imitation were rampant in India and were indeed the key drivers behind the 
development of India’s robust pharmaceutical industry. The explicit recognition of product patents 
in 2005 made an imitation based development strategy unviable for Indian. The focus now seems 
to have shifted toward increased collaboration with multinational firms in order to participate more 
vigorously in the global R&D chain, with an eye towards moving from imitation to innovation.  
In 2012, frictions between India and the pharmaceutical multinational Bayer flared up when 
India issued a compulsory license for Bayer’s cancer drug Nexavar. This episode raised the 
possibility that India could try to use its substantial manufacturing capacity in the area of 
pharmaceuticals to break patents held by foreign firms thereby weakening its IPR regime while 
still maintaining TRIPS compliance. However, since then India has not issued any further 
compulsory licenses; in fact, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion recently rejected 
a request for compulsory licensing because the Indian generic producer (BDR Pharmaceutical) 
seeking the compulsory license had failed to try to obtain a voluntary license from the patent-
holder (Briston-Myers Squibb), as is required under TRIPS rules.   
 118 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The face of global innovation is changing, particularly within Asia. Like in world trade, the 
major story in the realm of intellectual property has been the emergence of China on the global 
stage. While one can question the quality of patents issued by China to domestic residents, their 
quantity is impressive and beyond dispute. 
What are the implications of the changes in global landscape in the area of intellectual 
property that have been witnessed during the post TRIPS era? Perhaps the most important is this: 
the scope for frictions among major nations such as US and China may have been reduced with 
the emergence of Chinese innovation and with the recognition among China’s policy-makers that 
they need to improve the quality of local innovation. This implies that China now has a stronger 
interest in protecting intellectual property than it did two decades or so ago when TRIPS was 
ratified.  
A similar argument applies to the US-India relationship. Today, the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry is warmer to the idea of stronger intellectual property protection than it has ever been in 
the past. It is clear that stronger IPR protection is necessary for the Indian industry to participate 
in global R&D in a manner that is commensurate with its technological capabilities. If this process 
is hampered, it is difficult to see how India can transform itself from simply being a “pharmacy to 
the world” to an engine of innovation in the pharmaceutical sector, an area where it has developed 
significant technological capacity.  
Till date, this capacity has not translated into any major new innovations, something that is 
more likely to happen if the Indian industry starts to collaborate more with major multinationals 
as opposed to merely playing an imitative role, as it has done in the past. Some of the emerging 
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empirical evidence regarding the rise of international co-inventions suggests that this has indeed 
begun to happen. 
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APPENDIX 
A.1 Proofs from Chapter I 
Proof of Proposition I.1: Adding Eqs. (I.10) and (I.11) for countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 respectively 
yields  
 
2(𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚) − 𝜋 =
𝛾
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖+𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)(𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖) + (𝑀𝑖 +
𝑀𝑗)𝐶𝑐?̅?].  
(A.1) 
and 
 
2(𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚) − 𝜋 =
𝛾
𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗+𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑗
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)(𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗 + 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑗) + (𝑀𝑖 +
𝑀𝑗)𝐶𝑐?̅?].  
(A.2) 
It is easy to see that the right-hand sides of Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) are monotonic 
functions of total protections 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖  and 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗 + 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑗  respectively. And they 
must also be equal to each other since the left hands sides of the two equations are the 
same. It follows that we must have 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
∗ = 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗
∗ + 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ . Hence Eqs. (I.10) and 
(I.11) immediately imply that 𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ > 𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗  for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐹. □ 
Proof of Proposition I.3: We first show part (ii). Adding up the first-order conditions for 
𝛺𝑖 and 𝛺𝑗 under NT yields 
 2(𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚) − 𝜋 =
𝛾
𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗+𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑗
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)(𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗 + 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑗) + (𝑀𝑖 +
𝑀𝑗)𝐶𝑐?̅?].  
(A.3) 
Comparing Eq. (A.3) with either Eq. (A.1) or (A.2) and noting the monotonicity of the 
right-hand sides of these conditions regarding effective patent protection, we must have 
 𝑃𝑁𝑇 = 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗
𝑁𝑇 = 𝑃∗, 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐹  
  
 
which establishes (ii).  
Now notice that since 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 < 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜇𝑖𝜋 < 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚, we must have 
 𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ > 𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇 > 𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐹  
which is the desired result. 
Finally, when countries are symmetric we may focus on the symmetric equilibria 
where 𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝛺𝑗𝑗
∗ , 𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝛺𝑗𝑖
∗  under discrimination and 𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇 = 𝛺𝑗
𝑁𝑇, under NT. Then Eqs. 
(A.1) and (A.3) together imply that 
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1
𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ +𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ [(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)(𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ + 𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ ) + 2𝐶𝑐?̅?] =
1
2𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇 [(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)2𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇], 𝑖, 𝑗 =
𝐻, 𝐹.  
(A.4) 
Monotonicity of both sides ensures that we must have 𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ + 𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ = 2𝛺𝑖
𝑁𝑇. □ 
Proof of Proposition I.4: One can obtain the first-order conditions for country 𝑗 by 
reversing 𝑖 and 𝑗 in Eqs. (I.13) and (I.14). It is easy to show that 
 𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ (𝜃) =
𝐶𝑐?̅?
(2+𝛾)(𝐶𝑐−𝐶𝑚)−𝜋
[(1 + 𝛾) −
𝜂𝜃(𝐶𝑐−𝐶𝑚−𝜋)
𝐶𝑐−𝜃𝐶𝑚
]   
and 
 𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝜃) =
𝐶𝑐?̅?
(2+𝛾)(𝐶𝑐−𝐶𝑚)−𝜋
[
(1+𝛾)(𝐶𝑐−𝐶𝑚)−𝜋
𝐶𝑐−𝜃𝐶𝑚
−
𝜂
𝜃
],   
where 𝜂 = 𝑀𝑗/𝑀𝑖. It follows that 𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ (𝜃) decreases in 𝜃 since 
𝜂𝜃(𝐶𝑐−𝐶𝑚−𝜋)
𝐶𝑐−𝜃𝐶𝑚
 is an increasing 
function of 𝜃. 
Similarly, 𝛺𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝜃) increases in 𝜃 since 
(1+𝛾)(𝐶𝑐−𝐶𝑚)−𝜋
(𝐶𝑐−𝜃𝐶𝑚)
−
𝜂
𝜃
 is an increasing function of 
𝜃. Moreover, it can be shown that 
 𝑃𝑖
∗(𝜃) = 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖
∗ (𝜃) + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖
∗ (𝜃) = 
𝛾𝐶𝑐?̅?
(2+𝛾)(𝐶𝑐−𝐶𝑚)−𝜋
[𝑀𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗
𝜃(𝐶𝑐−𝜃𝐶𝑚)
𝐶𝑐−𝜃𝐶𝑚
] 
  
 
Clearly, since 𝑀𝑗
𝜃(𝐶𝑐−𝜃𝐶𝑚)
𝐶𝑐−𝜃𝐶𝑚
 is an increasing function of 𝜃, 𝑃𝑖
∗(𝜃) is increasing in 𝜃. □ 
Proof of Proposition I.5: We know that 𝛺∗(𝜃) satisfies the following first-order 
condition: 
 2𝐶𝑐 − (1 + 𝜃)𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 =
𝛾
(1+𝜃)𝛺∗(𝜃)
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)(1 + 𝜃)𝛺
∗(𝜃) +
(1 + 𝜃)𝐶𝑐?̅? − 𝜃(1 − 𝜃)𝐶𝑚𝛺
∗(𝜃)].  
(A.5) 
Similarly, 𝛺𝑑
∗ (𝜃) and 𝛺𝑓
∗(𝜃) respectively satisfy the following first order conditions 
 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 =
𝛾
𝛺𝑑
∗ (𝜃)+𝜃𝛺𝑓
∗ (𝜃)
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑑
∗ (𝜃) + 𝐶𝑐?̅?]  
  
 
and 
 𝐶𝑐 − 𝜃𝐶𝑚 =
𝛾
𝛺𝑑
∗ (𝜃)+𝜃𝛺𝑓
∗ (𝜃)
[(𝜃𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑓
∗(𝜃) + 𝐶𝑐?̅?].  
  
 
Adding up the last two equations we obtain 
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 2𝐶𝑐 − (1 + 𝜃)𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 =
𝛾
𝛺𝑑
∗ (𝜃)+𝜃𝛺𝑓
∗ (𝜃)
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝛺𝑑
∗ (𝜃) + 𝜃𝛺𝑓
∗(𝜃) +
(1 + 𝜃)𝐶𝑐?̅? − 𝜃(1 − 𝜃)𝐶𝑚𝛺𝑓
∗(𝜃)].  
(A.6) 
Moreover, it can be shown that 𝛺𝑑
∗ (𝜃) > 𝛺𝑓
∗(𝜃), which further implies that . Since the 
right-hand sides of Eqs. (A.5) and (A.6) must be equal, and since both are decreasing 
functions of 𝛺𝑑(𝜃) + 𝜃𝛺𝑓(𝜃) and (1 + 𝜃)𝛺(𝜃), we may conclude that 
 𝑀 (𝛺𝑑
∗ (𝜃) + 𝜃𝛺𝑓
∗(𝜃)) > 𝑀(1 + 𝜃)𝛺∗(𝜃).  □   
Proof of Proposition I.6: Here, we show that it is socially optimal to discriminate even 
when 𝛺𝑖𝑖 = ?̅?. Suppose 𝛺𝑖𝑖 = ?̅? and 𝛺𝑖𝑗 < ?̅?. Here we must have 𝛺𝑗𝑖 > 0 and 𝛺𝑖𝑗 = 0. It 
follows that country 𝑖 discriminates (i.e. 𝛺𝑖𝑖 > 𝛺𝑖𝑗). To show country 𝑗 also discriminates 
(i.e. 𝛺𝑗𝑗 > 𝛺𝑗𝑖), suppose 𝛺𝑗𝑖 > 0 (otherwise we are done). Note that the social planner's 
FOC for 𝛺𝑗𝑗  is given by 
 
𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 =
𝛾
𝑃𝑗(𝜃)
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)(𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗 + 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑗) + (𝑀𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗)𝐶𝑐?̅? −
(1 − 𝜃)𝐶𝑚𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑖𝑗]  
(A.7) 
Since 𝛺𝑖𝑗 = 0, this simplifies Eq. (A.7) as 
 𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝑚 − 𝜋 =
𝛾
𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗
[(𝐶𝑚 − 𝐶𝑐)𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗 + (𝑀𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗)𝐶𝑐?̅?]  (A.8) 
Comparing Eq. (A.7) with Eq. (A.8), we see that the left-hand side of Eq. (A.8) is 
smaller than that of Eq. (A.7). This implies that the right-hand side of Eq. (A.8) is also 
smaller than that of Eq. (A.7). We next show that 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗 . Suppose 
not, i.e., suppose we have 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖 > 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗 . Since 𝜃 ≤ 1 , we have 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗 <
𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖. Then it follows that the left-hand side of Eq. (A.8) is 
larger than that of Eq. (A.7), which constitutes a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗 . 
Note that since 𝛺𝑗𝑖 is increasing in 𝜃 (so that it attains its maximum value at 𝜃 = 1) 
while 𝛺𝑗𝑗  is independent of 𝜃, if we can show that 𝛺𝑗𝑗 > 𝛺𝑗𝑖 at 𝜃 = 1 then it must be this 
inequality holds for all 𝜃 . When 𝜃 = 1 , we have 𝑀𝑖𝛺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖 = 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗 . This 
immediately implies 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑖 < 𝑀𝑗𝛺𝑗𝑗 from which it follows that 𝛺𝑗𝑖 < 𝛺𝑗𝑗, i.e. given that 
country 𝑖 is discriminating, it is socially optimal to have country 𝑗 discriminate under free 
trade. Moreover, 𝛺𝑗𝑖  falls while 𝛺𝑗𝑗  does not change as 𝜃  decreases, so 𝛺𝑗𝑖 < 𝛺𝑗𝑗 
continues to hold when 𝜃 < 1. □ 
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A.2 Proofs from Chapter II 
Table A.1 Expressions for the thresholds of 𝜃 and 𝑠 
Thresholds for 𝜃  
Autarky 𝜃𝐴𝑈 =
3(1 − 𝑐)
2𝑠
 
NT 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 =
𝑐(2 − 𝑐)
2𝑠
 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 =
𝑐(2 − 𝑐)
2
 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑁 =
2𝑐(2 − 𝑐)
3𝑠
 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 =
2𝑐(2 − 𝑐)
3
 
MR 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 =
𝑐(20 − 3𝑐)
6𝑠(1 + 𝑐)
 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 =
𝑐(20 − 17𝑐)
6(1 − 𝑐)
 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀 =
𝑐(8 + 3𝑐)
3(1 + 𝑠)(1 + 𝑐)
 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑀 =
𝑐(8 − 11𝑐)
3(1 + 𝑠)(1 − 𝑐)
 
Others 𝜃𝑐𝑚 =
4𝑐(2 − 𝑐)
3(1 + 𝑠)
 𝜃𝑐𝑛 =
7𝑐2
3(1 − 𝑠 + 𝑐 + 𝑠𝑐)
 
Thresholds for 𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑀 =
20 − 23𝑐 + 3𝑐2
20 + 3𝑐 − 17𝑐2
 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 =
3(2 − 𝑐)(1 − 𝑐)
20 − 17𝑐
 
 
Proof of Proposition II.4: First, we prove that it is not optimal to apply discriminatory 
standards in country 𝐴. Let us define 𝜃𝑐1
𝐷  such that 
 𝑤𝑤({𝐿, 𝐻}, {𝐻, 𝐻}) > 𝑤𝑤({𝐻, 𝐻}, {𝐻, 𝐻}) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐1
𝐷 ,   (A.9)  
where 𝜃𝑐1
𝐷 =
𝑐(8+3𝑐)
6𝑠(1+𝑐)
. Similarly, we can find 𝜃𝑐2
𝐷  such that 
 𝑤𝑤({𝐿, 𝐿}, {𝐻, 𝐻}) > 𝑤𝑤({𝐿, 𝐻}, {𝐻, 𝐻}) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐2
𝐷 ,  (A.10)  
with 𝜃𝑐2
𝐷 =
𝑐(8−11𝑐)
6𝑠(1−𝑐)
. It can be shown that 
 𝜃𝑐1
𝐷 < 𝜃𝑐2
𝐷 .   (A.11)  
Therefore, for all 𝜃  such that it is optimal to choose the discriminatory policy profile 
({𝐿, 𝐻}, {𝐻, 𝐻}) over ({𝐻, 𝐻}, {𝐻, 𝐻}), the NT profile ({𝐿, 𝐿}, {𝐻, 𝐻}) would actually yield 
high world welfare than ({𝐿, 𝐻}, {𝐻, 𝐻}). Hence social optimality requires country 𝐴 to 
never discriminate against the foreign firm. 
Now examine the case for country 𝐵. We can analogously find 𝜃𝑐3
𝐷  that makes the 
following condition hold: 
 𝑤𝑤({𝐿, 𝐿}, {𝐻, 𝐻}) > 𝑤𝑤({𝐿, 𝐿}, {𝐿, 𝐿}) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑐3
𝐷 ,   (A.12)  
where 𝜃𝑐3
𝐷 =
𝑐(8−11𝑐)
6(1−𝑐)
. Also we may calculate 𝜃𝑐4
𝐷  such that 
 𝑤𝑤({𝐿, 𝐿}, {𝐻, 𝐻}) > 𝑤𝑤({𝐿, 𝐿}, {𝐿, 𝐿}) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑐3
𝐷 ,   (A.13)  
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where 𝜃𝑐4
𝐷 =
𝑐(8+3𝑐)
6(1+𝑐)
. It is straightforward to check that 
 𝜃𝑐3
𝐷 > 𝜃𝑐4
𝐷 .   (A.14)  
Hence whenever the discriminatory policy profile ({𝐿, 𝐿}, {𝐻, 𝐻})  dominates 
({𝐿, 𝐿}, {𝐿, 𝐿}), it must also be dominated by the NT profile ({𝐿, 𝐿}, {𝐻, 𝐻}). This implies 
that discrimination from country 𝐵 is not socially optimal either. □ 
Proof of Proposition II.7: As the pattern of equilibrium varies with 𝑠, it would be helpful 
to compare the two types of agreements over various ranges of 𝑠. Given c < 1/4, lemma 
1 implies that 𝑠 is minimized at 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4) ≈ 0.73. Hence we may consider two cases: 
s < 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4)  and 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4) ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 1 . Note that in the former case unique 
equilibrium is guaranteed, while in the latter case multiple equilibria could occur depending 
on the value of c. 
Case 1 (unique equilibrium is guaranteed). s < 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4). 
We use four thresholds obtained above: 𝜃𝑢
𝑁, 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 under NT and 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 , 𝜃𝑙
𝑀  under MR. 
First, it is easy to check that 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀, i.e. country 𝐴 is more likely to choose lax standards 
under MR because (i) part of the externality is borne by country 𝐵; (ii) profit is shifted to 
the domestic firm. Similarly, we have 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 implying country 𝐵 also tends to lower the 
standard under MR for the same reasons. Next, it can be show that there exists a unique 
threshold 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 such that 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 if and only if s < 𝑠𝑏
𝑀. Moreover, it is straightforward to 
show that 
 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 − 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4) < 0.     
Therefore we have two subcases to examine: s < 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 and 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 < 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4). 
Case 1.1. s < 𝑠𝑏
𝑀. 
Given s ≤ 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 the ordering of the thresholds is 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀. First note that 
for 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑁  and 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 , NT and MR lead to the same policy profiles, i.e. (𝐿, 𝐿) and 
(𝐻, 𝐻)  and are equally efficient. For 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 , NT induces (𝐿, 𝐻)  while the 
equilibrium under MR is (𝐻, 𝐻) . Recall that (𝐿, 𝐻)  dominates (𝐻, 𝐻)  if 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 . 
Moreover, it can be shown that 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀, implying that MR prevails over 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 <
𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁  while NT is favored over 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 . Next consider 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁  where the 
equilibrium under MR changes to (𝐿, 𝐻). We can then find 𝜃𝑐𝑛 such that 
 ww𝑁(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) > ww𝑀(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑐𝑛,   (A.15)  
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Hence (𝐿, 𝐻) under NT dominates (𝐿, 𝐻) under MR if 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑐𝑛.
1 Then we need to compare 
𝜃𝑐𝑛 and 𝜃𝑙
𝑀. Some simple algebra shows that 
 𝜃𝑐𝑛 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀,   (A.16)  
which implies that welfare is always higher under NT for 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁. Finally consider 
the range 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀, where the externality is relatively high so that the equilibrium 
under NT is uniform high standards. We have shown that (𝐻, 𝐻) is preferred to (𝐿, 𝐻) if 
𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑀. Moreover, it is easy to check that 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 if and only if s < 𝑠𝑐
𝑀 where 𝑠𝑐
𝑀 is 
some threshold of 𝑠. But this must be the case because it can be verified that 𝑠𝑐
𝑀 > 𝑠𝑏
𝑀, so 
whenever s < 𝑠𝑏
𝑀  we must have s < 𝑠𝑐
𝑀 . Hence for all 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀  NT would yield 
higher welfare than MR. 
Thus we have shown that over s < 𝑠𝑏
𝑀, NT is more efficient for large values of the 
externality (𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀) but is dominated by MR when the externality is small (𝜃𝑙
𝑁 <
𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁). To compare the two agreements as asymmetry varies, note that by definition 1 
we may write 𝑟 in this case as 
 𝑟2 =
𝜃𝑢
𝑀 − 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁
𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 − 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 .    
Direct calculation shows that 
 
𝜕𝑟2
𝜕𝑠
< 0.  (A.17)  
Eq. (A.17) implies that as countries become more asymmetric (i.e. s lowers), NT would 
become more desirable by yielding strictly higher world welfare for a larger proportion of 
the externality. Next we examine the case when 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 < 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4). 
Case 1.2. 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 < 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4). 
In this case we have 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀. Again, for 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 and 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 NT and 
MR induce identical equilibrium outcome and are indistinguishable from the efficiency 
point of view. Now consider 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀 . We already know from Case 1.1 that MR 
dominates NT over 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁. Also it can be shown that 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 if and only if 
𝑠 < 3/4. This must be the case given we are considering 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4). Hence for 
𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 welfare is higher under NT. Next for 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀, we need to compare 
(𝐻, 𝐻) under NT with (𝐿, 𝐿) under MR. Recall ww(𝐻, 𝐻, 𝜃) > ww(𝐿, 𝐿, 𝜃) if 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑐𝑚 . 
Note that we must have 𝜃𝑐𝑚 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀. Moreover, comparing 𝜃𝑐𝑚 with 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 we know 
                                                     
1The reason underlying the tradeoff between (𝐿, 𝐻) under the two agreements is the following. The outcome 
(𝐿, 𝐻) under NT can be more efficient because the lenient standard is exclusively applied in country 𝐴 that 
values quality less. On the other hand, (𝐿, 𝐻) under MR can dominate as it induces more intense competition 
in both countries. When 𝜃 is small the gain from enhanced competition dominates so that (𝐿, 𝐻) under MR 
yields higher world welfare. On the other hand, welfare is higher for (𝐿, 𝐻) under NT when 𝜃 is large because 
it prevents the lenient standard from being used in country 𝐵. 
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 𝜃𝑐𝑚 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 < 3/5.  (A.18)  
It can be checked that 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 < 3/5. Hence if 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 < 𝑠 ≤ 3/5, then NT dominates over 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 <
𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀; if instead 
3
5
< 𝑠 < 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4), then MR performs better over 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑚 
while NT dominates over 𝜃𝑐𝑚 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀. 
Finally consider 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀, in which we compare (𝐻, 𝐻) under NT with (𝐿, 𝐻) 
under MR. We already know ww𝑀(𝐻, 𝐻, 𝜃) > ww𝑀(𝐿, 𝐻, 𝜃) if 𝜃 > 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀 . Moreover, we 
can check that 𝜃𝑐𝑢
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀. Hence NT dominates MR for all 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀. 
Depending on 𝑠, we can calculate 𝑟 in the following ways: 
 𝑟3 =
𝜃𝑢
𝑀 − 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁
𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 − 𝜃𝑙
𝑁  if 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 < s ≤ 3/5,  (A.19)  
 
 
 𝑟4 =
𝜃𝑢
𝑀 − 𝜃𝑐𝑚 + 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 − 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁
𝜃𝑐𝑚 − 𝜃𝑢𝑁 + 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 − 𝜃𝑙
𝑁  if
3
5
< s ≤ 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4). (A.20)  
As by definition 𝑟3 = 𝑟2, we know immediately: 
 
𝜕𝑟3
𝜕𝑠
< 0.   
Moreover, some algebra indicates that 
 
𝜕𝑟4
𝜕𝑠
< 0.    
Thus for all 𝑠𝑏
𝑀 < s ≤ 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4), we have shown that NT becomes more palatable as 
countries possess more heterogeneous preferences. 
Case 2 (possible multiple equilibria under MR): 𝑠 > 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4). 
In this case multiple equilibria could arise under MR depending on the value of 𝑐. In 
particular, for any 𝑐 < 1/4 unique equilibrium obtains if 𝑠(𝑐 = 1/4) < 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠(𝑐) while 
multiple equilibria occur if 𝑠(𝑐) < 𝑠. In the meantime we note that the relationship between 
𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 and 𝜃𝑢
𝑁 depends on s. In particular, the following can be shown to hold: 
 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 < 3/4. (A.21)  
Hence we will examine two subcases with 𝑠 < 3/4 and 𝑠 ≥ 3/4. As shown in Case 
1.2, when < 3/4 NT dominates for higher levels of the externality over 𝜃𝑐𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑁, 
while if 𝑠 ≥ 3/4 MR dominates over the entire range. Also let ĉ be such that 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = ĉ) =
3/4  which will be useful the following analysis. 
Case 2.1. 𝑠𝑎
𝑀(𝑐 = 1/4) < s < 3/4. 
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Again, depending on the value of 𝑐, we have either unique equilibrium under MR for 
3/4 < 𝑠 < 𝑠(𝑐) or multiple equilibria for 𝑠(𝑐) < 𝑠 < 1. But in both cases it is easy to see 
that NT dominates over 𝜃𝑐𝑚 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑢
𝑀  while MR is favored under 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑐𝑚 . 
Therefore, we can always calculate 𝑟 as 
 𝑟5 =
𝜃𝑢
𝑀 − 𝜃𝑐𝑚
𝜃𝑐𝑚 − 𝜃𝑙
𝑁 .  (A.22)  
Finally, we show that 𝑟5 first decreases and then increase as 𝑠 falls from 1, with the 
turning point 𝑠(𝑐) being a function of 𝑐 . Differentiate 𝑟5  with respect to 𝑠  and set the 
derivative equal to zero: 
 
𝜕𝑟5
𝜕𝑠
= 0,  (A.23)   
we can solve for a unique 𝑠(𝑐) such that Eq. (A.23) holds. It can be checked that 𝑠(𝑐) does 
belong to [3/4,1]. To see this, note it is possible to show that 
 
𝜕?̂?(𝑐)
𝜕𝑐
< 0,  (A.24)   
i.e. 𝑠(𝑐) is monotonically increasing in 𝑐. Moreover, we have 𝑠(𝑐 = 0) ≈ 0.77 ∈ [3/4,1] 
and 𝑠(𝑐 = 1/4) ≈ 0.8 ∈ [3/4,1]. Thus 𝑠(𝑐) ∈ [3/4,1] for all 𝑐 < 1/4. 
Moreover, it can be shown that: 
𝜕𝑟5
𝜕𝑠
> 0 for 𝑠(𝑐) < 𝑠 ≤ 1 and 
𝜕𝑟5
𝜕𝑠
< 0 for 3/4 < 𝑠 ≤
𝑠(𝑐). Thus we know as s fall from 1, 𝑟5 first decreases and then increases with the turning 
point being 𝑠(𝑐). □ 
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